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**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND**



**ANNEX K
USAFRICOM CAMPAIGN PLAN
(FY24 THEATER POSTURE PLAN)
01 NOVEMBER 2023**

(b)(1) 1.4a

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
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01 November 2023

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~~(U)~~ Executive Summary

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



4. ~~(S)~~(b)(1) 1.4a



5. ~~(S)~~ USAFRICOM establishes agreement priorities based on a tiered risk framework, prioritizing the establishment of agreements intended to enable risk-mitigated operations, activities and investments. (b)(1) 1.4a



The identified priorities are subject to change after the CCDR signs the TPP based on reordered priorities arising from decisions regarding the employment of forces throughout the AOR and further engagement with host nation partners.

6. USAFRICOM continues to employ its forces, footprint, and agreements in a strategically informed and operationally flexible manner. This approach optimizes its potential to achieve U.S. strategic objectives and USAFRICOM theater objectives across the span of assigned missions. However, urgent force and footprint shortfalls must be addressed to lessen risk as USAFRICOM continues to accomplish assigned objectives, to include responding to the emerging challenges and opportunities of strategic competition.

FY24 USAFRICOM Posture Footprint (U)



~~(U)~~ Chapter 1: Strategic Narrative

1.1. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ Theater Vision and Objectives. (b)(1) 1.4a

1.2. ~~(U)~~ Theater Strategy.

1. ~~(U)~~ Africa measures nearly 5,000 miles from north to south and more than 4,600 miles at its widest point from east to west, accounting for a total land area of more than 11.7 million square miles. The continent sits astride geostrategic global maritime crossroads critical to U.S. security and economic interests. Africa is home to significant social, economic, political, resource, and infrastructural diversity; however, low confidence in national institutions, weak governance, growing urbanization, changing weather patterns, an increasing demand for food and water, burgeoning youth populations, a growing shortage of economic opportunities, persistent economic inequality, and pervasive corruption, help fuel political, religious, economic, and social instability. Chronic instability, driven by the lack of representative institutions, and the inability of many states to govern effectively, permits VEOs and other malign actors to leverage ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, and accomplish goals at odds with African stability, security, and prosperity.

2. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ The key to campaign success is effective employment (campaign “ways”) of OAIs, (campaign “means”) to align with USAFRICOM’s four interrelated campaign objectives (campaign “ends”). (b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a

b. ~~(U)~~ The annual USAFRICOM Campaign Order (ACO) is the means by which the command directs the staff, components, and subordinate commands to execute OAI ISO the campaign.

c. ~~(U)~~ The TPP is a critical supporting document for the five-year ACP and aligns with key national direction. It is informed by national policy outlined in the NSS, the NDS, GPR guidance, and other policy documents.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ USAFRICOM accepts risk associated with its limited capacity to establish forces, footprint, and agreements in the AOR. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.4d


USAFRICOM relies on the close cooperation of Office of the Secretary of Defense, Plans and Posture [OSD (P&P)] to facilitate the conclusion of the relevant international agreements and arrangements.

1.3. ~~(U)~~ *Approach to Posture Development.*

1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

(b)(1) 1.4a



a. ~~(S//REL)~~(b)(1) 1.4a



b. ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1) 1.4a



c. ~~(U)~~ Mission Area 3: Advance Innovative Methods. Mission area 3 concludes the competition metaphor, seeking advantage by changing USAFRICOM's approach to theater posture to conform to GPR guidance to develop new ways of operating in response to posture and resource limitations. Advancing innovative methods improves flexibility within the USAFRICOM posture footprint network that incorporates a close analysis of existing, posture-related processes to better align forces, footprint, and agreements with a dynamic set of operational demands.

1.4. ~~(U)~~ *Posture Initiatives.*

1. ~~(U)~~ West Africa.

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g



d. ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c



e. ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c



f. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



g. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



h. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



i. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g




j. ~~(U)~~ Identify and nominate an enduring location in the coastal west African states to regain partnered operational reach for C-VEO limit and prevent operations and monitor RPN expansion.


1) ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



2) ~~(S)~~(b)(1) 1.4a



3) ~~(S//RELIDO)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g




(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g



4) (~~S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



5) (~~S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g




6) (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



7) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



8) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




9) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



a) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



b) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




c) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




10) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



a) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



b) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




11) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g



12) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



k. ~~(U)~~ Evaluate the potential to relocate CSL Dakar, Senegal. Following an updated U.S. Air Force (USAF) airfield assessment prioritized in FY24, determine the feasibility of Ouakam Airbase (IATA: DKR) to host the U.S. CSL for the next 5-10 year timeframe.

1) ~~(CU)~~ The facilities currently hosting CSL Dakar, Senegal at Ouakam Airbase are adequate to currently support this mission. A 2019 USAF airfield assessment noted the runway is deteriorating, taxiway and ramp concerns, bird strike mitigation issues, and a lack of functioning navigation aids. During a January 2023 engagement, the team observed substantial Senegalese monetary investment and improvement to critical shortfalls at DKR, with multiple projects ongoing. These included updated force protection measures, newly installed navigational aids, and improvements to taxiways and parking ramps. The Senegalese are also in the midst of constructing a new Presidential hangar and recently refurbished the VIP terminal. The DKR Support Commander relayed his specific intent to mitigate remaining U.S. concerns through future infrastructure enhancement, but requested assistance with vegetation control and mitigation to bird strikes.

2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g




2. ~~(U)~~ Southern Africa.

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



1) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



(b)(1) 1.4a



2) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g




4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



3. ~~(U)~~ East Africa (Somalia Persistent Presence).

a. ~~(U)~~ Refine T-CL Berbera Operational Requirements.

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



2) ~~(U)~~ Berbera, Somalia is an exceptionally unique location with extensive potential to support USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and USINDOPACOM operations. Berbera is a multi-modal location incorporating ground, seaport, and airport facilities within a small radius. Somali authorities have demonstrated significant interest in using the same facilities to enable parallel security cooperation activities with the U.S. The UAE is also constructing a new naval facility within three kilometers of the existing airfield. Somaliland forces are a willing potential partner with available multimodal infrastructure that could support real-world operations or habitual exercises.

3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



5) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



b. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



c. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



d. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a




e. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a




1) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a




2) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



3) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




I.5 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Emerging Requirements. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



Chapter II: Forces

II.1 ~~(S)~~ Forces Gaps/Risks. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



1. ~~(U)~~ Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.


a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4g



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



d. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4g



2. ~~(S//NF)~~ Vertical Lift.

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g



3. ~~(U)~~ Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD).

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4g



c. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b



4. ~~(U)~~ Personnel Recovery (PR) / Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC).

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(U)~~ CCDR WRN response requirements are defined as:

1) ~~(CUI)~~ Low-risk locations & operations: Recover all isolated personnel within 4 hours, surgical care within 6 hours.

2) ~~(CUI)~~ Moderate risk: Recovery & resuscitative care within 2 hours, surgical care within 4 hours.

3) ~~(CUI)~~ Significant risk: Recovery & resuscitative care within 2 hours, surgical care within 3 hours.


4) ~~(CUI)~~ Recovery & resuscitative care within 1 hour, surgical care within 2 hours.

c. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e



Surgical and trauma care sourcing that adheres to the WRN operational requirements requires aeromedical evacuation capabilities for East and West Africa to support episodic high-risk operations, and regional contingency and crisis response requirements.

d. ~~(U)~~ Joint Staff has validated USAFRICOM GFM requests for Personnel Recovery Task Force-Heavy ISO North/West Africa since (b)(1) 1.7e



5. ~~(U)~~ Non-lethal Weapons-Intermediate Force Capabilities (NLW-IFC).

a. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM & partners NLW-IFC gaps.

1) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



2) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b



b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a




c. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



II.2 ~~(U)~~ Force Movements.

1. ~~(C//U)~~ Overseas Force Structure Changes (OFSC). (b)(1) 1.7e



2. ~~(U)~~ Movement of Rotational/Allocated Forces. USAFRICOM presently has no planned movements of rotational/allocated forces that may have policy significance. (b)(1) 1.7e



This location is 790 nautical miles away (one-way) to where the preponderance of operations in East Africa take place. Significant improvements in all other posture locations would have to be made in order to

support the entire package. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g





Table 1. ~~(S)~~ Overseas Force Structure Changes (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

~~(U)~~ Chapter III: Footprint

III.1 ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Footprint Gaps/Risk. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g



1. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ East Africa. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.4b



b. ~~(U)~~ West Africa.

1) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4c, (b)(1) 1.4g



2) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



2. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



c. ~~(S)~~(b)(1) 1.4a




3. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ West Africa. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ North Africa. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



III.2 ~~(U)~~ Enduring Locations

1. ~~(U)~~ Forward Operating Sites. USAFRICOM has four FOSs within its AOR, Ascension Island, CLDJ, CADJ, and Manda Bay, Kenya. USAFRICOM is also heavily reliant on enduring locations in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) AOR, including prominently in the United Kingdom (Croughton, Lakenheath, Mildenhall, and Molesworth), in Germany (Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, Ramstein, Landstuhl, and Baumholder), in Italy (Aviano, Naples, Sigonella, Vicenza, and Livorno), in Spain (Rota and Morón), in Greece (Souda Bay), and in Cyprus (Akrotiri).

a. ~~(U)~~ Ascension Island is a sovereign British overseas territory hosting U.S. forces and capabilities. (b)(1)1.7e



b. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. FOS CLDJ is currently supported by the U.S. Navy in the Horn of Africa (HOA), adjacent to a Djiboutian commercial port and


airfield (ICAO: HDAM). (b)(1) 1.4a



c. ~~(S// REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ Chebelley, Djibouti. FOS CADJ is part of the Djibouti Base Cluster and is located approximately 20km from CLDJ, from which it draws much of its support. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




d. ~~(S// REL USA, FVEY)~~ Manda Bay, Kenya. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



2. ~~(S)~~ Cooperative Security Locations (CSL). USAFRICOM has 11 CSLs in its AOR that support a diverse range of operational missions.

a. ~~(S// REL USA, FVEY)~~ Dakar, Senegal. (b)(1)1.4b




(b)(1) 1.4a



b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Niamey, Niger. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Agadez, Niger. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c




d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ N'Djamena, Chad. CSL N'Djamena is located at Hassan D'Jamous International Airport (ICAO: FTTJ). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




e. ~~(U)~~ Accra, Ghana. CSL Accra is a Crisis Response CSL located in Accra, Ghana at Kotoka International Airport (IATA: ACC / ICAO: DGAA) within the Ghanaian Air Force Base within Burma Camp. CSL Accra was established to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., SA/MAD. CSL Accra also supports the civil affairs and engagement activities of the Accra-based Regional Civil Military Support Element (CMSE). Additionally, CSL Accra supports theater security cooperation activities as needed, and provides access for USTRANSCOM multimodal distribution activities. CSL Accra has no routine U.S. force presence. The lead Service has raised concerns over space limitations associated with the CSL; however, the site remains fully capable of supporting crisis response operations with appropriate risk reduction waivers and mitigations emplaced.

f. ~~(U)~~ Libreville, Gabon. CSL Libreville is a Crisis Response CSL located in Libreville, Gabon at the Leon M'Ba International Airport (ICAO: FOOL). As required, CSL Libreville supports theater security cooperation activities and foreign humanitarian assistance missions. CSL Libreville is also a USTRANSCOM global aerial en route and multimodal location. USAFRICOM established CSL Libreville to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., SA/MAD. CSL Libreville has no routine U.S. force presence, but has historically been used to support Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS with expected future use. The U.S. has been negotiating a DCA with Gabon since 2016 without success, with substantial engagements immediately prior to the 2023 elections. For this reason, USAFRICOM drafted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to permit the U.S. to undertake pending, required force protection-related construction at the CSL. (b)(1) 1.7e



Gabonese airport officials have communicated through the U.S. Embassy in Libreville their intent to construct a perimeter road that will impact the CSL. During construction there will be impacts to ammunition storage and will require some reconfiguration of the site upon completion. (b)(1) 1.7e



If

USAFRICOM is able to receive the necessary operational control/unimpeded access to CSL Libreville, this location has the potential to host increased use from both U.S. and allied forces for exercises and security force assistance OAs.

g. ~~(U)~~ Entebbe, Uganda. CSL Entebbe is a Crisis Response CSL established to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., SA/MAD. CSL Entebbe is located on the military side of Entebbe International Airport (ICAO: HUEN). CSL Entebbe currently has no routine U.S. force presence. (b)(1) 1.7e

[REDACTED] The CSL is currently supported with an Access MOU.

h. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Baledogle, Somalia. CSL Baledogle is located at Baledogle airfield, Somalia. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g

i. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Kismayo, Somalia. CSL Kismayo is located at Kismayo airfield, Somalia. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b

j. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Mogadishu, Somalia. CSL Mogadishu is located at the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) (b)(1) 1.4a

k. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Mombasa, Kenya. (b)(1) 1.4a

(b)(1) 1.4a

3. ~~(U)~~ Multimodal locations. In addition to USAFRICOM specific posture locations, USTRANSCOM's En route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) identifies en route locations which are crucial to the support of CCMD requirements and are worthy of long-term investment. Such investment may be through sustaining existing posture, enhancing infrastructure at overseas locations, or strengthening host nation relationships with a focus on commercial capacity to foster assured access. These locations include not only those identified in this TPP where the U.S. currently enjoys considerable freedom of access, but also those where access is limited or non-existent, and where USTRANSCOM, in coordination with the CCMDs with assigned AORs, intends to pursue access over the next 2 to 5 year period. (b)(1)1.7e

ERIMP updates are aligned with the latest published DOD strategic guidance, CCMD TPPs, and other USTRANSCOM products and processes such as the TRANSCOM Posture Infrastructure Steering Committee (TPISC).

III.3 ~~(U)~~ Contingency Locations.

1. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM has six Contingency Locations (CLs). Table 2 is a summary of USAFRICOM's CLs.

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Misrata, Libya. CL Misrata is located on the coast in the city of Misrata, Libya. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Ouallam, Niger. CL Ouallam is located 1km west of the town of Ouallam, Niger. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Diffa, Niger. CL Diffa is located on the Nigerien Military Base directly north of the city of Diffa, approximately 4 km south of the airport. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Berbera, Somalia. T-CL Berbera is located at Berbera Airport, Somalia. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



e. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Gaborone, Botswana. CL Gaborone is located at Sir Seretse Khama International Airport, Botswana, established on 04 August 2022. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



f. ~~(S//NF)~~ Bizerte, Tunisia. CL Bizerte is located at Sidi Ahmed Airbase (ICAO: DTTB) near Bizerte, Tunisia. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




Table 2. ~~(S)~~ USAFRICOM Contingency Locations (Table classified ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1) 1.4a

~~(U)~~ Chapter IV: Agreements

IV.1 ~~(U)~~ Status of Current Agreements

1. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Future and Pending Agreements:

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Gabon DCA. USAFRICOM seeks the conclusion of DCA negotiations with the Government of Gabon for status protections of U.S. DOD personnel and access and use of areas and facilities at CSL Libreville, Gabon. (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Kenya Access Arrangement. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Botswana Access MOU. With the addition of a posture location at the Gaborone International Airport, USAFRICOM requires an access MOU to establish unimpeded access/operational control (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Somalia DCA. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b




Table 3. ~~(S)~~ Status of Current USAFRICOM International Agreements (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d


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
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d




(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d




(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d




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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

Table notes:

- A) ~~(EUH)~~ Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) that do not meet the provisions of the global SOFA template (GST) or agreements in NATO that do not provide for a standing waiver of jurisdiction is highlighted in yellow.
- B) ~~(EUH)~~ Any limitation on access, access only through non-binding instruments, or access without a grant of operational control is highlighted in yellow.
- C) ~~(EUH)~~ Host Nation Support agreements pertain only to those instruments that provide financial or in-kind contributions for logistics or infrastructure support. Standard SOFA or access provisions for tax exemptions, land use, movement facilitation, etc. do not constitute a Host Nation Support agreement.

IV.2. ~~(U)~~ *Prioritizing Agreement Actions.*

1. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM establishes agreement priorities on the basis of a tiered risk framework, prioritizing the establishment of agreements to enable risk-mitigated operations, activities, and investments. These priorities are subject to change after the TPP is signed out on the basis of reordered priorities arising from DOD decisions on the employment of forces throughout the AOR. Note that some locations will have multiple considerations associated with the risk-based framework:

a. ~~(U)~~ Countries in which there are ongoing U.S. operations/deployments, but that provide insufficient legal protections (e.g. C-VEO operations for which there is a legal/status protection risk for participating personnel);

b. ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations, but that provide insufficient legal protections or access guarantees (e.g. NEW NORMAL posture locations with access-related mission accomplishment risk);

c. ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations at which U.S. forces are conducting or planning to conduct multilateral exercises for which insufficient legal protections or access guarantees exist; and

d. ~~(U)~~ Countries with posture locations with potential priority missions with insufficient legal protections (e.g. competition missions).

2. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM has developed a methodology to prioritize its agreement initiatives based on factors drawn from command strategic guidance. This summation of relevant factors produces a numerically expressed priority list, subject to CCDR review and confirmation. The strategic factors include:

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

e. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

f. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


g. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Table 4. ~~(U)~~ Priority of Required Agreements (Table classified S//~~PEL USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1) 1.4a



~~(U)~~ Chapter V: Appendices

~~(U)~~ Appendix 1: Theater Maps. The map below incorporates USAFRICOM posture locations for FY24, and further depicts the USEUCOM posture locations on which USAFRICOM relies for a range of requirements.

FY24 USAFRICOM Posture Footprint (U)




~~(U)~~ Appendix 2: Charts of Posture by Location

1. Accra, Ghana.....	60
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6. Bizerte, Tunisia.....	65
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8. Chebelley, Djibouti.....	67
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11. Entebbe, Uganda.....	70
12. Gaborone, Botswana.....	71
13. Kismayo, Somalia.....	72
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15. Manda Bay, Kenya.....	74
16. Misrata, Libya.....	75
17. Mogadishu, Somalia.....	76
18. Mombasa, Kenya.....	77
19. N'Djamena, Chad.....	78
20. Niamey, Niger.....	79
21. Ouallam, Niger.....	80

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
(b)(1)1.4a



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(b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



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
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(b)(1) 1.4a



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(b)(1) 1.4a



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) 1.4a




(b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a




(b)(1) 1.4a




(b)(1) 1.4a




(b)(1) 1.4a




(b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



(b)(1) 1.4a



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) 1.4a



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U)~~ Appendix 3: Project Summary Sheets. The following military construction projects are ordered in terms of priority by fiscal year.

1. Fiscal Year 26

- a. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Electrical Power Plant Phase B..... 82
- b. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Aircraft Parking Apron Expansion Phase 2..... 83
- c. FOS Chebelley, Djibouti: Prime Power Plant and Distribution..... 83

(b)(1) 1.7e

- f. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Combined Air Cargo Passenger Terminal..... 85
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- e. CSL Agadez, C-130 Ops & Maintenance Hanger..... 91

(U) Appendix 3: Project Summary Sheets. The following military construction projects are ordered in terms of priority by fiscal year.

1. Fiscal Year 26

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

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(b)(1)1.7e

					(b)(1)1.7e		
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2. Fiscal Year 27

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

3. Fiscal Year 28

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e


(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

~~(S)~~ Appendix 4: MILCON Prioritization (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



~~(U)~~ Appendix 5: Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations (ECN)

1. ~~(U)~~ Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations

(b)(1) 1.7e

~~(S)~~ Appendix 6: Contingency Location Master List Change Nominations (CCN)

1. ~~(U)~~ None

(U) Appendix 7: EL and CL Closures

1. (U) USAFRICOM proposes the closure of one contingency locations, Bizerte, Tunisia.

a. ~~(S//REL-USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

able 7. (U) Contingency Location Closures

(b)(1) 1.7e

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ Acronyms

AA	Access Agreement
ACP	USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
ACO	USAFRICOM Campaign Order
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
AFAFRICA	U.S. Air Forces Africa
A-ISR	Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APIT	Africa Posture Implementation Team
APOE/D	Aerial Port of Embarkation/Debarcation
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASC	Airport Services Contract
ASP	Ammunition Storage Point
ATOC	Air Terminal Operations Center
BAM	Bab al-Mandab
BH	Boko Haram
BOS	Base Operating Support
BPLAN	Base Plan
BM	Ballistic Missile
C2	Command and Control
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CCMD	Combatant Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CL	Contingency Location
CLDJ	Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti
CLML	Contingency Location Master List
CLU	Containerized Living Units

CM	Cruise Missile
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMSE	Civil-Military Support Element
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
C-SA/MAD	Crisis Response – Security Augmentation and Military Assisted Departure
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSL	Cooperative Security Location
CT	Counterterrorism
C-VEO	Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
DA	Direct Action
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
DIPNOTE	Diplomatic Note
DJBC	Djibouti Base Cluster
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DPIT	Diplomatic Security Augmentation Posture Implementation Team
EARF	East Africa Response Force
ECN	ELML Change Nomination
ELML	Enduring Location Master List
ERC	Exercise-Related Construction
ESPCS	Expeditionary Space Control Squadron
EXORD	Execute Order
F/W	Fixed-wing
FAA	Facilities Access Agreement
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FOS	Forward Operating Site
FP	Force Protection

FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GFM	Global Force Management
GFMAP	Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GPR	Global Posture Review
HN	Host Nation
HR/HT	High-Risk/High-Threat
IA	Implementing Arrangement
ISIS	Islamic State
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JTF-HOA	Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
KNAV	Kenyan Navy
LAMS	Large Area Maintenance Shelter
LSA	Life Support Area
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NAVAF	U.S. Naval Forces Africa
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	Net Square Feet
NSS	National Security Strategy
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OAI	Operations, Activities, and Investments
OJS	Operation JUNIPER SHIELD
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PLANORD	Planning Order

PR	Personnel Recovery
QRC	Quick Reaction Capability
R/W	Rotary-wing
RPA	Remotely Piloted Aircraft
SA/MAD	Security Augmentation and Military Assisted Departure
SAP	Special Access Programs
SECFOR	Security Force
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCAF	Special Operations Command Africa
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSA	Secured Sensitive Areas
STO	Special Technical Operations
TPP	Theater Posture Plan
TPISC	USTRANSCOM Posture Initiative Steering Committee
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UFC	Unified Facilities Criteria
UMMC	Unspecified Minor Military Construction
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces Europe
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAG	U.S. Army Garrison
USAREUR-AF	United States Army Europe – Africa
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSF	United States Space Force

USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations
WRN	Warfighter Recovery Network