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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND



FY22 THEATER POSTURE PLAN 1 NOVEMBER 2021

(b)(1)1.4a

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
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1 November 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~~(U)~~ REFERENCES. See USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-21	
~~(U)~~ Executive Summary.....	4
~~(U)~~ Chapter I: Strategic Narrative.....	12
I.1: Theater Vision and Objectives.....	12
I.2: Theater Strategy.....	12
I.3: Approach to Posture Development.....	13
I.4: Posture Initiatives.....	15
I.5: Emerging Requirements.....	17
~~(U)~~ Chapter II: Forces.....	22
II.1: Forces Gaps/Risks.....	22
II.2: Force Movements.....	24
~~(U)~~ Chapter III: Footprint.....	26
III.1: Footprint Gaps/Risk.....	26
III.2: Enduring Locations.....	29
III.3: Contingency Locations.....	34
~~(U)~~ Chapter IV: Agreements.....	37
IV.1: Status of Current Agreements.....	37
IV.2: Prioritizing Agreement Actions.....	63
~~(U)~~ Chapter V: Appendices.....	68
Appendix 1: Theater Maps.....	68
Appendix 2: Charts of Posture by Location.....	69
Appendix 3: Project Summary Sheets.....	100
Appendix 4: MILCON Prioritization.....	119
Appendix 5: Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations (ECNs).....	120
Appendix 6: EL and CL Closures.....	123
~~(U)~~ Acronyms.....	125

~~(U)~~ Executive Summary

1. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Strategic Concept. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Posture Status.

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ USAFRICOM accepts risk associated with its limited capacity to establish forces, footprint, and agreements in the AOR. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moreover, all USAFRICOM operations, activities, and investments are achieved with only 0.3% of total DOD resources—both fiscal and human. The command's efforts to maximize the potential of its resources are further magnified through leveraging its international and interagency partnerships.

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

2) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

3) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

4) ~~(S//NF)~~ Finally, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

c. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

. Each identified gap will be addressed in the impending Africa Posture Implementation Team (APIT) and the Diplomatic Security Augmentation Posture Implementation Team (DPIT) as appropriate. Each emerging requirement is addressed below.

1) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

2) (~~S//REL FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

1. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

d. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

1) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM will strive to become or sustain its standing as the regional partner of choice. (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]

2) (S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]

3) (S//REL FVEY) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]

e. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM is advancing the following six posture footprint initiatives during FY22.

1) ~~(EU)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Change of Lead Service at CSL N'Djamena. USAFRICOM implemented a change of lead Service for CSL N'Djamena. CSL N'Djamena was established with the Air Force as the lead Service. However, the predominant user of the site has been the U.S. Army for the last several years. Accordingly, USAFRICOM coordinated with the affected Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff to effect a change of lead Service from the U.S. Air Force to the U.S. Army. (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

4 and 5) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

6) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

f. ~~(U)~~ Agreement Priorities.

1) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM establishes agreement priorities on the basis of a tiered risk framework, prioritizing the establishment of agreements to enable risk-mitigated operations, activities and investments. These priorities are subject to change after the TPP is signed out on the basis of reordered priorities arising from DoD decisions on the employment of forces throughout the AOR. Note that some locations will have multiple considerations associated with the risk-based framework:

a) ~~(U)~~ Countries with ongoing operations/deployments with insufficient legal protections (e.g., C-VEO operations: personnel with legal/status protection risk).

b) ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations that have insufficient legal protections or access guarantees (e.g., New Normal posture locations with access-related mission accomplishment risk).

c) ~~(U)~~ Countries in which USAFRICOM is conducting or planning to conduct multilateral exercises with insufficient legal protections or access.

d) ~~(U)~~ Countries with potential priority missions with insufficient legal protections (e.g., competition missions).

2) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Current U.S. agreement priorities are:

a) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

b) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

c) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ A(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g

d) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

e) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

f) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

g) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

h) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

4. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Conclusion. USAFRICOM continues to deploy its forces, footprint, and agreements in a strategically-informed and operationally-flexible manner. This approach

optimizes its potential to achieve U.S. strategic objectives and USAFRICOM theater objectives across the span of assigned missions. (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FY22 USAFRICOM Posture Footprint ~~(UNCLAS)~~

(b)(1)1.7e



~~(U)~~ Chapter 1: Strategic Narrative

1.1 ~~(U)~~ *Theater Vision and Objectives.* The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Campaign Plan (ACP) has four objectives: Gain and Maintain Strategic Access & Influence, Disrupt Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) Threats to U.S. Interests, Respond to Crises to Protect U.S. Interests, and Coordinate Action with Allies & Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives. All of these are intended to reach an endstate that has identified, countered, disrupted, and deterred adversary and competitor activities in Africa; prevented VEOs from posing a threat to the U.S. homeland; and retained the strategic and operational access, influence, and partnerships necessary to conduct crisis and contingency operations. All of these efforts contribute to Department of Defense (DoD) and whole of government efforts to enhance regional security, stability, and prosperity.

1.2 ~~(U)~~ *Theater Strategy.*

1. ~~(U)~~ Africa measures nearly 5,000 miles from north to south and more than 4,600 miles at its widest point from east to west. This accounts for a total land area of more than 11.7 million square miles in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR), or 3.5 times the size of the continental U.S. The continent sits astride geostrategic global maritime crossroads critical to U.S. security and economic interests. The population of the continent is home to significant social, economic, political, resource, and infrastructural diversity. However, low confidence in national institutions, growing urbanization, changing weather patterns, growing demand for water, burgeoning youth populations, persistent economic inequality, and pervasive corruption fuel political, religious, economic, and social instability. Chronic instability, driven by the lack of representative institutions, and the inability of many states to govern effectively, permits VEOs and other malign actors to leverage ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, and accomplish goals at odds with African stability, security, and prosperity.

2. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ The ACP was written to align with national strategic guidance over a five year period. It is informed by national policy outlined in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and other policy documents. ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ USAFRICOM views operational access as the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ The key to campaign success is effective employment (campaign “ways”) of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI), (campaign “means”) to align with USAFRICOM’s four interrelated campaign objectives (campaign “ends”). USAFRICOM will invest in resource-informed and high-return OAI, pursue reforms, and share costs and risks of achieving mutual security objectives with allies and partners. ~~(b)(1)1.4g~~,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. (U) Additionally, the USAFRICOM Commander issues the annual USAFRICOM Campaign Order (ACO) as the means by which the staff, components, and subordinate commands are directed to execute OAI in support of the campaign.

c. (U) The Theater Posture Plan (TPP) is a critical supporting document for the five-year ACP and also aligns with key national direction. It is informed by national policy outlined in the INSSG, the NSS, the NDS, and other policy documents.

3. (S//NF) USAFRICOM accepts risk associated with its limited capacity to establish forces, footprint, and agreements in the AOR. Adjusting posture locations and associated forces from one location to another to address evolving and reprioritized operational demands induces the risk of a perceived U.S. withdrawal from Africa. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

, (b)(1)1.4g

USAFRICOM relies on and appreciates the close cooperation of OSD(P) to facilitate the conclusion of the relevant international agreements and arrangements.

1.3 (U) Approach to Posture Development.

1. (U) USAFRICOM posture incorporates the forces, footprint, and agreements that support joint and combined operations and plans in the USAFRICOM AOR. Additionally, given its central geography, USAFRICOM supports steady state and contingency operations in both the USCENTCOM and USEUCOM AORs. For instance, in the event of crisis, USCENTCOM forces will transit through the USCENTCOM AOR in close proximity to USAFRICOM posture locations, meaning support from key USAFRICOM locations is critical. A related consequence of posture footprint decisions is the expression of U.S. strategic intent. This understanding is based on DODI 3000.12, which indicates "Foreign and overseas posture is...central to defining and communicating U.S. strategic interests to allies, partners, and adversaries." While USAFRICOM acknowledges posture is likely insufficient on its own to produce a desired competitive outcome, when coupled with other operations, activities, and investments, posture footprint can make a key, even essential, contribution to such an outcome.

2. (U) Given limited resources, USAFRICOM arranges its forces, footprint, and agreements to support its strategic objectives within the AOR, anticipating the need for flexibility and

repositioning in response to a dynamic theater. For this reason, USAFRICOM also relies on posture footprint in the USEUCOM and USCENTCOM AORs.

3. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

As a result of these evolving demands, USAFRICOM posture has been adjusted throughout the AOR since the Combatant Command's (CCMD) inception, responding to dynamic threats, priorities, and crises. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ In the context of geopolitical competition, USAFRICOM's posture approach begin with the presumption that presence helps to create influence, access, and opportunity. The commitment expressed to partners through presence is powerful. (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

U.S. forces and footprint to the Bab al-Mandab (BAM) chokepoint helps assure military access, power projection, and the free flow of commerce through that critical strait, particularly during crisis.

5. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ As noted above, USAFRICOM's dynamic posture approach enables it to respond to evolving challenges throughout the AOR while ensuring the most economical approach to mission accomplishment. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Though additional resources

would logically permit enhanced operational and strategic outcomes, the artful positioning of footprint capable of addressing multiple challenges helps ensure continued achievement of U.S. strategic objectives—even when no forces are permanently based at those locations. Further, collaborating with partners and allies with consolidated posture locations helps achieve mutually advantageous aims with reduced initial investment, fewer forces, and lower recurring costs. One way USAFRICOM could collaborate with OSD to improve posture flexibility in the USAFRICOM AOR is through an expanded approach to concluding agreements with willing partners. (b)(1)1.4a

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ Timing and Context of Submission. At the point of submission of the USAFRICOM FY22 TPP, the Global Posture Review process has initiated subordinate reviews of USAFRICOM posture through the APIT and the DPIT. (b)(1)1.4a

1.4 ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Posture Initiatives. (b)(1)1.4a

. Alongside the potential for new requirements from the ongoing GPR, APIT, DPIT and emerging priorities of the current administration, USAFRICOM posture initiatives (footprint) include the following:

1. (S//REL FVEY) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

. Currently, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

2. (S//NF) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. (S//REL FVEY, FRA) Change of Lead Service for CSL N'Djamena. CSL N'Djamena was established with the lead Service as the U.S. Air Force. However, the predominant user of the site has been the U.S. Army for the last several years leading to continuing efforts to change the lead Service. The lead Service change was delayed in FY19 by an agreement to delay between Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and Headquarters Air Force (HAF). (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM currently intends to retain N'Djamena as an enduring location. For this reason, the lead Service change described above was also undertaken. USAFRICOM coordinated with the affected services, OSD, and the Joint Staff to implement the change of lead service from the U.S. Air Force to the U.S. Army on 1 October 2021. Real property will be transferred by 30 April 2022.

4. (S//REL FVEY) Close and remove CL Bamako, Mali from the Contingency Location Master List (CLML). (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

USAFRICOM components have no anticipated operational requirement for CL Bamako.

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]. Given GPR guidance to economize its posture footprint, and in consonance with U.S. foreign policy, USAFRICOM has decided to remove CL Bamako from the CLML. USAFRICOM will coordinate the timing of the closure of CL Bamako to maximize its political impact in support of U.S. and allied policy aims.

5. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Close and remove CL Wajir, Kenya from the CLML. (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM components have no anticipated operational requirement for CL Wajir. In light of GPR guidance to economize its posture footprint, USAFRICOM will remove CL Wajir from the CLML.

6. ~~(U)~~ Evaluate Realignment of Ascension Island under Alternative Combatant Command. FOS Ascension Island has no USAFRICOM equities. It is manned by service-retained forces, supports the activities of USTRANSCOM and USSPACECOM, and provides global capabilities for DOD. In pursuit of additional functional efficiencies, USAFRICOM proposes that FOS Ascension Island be realigned under a different CCMD (e.g., USTRANSCOM, USSPACECOM, other) during FY22.

1.5 ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Emerging Requirements. The evolving security dynamic in the USAFRICOM AOR necessitates an ongoing assessment to anticipate and respond with posture adjustments as required. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. ~~(U)~~ West Africa Operations.

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

USAFRICOM will strive to become, or sustain its standing as the regional partner of choice. The potential requirements for west African posture footprint that advance USAFRICOM operations and activities against competitors will be continuously evaluated as conditions dictate in order to achieve a position of advantage over competitors. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. (~~S//REL FVEY~~) Counter-VEO Operations in west Africa. (b)(1)1.4a

USAFRICOM

operations, activities, and investments enable regional operations necessary to increase security and provide time and space for the development of institutional capabilities and capacities. USAFRICOM provides the U.S. with the opportunity to hedge against threats at very low cost and without permanent commitments. This approach is aligned with the National Security Council's (NSC) regional strategies. USAFRICOM will coordinate and operate with littoral partners in their maritime Economic Exclusion Zones to reduce sources of instability that are eroding partner resiliency against VEO expansion. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

2. (U)(b)(1)1.4a

a. (~~S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

3. (S//REL FVEY)(b)(1) 1.4g

a. (S//NF)(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

b. (S//REL FVEY)(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

c. (S//REL FVEY)(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

e. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

f. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)l.4a, (b)(1)l.4d, (b)(1)l.4g

g. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

h. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

i. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chapter II: Forces

II.1 ~~(S)~~ Forces Gaps/Risks. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 22 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

1. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ The WRN, inclusive of PR/CSAR, is a critical capability required to respond to threats, assure partners, and address urgent life-saving needs of deployed USAFRICOM forces. Timely recovery from point of incident, rapid evacuation, and the potential transportation to higher echelons of medical care is a moral imperative, not just an operational requirement. (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

e. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

c. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

4. (~~S//REL FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

a. (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

b. (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

II.2 (~~U~~) Force Movements.

1. (~~C~~) Overseas Force Structure Changes (OFSC). (b)(1) 1.7e

[REDACTED]

2. (~~U~~) Movement of Rotational/Allocated Forces. USAFRICOM presently has no planned movements of rotational/allocated forces that may have policy significance.

Table 1. (~~U~~) Overseas Force Structure Changes (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)

(b)(1) 1.4a

~~(U)~~ Chapter III: Footprint

III.1 ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Footprint Gaps/Risk. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4a
[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Crisis Response Posture Location in Southern Africa. On September 7, 2021, the Combatant Commander, USAFRICOM established a temporary contingency location in southern Africa in response to a deteriorating security situation (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]. Specific security concerns in southern Africa relate to Eswatini, South Africa, and Mozambique, the concerns surrounding which are developed below. With respect to ensuring the CL can support potential crisis response requirements, USAFRICOM is working within the scope of the CCCR's authority to prepare the site for use during crisis response.

a. ~~(U)~~ Recent protests in Eswatini led to ambassadorial approval for authorized departure from Embassy Mbabane of eligible family members and non-emergency personnel. The fragility of the Eswatini government amid significant popular dissatisfaction with its enduring autocratic government created the dynamic that led to the Ambassador's decision. In this case, the government has been condemned for excessive violence including the use of live ammunition to quell protests. In a second example, South Africa is struggling with a loss of confidence in the government following three successive waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. The arrest of former President Zuma for contempt of court led to violent protests and the deployment of the military to keep order. In both these cases (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

c. (S//REL FVEY) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

d. (S//REL FVEY) (b)(1)1.4a
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

2. (S//REL FVEY) Posture Locations in West Africa to Support Coastal West Africa C-VEO operations.

a. (S//REL FVEY) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
[Redacted]

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

c. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

d. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

3. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]. These requirements will be evaluated during the upcoming APIT process.

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

c. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Camp Lemonnier's missions (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
supports a wide range of missions and functions, including hosting Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA), supporting operations for USCENTCOM, supporting the East Africa Response Force and crisis response, and supporting Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) with PR and CASEVAC. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

III.2 ~~(U)~~ Enduring Locations

I. ~~(U)~~ Forward Operating Sites (FOS). USAFRICOM has two FOSs within its AOR, Ascension Island and Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. USAFRICOM is also heavily reliant on enduring locations in the United States European Command (USEUCOM) AOR, including prominently in the United Kingdom (Croughton, Lakenheath, Mildenhall, and Molesworth), in Germany (Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, Ramstein, Landstuhl, and Baumholder), in Italy (Aviano, Naples, Sigonella, Vicenza, and Livorno), in Spain (Rota, and Morón), in Greece (Souda Bay), and in Cyprus (Akrotiri).

a. ~~(U)~~ Ascension Island is a sovereign British overseas territory hosting U.S. forces and capabilities, (b)(1) 1.7e

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is a U.S. Navy installation in the Horn of Africa (HOA) adjacent to a Djiboutian commercial port and airfield (ICAO: FHAW). CLDJ

supports USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and numerous other mission functions. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

CLDJ is a FOS that, while austere, is under continual development from a dominantly expeditionary footprint to a more permanent one to meet its long-term mission requirements.

2. ~~(U)~~ Cooperative Security Locations (CSL). USAFRICOM has 12 CSLs in its AOR engaged in a diverse range of operational missions.

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Dakar, Senegal. CSL Dakar is a Type 2 CSL, meaning it was established to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., C-SA/MAD. While currently under review to ensure the related standards can support an expanding range of potential mission forces, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Niamey, Niger. CSL Niamey (also referred to as Airbase 101) is located at the Diori Hamani Airfield (ICAO: RVLD). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Agadez, Niger. CSL Agadez (also referred to as Airbase 201) is located on a purpose-built facility near Agadez, Niger. CSL Agadez supports security force assistance activities and armed ISR for counterterrorism operations in north, west, and central Africa. Operationally, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

d. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ N'Djamena, Chad. CSL N'Djamena is located at Hassan D'Jamous International Airport (ICAO: FTTJ). U.S. forces share part of the military portion of the airfield with Chadian and French forces, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.4b

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.4b

CSL N'Djamena's lead Service transitioned from the U.S. Air Force to the U.S. Army on 1 October 2021.

e. ~~(U)~~ Accra, Ghana. CSL Accra is a Type 2 CSL located in Accra, Ghana and comprised of facilities on Kotoka airfield (ICAO: DGAA). CSL Accra was established to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., C-SA/MAD. CSL Accra also supports the civil affairs and engagement activities of the Accra-based Regional Civil Military Support Element (CMSE). Additionally, CSL Accra supports theater security cooperation activities as needed, and provides access for USTRANSCOM multimodal distribution activities. CSL Accra has no routine U.S. force presence. Among other locations, CSL Accra will be considered for

integration into emerging west Africa missions and manned ISR missions related to both C-VEO and maritime domain awareness operations.

f. ~~(U)~~ Libreville, Gabon. CSL Libreville is a Type 2 CSL located in Libreville, Gabon at the Leon M'Ba International Airport (ICAO: FOOL). As required, CSL Libreville supports theater security cooperation activities and foreign humanitarian assistance missions. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

CSL Libreville has no routine U.S. force presence. The United States has been negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Gabon for five years without success. For this reason, USAFRICOM drafted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to permit the United States to undertake force protection-related construction at the CSL. The MOU has not yet been concluded either. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

g. ~~(U)~~ Entebbe, Uganda. CSL Entebbe is a Type 2 CSL established to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., C-SA/MAD. CSL Entebbe is located at Entebbe International Airport (ICAO: HUEN). CSL Entebbe currently has no routine U.S. force presence.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

h. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Chebelley, Djibouti. CSL Chebelley (CADJ) is part of the Djibouti Base Cluster and is located approximately 20km from CLDJ from which it draws much of its support. The CADJ airfield is French-owned. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

CSL Chebelley supports ISR, counterterrorism, security force assistance, and contingency response missions, primarily with the MQ-9.

(b)(1)1.4a

i. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Baledogle, Somalia. CSL Baledogle is located at Baledogle airfield, Somalia. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

j. (S//REL FVEY) Mogadishu, Somalia. CSL Mogadishu is located at the Mogadishu International Airport. Collocated with CSL Mogadishu are missions and personnel from the African Union and United Nations. CSL Mogadishu primarily provides security support for the U.S. Embassy and its personnel that are also collocated. (b)(1)1.4a

k. (S//REL FVEY) Manda Bay, Kenya. CSL Manda Bay is comprised of Manda Bay Airfield and Camp Simba. CSL Manda Bay recently received significant growth in personnel and

(b)(1) 1.4a

l. (S//REL FVEY) Mombasa, Kenya. CSL Mombasa includes two sites, one located at the Moi International Airport and a second at the Mtongwe Navy Base three miles away. CSL Mombasa provides support to stage and sustain forces as required, (b)(1)1.4a

3. (U) Multimodal locations. In addition to USAFRICOM specific posture locations, USTRANSCOM's Enroute Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) identifies en route locations which are crucial to the support of Combatant Command requirements and worthy of long-term investment. Such investment may be through sustaining existing posture, enhancing infrastructure at overseas locations, or strengthening host nation relationships with a focus on commercial capacity to foster assured access. These locations include not only those identified in this TPP where the U.S. currently enjoys considerable freedom of access, but also those where access is limited or non-existent, and where USTRANSCOM, in coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), intends to pursue access over the next 2 to 5 year period. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

USTRANSCOM products and processes such as the TRANSCOM Posture Infrastructure Steering Committee (TPISC).

III.3 ~~(U)~~ Contingency Locations. USAFRICOM has eight Contingency Locations of which two are planned for closure, Bamako, Mali and Wajir, Kenya.

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ Bizerte, Tunisia. CL Bizerte is located at Sidi Ahmed Airbase (ICAO: DTTB) near Bizerte, Tunisia. CL Bizerte was used to support ISR operations using unmanned aerial systems, typically MQ-9. CL Bizerte's proximity to the Mediterranean Sea is problematic for flight operations as a result of frequent climatological impacts limiting visibility. (b)(1)1.4a

CL Bizerte retains two large area maintenance shelters (LAMS), but is otherwise void of equipment. At this point, the primary utility of this contingency location is a sign of DOD's continued support to Tunisia. Determining CL Bizerte's future is a current posture initiative in consideration of the likelihood that other relevant activities can be undertaken from this location.

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4b

2. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Misrata, Libya. CL Misrata is located on the coast in the city of Misrata, Libya, and functioned as a SOF operating location. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3. ~~(U)~~ Bamako, Mali. CL Bamako is located at Bamako Senou Airfield. (b)(1)1.4a

Bamako will be removed from the CLML for FY22. USAFRICOM will coordinate the timing of the closure of CL Bamako to maximize the political impact in support of U.S. and allied policy aims.

4. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Ouallam, Niger. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

5. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Diffa, Niger. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6. ~~(U)~~ Wajir, Kenya. CL Wajir is located on Wajir airfield, adjacent to the town of Wajir, Kenya. There is no access agreement, USAFRICOM property, or routine presence at CL Wajir, nor is any envisioned for the foreseeable future. For the reasons outlined in Chapter I, CL Wajir will be removed from the CLML for FY22.


7. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Kismayo, Somalia. CL Kismayo is located at Kismayo airfield, Somalia. CL Kismayo (b)(1)1.4a
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CL Kismayo is also collocated with United Nations and African Union missions.

8. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Table 2. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM Contingency Locations (Table classified ~~S//REL FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



~~(U)~~ Chapter IV: Agreements

IV.1 ~~(U)~~ Status of Current Agreements

1. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(U)~~ Future and Pending Agreements:

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Kenya Agreement. (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S)~~ Djibouti Implementing Arrangement (IA). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ The United States and Niger have access agreements covering the U.S. use of Nigerien sites at Niamey and Agadez. (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

e. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Somalia (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

f. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ Gabon (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

g. ~~(S//NF)~~ Equatorial Guinea (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

h. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

i. (~~S//REL FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4b [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Table 3. (U) Status of Current USAFRICOM International Agreements (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)

(b)(1)1.4b									
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
(b)(1)1:4b

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1:4b


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1:4b



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1:4b



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


(b)(1)1:4b

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1:4b



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1:4b

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1:4b

(b)(1)1.4b

Table notes:

- A) Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) that do not meet the provisions of the global SOFA template (GST) or agreements in NATO that do not provide for a standing waiver of jurisdiction is highlighted in yellow.
- B) Any limitation on access, access only through non-binding instruments, or access without a grant of operational control is highlighted in yellow.
- C) Host Nation Support agreements pertain only to those instruments that provide financial or in-kind contributions for logistics or infrastructure support. Standard SOFA or access provisions for tax exemptions, land use, movement facilitation, etc. do not constitute a Host Nation Support agreement.
- D) Countries eligible for logistics support agreements, but that do not yet have any in force, are highlighted in yellow.

IV.2: ~~(U)~~ Prioritizing Agreement Actions.

1. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM establishes agreement priorities on the basis of a tiered risk framework, prioritizing the establishment of agreements to enable risk-mitigated operations, activities, and investments. These priorities are subject to change after the TPP is signed out on the basis of reordered priorities arising from DOD decisions on the employment of forces throughout the AOR. Note that some locations will have multiple considerations associated with the risk-based framework:

- a. ~~(U)~~ Countries in which there are ongoing U.S. operations/deployments, but that provide insufficient legal protections (e.g., C-VEO operations for which there is a legal/status protection risk for participating personnel).
- b. ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations, but that provide insufficient legal protections or access guarantees (e.g., New Normal posture locations with access-related mission accomplishment risk).
- c. ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations at which U.S. forces are conducting or planning to conduct multilateral exercises for which insufficient legal protections or access guarantees exist.
- d. ~~(U)~~ Countries with posture locations with potential priority missions with insufficient legal protections (e.g., competition missions).

2. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM has developed a methodology to prioritize its agreement initiatives based on factors drawn from command strategic guidance. This approach sums an assessment of relevant factors to produce a numerically expressed priority list subject to CCDR review and confirmation. The strategic factors include:

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

c. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

d. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

e. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

f. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


g. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a




~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Table 4. ~~(U)~~ Priority of Required Agreements (Table classified S//REL FVEX)


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4b



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4b



~~(U)~~ Chapter V: Appendices

~~(U)~~ Appendix 1: Theater Maps. The map below incorporates USAFRICOM posture locations for FY22, and further depicts the USEUCOM posture locations on which USAFRICOM relies for a range of requirements.

FY22 USAFRICOM Posture Footprint ~~UNCLAS~~


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
~~(U)~~ Appendix 2: Charts of Posture by Location

1. Thebephatshwa, Botswana.....	70
2. N'Djamena, Chad.....	71
2. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.....	73
3. Chebelley, Djibouti.....	75
4. Libreville, Gabon.....	77
5. Accra, Ghana.....	78
6. Manda Bay, Kenya.....	79
7. Mombasa, Kenya.....	81
8. Wajir, Kenya (to be closed).....	82
9. Misrata, Libya.....	84
10. Bamako, Mali (to be closed).....	85
11. Agadez, Niger.....	86
12. Diffa, Niger.....	88
13. Niamey, Niger.....	89
14. Ouallam, Niger.....	91
15. Dakar, Senegal.....	92
16. Baledogle, Somalia.....	93
17. Kismayo, Somalia.....	94
18. Mogadishu, Somalia.....	95
19. Bizerte, Tunisia.....	96
20. Entebbe, Uganda.....	97
21. Ascension Island, United Kingdom.....	98

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d




(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d




(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b) (6), (b)(3)10 USC § 130b




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(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b) (6), (b)(3)10 USC § 130b




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
(b) (6), (b)(3)10 USC § 1305

[REDACTED]


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(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b) (6)




(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b) (6)




(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(6), (b)(3)10 USC § 130b
[Redacted text block containing multiple paragraphs of information, all obscured by black bars.]

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b) (6)




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


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
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


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


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
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
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[REDACTED]


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
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
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
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
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
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(b) (6), (b) (3) 10 USC § 130b [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Appendix 3: Project Summary Sheets. The following military construction projects are ordered in terms of priority by fiscal year.

1. Fiscal Year 25

(b)(1)1.7e

2. Fiscal Year 26

(b)(1)1.7e


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
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(b)(1)1.7e


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g



~~(S)~~ Appendix 4: MILCON Prioritization (Table Classified SECRET)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



(U) Appendix 5: Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations (ECN)

1. (U) ECN: CSL N'Djamena, Chad – Change Lead Service to U.S. Army

a. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

[REDACTED]

c. (U) Discussion

(1) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) The current arrangement enabling mission execution is a 1 April 2018 memorandum of understanding (MOU) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

[REDACTED]

(3) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

(4) ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(5) (U) (b)(1) 1.4a



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Table 5. (U) Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations

(b)(1) 1.7e

~~(U)~~ Appendix 6: EL and CL Closures

1. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM proposes the closure of two contingency locations, (b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED].

a. ~~(U)~~ CL (b)(1)1.7e was established during FY15. Since then it has had no routine presence by U.S. forces. Accordingly, no lead Service is assigned, no access agreements have been put in place, no U.S. property exists at the location, and no construction is anticipated. There is currently no operational requirement registered by USAFRICOM or its subordinate components. For these reasons, USAFRICOM intends to close CL (b)(1)1.7e. USAFRICOM will coordinate the timing of the closure of CL (b)(1)1.7e to maximize the political impact in support of U.S. and allied policy aims.

b. ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ CL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b was established as a temporary contingency location in FY14. Since then it has had no routine presence by U.S. forces. The lead Service for CL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b is the U.S. Air Force, but no BOS-I is assigned. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is currently no operational requirement registered by USAFRICOM or its subordinate components. For these reasons, USAFRICOM intends to close CL (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b during FY22.

Table 6.4(U) Contingency Location Closures

(b)(1)1.7e

~~(U)~~ Acronyms

AA	Access Agreement
ACP	USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
ACO	USAFRICOM Campaign Order
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
AFAFRICA	U.S. Air Forces Africa
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APIT	Africa Posture Implementation Team
APOE/D	Aerial Port of Embarkation/Debarcation
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASC	Airport Services Contract
ASP	Ammunition Storage Point
ATOC	Air Terminal Operations Center
BAM	Bab al-Mandab
BH	Boko Haram
BOS	Base Operating Support
BPLAN	Base Plan
BM	Ballistic Missile
C2	Command and Control
C2F	Command and Control Facility
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CCMD	Combatant Command
CEMIRT	Civil Engineer Maintenance, Inspection, and Repair Team
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CL	Contingency Location
CLDJ	Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti
CLML	Contingency Location Master List

CLU	Containerized Living Units
CM	Cruise Missile
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMSE	Civil-Military Support Element
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
C-SA/MAD	Crisis Response – Security Augmentation and Military Assisted Departure
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSL	Cooperative Security Location
CT	Counterterrorism
C-VEO	Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
DA	Direct Action
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
DIPNOTE	Diplomatic Note
DJBC	Djibouti Base Cluster
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DPIT	Diplomatic Security Augmentation Posture Implementation Team
EARF	East Africa Response Force
ECN	ELML Change Nomination
ELML	Enduring Location Master List
ERC	Exercise-Related Construction
ESPCS	Expeditionary Space Control Squadron
EXORD	Execute Order
F/W	Fixed-wing
FAA	Facilities Access Agreement
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FOS	Forward Operating Site

FP	Force Protection
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GFM	Global Force Management
GFMAP	Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GPEC	Global Posture Executive Council
GPR	Global Posture Review
HAF	Headquarters, Air Force
HN	Host Nation
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HTHR	High-Threat/High-Risk
IA	Implementing Arrangement
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INSSG	Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
IO	Information Operations
ISIS	Islamic State
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCC	Joint Cyber Center
JTF-HOA	Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
KNAV	Kenyan Navy
LAMS	Large Area Maintenance Shelter
LSA	Life Support Area
MARFORAF	U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NARF	North and West Africa Response Force

NAVAF	U.S. Naval Forces Africa
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	Net Square Feet
NSS	National Security Strategy
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OAI	Operations, Activities, and Investments
OJS	Operation JUNIPER SHIELD
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSDP	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
P&D	Planning and Design
PCR	Planning Charette Report
PLANORD	Planning Order
PR	Personnel Recovery
QRC	Quick Reaction Capability
R/W	Rotary-wing
RPA	Remotely Piloted Aircraft
SAP	Special Access Programs
SECFOR	Security Force
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCAFRICA	Special Operations Command Africa
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSA	Secured Sensitive Areas
STO	Special Technical Operations

TPP	Theater Posture Plan
TPISC	USTRANSCOM Posture Initiative Steering Committee
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UFC	Unified Facilities Criteria
UMMC	Unspecified Minor Military Construction
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces Europe
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAG	U.S. Army Garrison
USAREUR-AF	United States Army Europe – Africa
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USG	U.S. Government
USSF	United States Space Force
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations
WRN	Warfighter Recovery Network