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USAFRICOM
Somalia Country Cooperation Plan FY 2017-2021



09 Jun 2016

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~~(U)~~ **1. Situation & Mission**

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Purpose.** The U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Country Cooperation Plan (CCP) implements the higher direction set forth in the ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~ and its subordinate commands for the country of Somalia, thereby managing the United States military relationship with the Somalia security forces and civil authorities. The CCP is the USAFRICOM Commander's instrument for communicating his intent and providing ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

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b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Mission.** USAFRICOM conducts steady state military engagement and interagency partnering activities with Somalia to enhance sub-Saharan security, disrupt ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

c. ~~(U)~~ **Background and Atmospherics.**

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

. During the next three to five years, Somalia's political leaders and international partners, including the Somali diaspora, must cooperate closely to secure a better future for Somalia's long-suffering people and to ensure that entities in Somalia do not generate serious instability in the region. Promoting a unified, peaceful, secure, democratic, and prosperous nation will require a holistic approach that focuses on liberating and holding territory from al-Shabaab control, enhancing the provision of basic services by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and developing appropriate institutions and political relationships across all regions of the country and all levels of government. The Department of Defense should ensure that such cooperation occurs in a ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

the Federal Government of Somalia and people. Moreover, all of our assistance projects – whether devoted to security, stabilization, humanitarian, and development needs – must permit appropriate engagement and visibility by all levels of the Somali government (federal, regional, and local) to enhance delivery of public services and to reinforce the relevance and importance of long-absent government institutions in the daily lives of Somali citizens.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia's economic recovery and resumption of growth after decades of misrule and conflict will promote both national and regional stability. The establishment of a regulatory framework for the management of natural resources, particularly petroleum and fisheries, will be an important first step in the development of those industries. Somalia needs a well-regulated commercial banking system. The investment climate needs improvement to enable businesses to develop, with monopolies prohibited, land tenure secured, and contract obligations protected. With international partners, USG will work to increase and diversify crop and livestock production, the mainstay of the Somali economy, and to expand opportunities for youth employment. The international community will also need to assist with returning refugee populations, as they present special challenges.

(4) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

(5) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia suffers from the lowest health and socio-economic indicators in the world. To reverse this situation, the International Community will need to help the Somali government increase its capacity to deliver basic services. Improved government revenue collection, functioning infrastructure, and the proper use of leased government lands will provide stability to the government and promote legitimacy among its people. However, partners support will be pivotal to the long-term success of the Somali government, particularly in the areas of education and health sectors, rehabilitating schools and clinics, training teachers and health workers, and helping to develop simple regulatory frameworks.

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(6) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Long-term stability will require establishment of inclusive, representative, and accountable governance. Somalia's political leadership has considerable work to do to meet its own timetable and goals for establishing states, reviewing the constitution and submitting it to a public referendum, and preparing for national elections in 2016. One of the most difficult elements in this process involves determining how the states, local districts, and the federal government will share revenue. While not dictating solutions, the international community will need to encourage development of proper relationships and sharing of revenue, including through the provision of advice and technical assistance.

d. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Strategic Priorities.**

(1) ~~(U)~~ **Chief of Mission (COM) Priorities.**

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

(b)(1) 1.7e

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The second COM priority is for economic recovery and growth for Somalia. Improving economic growth fosters U.S. foreign policy objectives of promoting peace and stability in Somalia by mitigating the underlying conditions that cause poverty and encourage violent extremism, instability, and terrorism. Unemployed, uneducated or excluded youth remain a particular priority for USG assistance given their vulnerability to recruitment by extremists or pirate networks. In order for the population to have a positive alternative to violent extremism or criminality, they need employment opportunities.

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Thirdly, COM desires an inclusive and accountable governance. The FGS assumed office in September 2012 with a mandate to establish federal units, review and ratify its Provisional Federal Constitution, and conduct nation-wide elections by 2016. Assuming progress in securing the country, FGS success in accomplishing these important nation-building objectives would increase the internal legitimacy of the FGS, build stronger partnerships among federal, regional, and local governments, and provide greater stability to a country emerging from more than 20 years of conflict.

(2) ~~(U)~~ **USAFRICOM Commander Priorities.**

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM Commander's priorities are to synchronize the actions of the Command and its subordinate commands across the ways available to the CCDR. (b)(1) 1.7e

, support humanitarian and disaster response, set the theater by securing required agreements, locations, intelligence, and command and control (C2) networks, set the force by ensuring that USG has the right capabilities, posture and presence to project, sustain, and (b)(1) 1.7e

Access and freedom of movement throughout Africa is assured. African states and regional organizations are willing and able to address transnational threats. African militaries operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international humanitarian and human rights laws, are representative of their populations, and contribute to stability in their respective states.

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities (PUSPF) and Access (b)(1) 1.7e

. The details linked to the execution of these enduring tasks are articulated in the TCP. Broad collection requirements, set the force requirements, and set the theater requirements for executing PUSPF contingency plans are articulated in TCP Annex CC CC (Contingency Plans).

(3) ~~(U)~~ **Partner Nation Priorities.**

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

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(b)(1) 1.7e

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The FGS is fully dependent on international assistance as (b)(1) 1.7e

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

(d) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia's rebuilding of security institutions will be combined with a stabilization strategy (b)(1) 1.7e

Key aspects of the stabilization strategy include reinstituting police, developing and institutionalizing the Somali civilian courts system, and a demobilization and reintegration campaign for former pirates and fighters, including al-Shabaab. The FGS will also need to integrate rural anti-Shabaab militia throughout Somalia and more formal security forces reporting to the semi-autonomous regional administrations in Puntland, ISWA, IGA, and IJA.

(U) Table 1-1: Alignment of Priorities
(Green highlight indicates support)

Priority

CCDR

COM

PN

(b)(1) 1.7e

e. ~~(U)~~ Resource Prioritization.

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ To inform future funding decisions, (b)(1) 1.7e

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e implement security assistance according to this CCP. (b)(1) 1.7e

1) Posture, 2) SFA, 3) Exercises and 4) Engagement. For Security Force Assistance activities, all

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parties will pursue acquisitions and activities that are in general alignment with the following prioritization: 1) Sustainment, 2) Movement and Maneuver, 3) Command and Control, 4) Protection, 5) Fires, 6) Intelligence capabilities.

f. ~~(U)~~ **International and Regional Engagement.**

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Several successive United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions have endorsed and expanded UN and international financing and equipping of AMISOM – an African Union peace support operation incorporating troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The most recent resolution (UNSCR 2245/Nov 2015) authorizes additional troops and enablers for AMISOM in order to facilitate a renewed offensive against al-Shabaab. UNSCR 2245 also authorizes a training element for AMISOM to assist with building the SNA as well as direct UN logistical support for the SNA. Implementation of all aspects of UNSCR 2124 will require significant new international assistance.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ AMISOM training, equipment, and logistics are serviced by the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) and international partners, particularly the U.S., EU, Japan, and individual European countries. The 501c3 non-profit arm of a private security services company (Bancroft Global Development) plays a key role in mentoring AMISOM and SNA personnel with U.S. government support. Overall, the international community's support to Somalia's security sector is complex and coordination is currently inadequate. The CJTF-HOA uniformed personnel in the Military Coordination Cell (MCC) are assisting the U.S. Mission to Somalia (resident in Nairobi) to harmonize and de-conflict USG security assistance with other international partners.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ In December 2013, AMISOM began work on a new concept of operations that would leverage the entrance of Ethiopia as a Troop Contributing Country (TCC), bringing an additional 3,950 troops into AMISOM. Combined with UNSCR 2124, the resumption of offensive operations by AMISOM in early March 2014 led to a rapidly changing situation, requiring immediate backfill and resumption of governance following the liberation of several towns in southern Somalia. UNSCR 2124 has also given AMISOM two additional mandates: establishment of a training unit for Somali forces and work with the SNA in joint operations.

(4) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia maintains diplomatic relations with more than 50 countries, but only approximately 15 countries have diplomatic facilities in Mogadishu. Somalia is a member of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Arab League, and the East African Community (EAC). Somalia does not contribute troops to overseas peacekeeping operations.

g. ~~(U)~~ **Assumptions.**

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM will obtain the authorities and resources required to build the capacity of AMISOM and the SNA inside Somalia.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ AMISOM's mandate will be extended and continued until AMISOM can successfully transition security responsibilities to Somali national security forces.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM will maintain the authorities, permissions, and resources required to provide security force assistance for African partners deploying forces into Somalia.

(4) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM will conduct security force assistance in permissive and uncertain environments only.

(5) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM will maintain authorities and funding derived from current named operations.

(6) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM will gain access and operational control of additional Contingency Locations, for staging forces, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and other supporting operations.

(7) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ International partners will continue to provide access and support at locations currently in use or planned through legally approved agreements.

(8) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia will allow access to radio frequency spectrum in support of operations and exercises on a non-interference basis and at no cost to the U.S. Government.

h. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Risks.** AMISOM forces in Southern and Central Somalia have achieved ~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

~~(b)(1) 1.7e~~

i. ~~(U)~~ **Planning Considerations.**

- (1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Chief of Mission concurrence is required for conducting security force assistance engagement activities in-country.
- (2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Security force assistance activities provided by U.S. personnel are subject to established USG laws and regulations.
- (3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The presence of DoD personnel in Somalia is policy sensitive and may require higher level USG approval.
- (4) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Capacity building efforts will not be successful without the concurrent development of SNA defense institutions. The pace of institution development is limited by the capacity of the FGS, which is challenged by ongoing operations against al-Shabaab, AMISOM TCCs support to peace keeping operations, and very limited institutional capacity.
- (5) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The FGS's ability to achieve the long-term desired endstates will be constrained by political changes, insecurity, changes in government and security leadership, threats from al-Shabaab, economic challenges, and humanitarian crisis.
- (6) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Morale of SNA is moderate to low; lack of skill and pay will continue to dampen professionalization efforts.
- (7) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The unpredictability of international partner support to Somalia and the varying levels of U.S. authorities will complicate longer-term comprehensive planning.
- (8) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ While no Status of Forces agreement exists between the United States and Somalia, adequate status protections are in place for U.S. personnel in Somalia, whether permanently or temporarily assigned.
- (9) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The number of U.S. military personnel allowed in Somalia may be limited by the threat environment and current policies.
- (10) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CJTF-HOA is the primary coordinator for DoD activity in CJOA East Africa.

~~(U)~~ **2. Execution**

a. ~~(U)~~ **Concept of Operations with Focus Area Assignments to Headquarters Directorates and Subordinate Commands.**

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Activity executed by USAFRICOM are linked to the achievement of campaign end states or enduring tasks. USAFRICOM activity in East Africa is coordinated and synchronized by CJTF-HOA. (b)(1) 1.7e

. SFA builds African partner capability and capacity in each of their war fighting functions of sustainment, movement and maneuver, command and control, protection, fires, and intelligence.


(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ In the execution of the Somalia CCP, USAFRICOM directs CJTF-HOA to synchronize all activities inside the East Africa CJOA. All Focus Area OPR's will coordinate the development and execution of milestones by, with, and through CJTF-HOA.

~~(S)~~ Table 2-1: Theater Campaign Plan Support Overview

(Green indicates Support in this CCP. See following table for description of supported IMOs.)


(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g



~~(S)~~ Table 2-1: Theater Campaign Plan Support Overview

(Green indicates Support in this CCP. See following table for description of supported IMOs.)

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g



~~(S)~~ Table 2-2: Intermediate Military Objectives Supported Overview

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

~~(S)~~ Table 2-3: Country Level Objectives and IMO Linkage Overview

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

(U) Table 2-4: TCP Ways Supported Overview
(Green highlight indicates support in this CCP)

Security Force Assistance. DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces and the supporting institutions. CCDR views SFA as his decisive effort.

Exercises. A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution that is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. Within USAFRICOM exercises may be conducted to maintain readiness of and evaluate capability of U.S. forces, to improve/maintain readiness of and assess capability of African partner nations, or to establish/maintain relationships. CCDR views exercises as part of his decisive effort.

Operations. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. CCDR views operations as a shaping effort that buys time and space for decisive action to be successful over time.

Engagements. Contacts or meetings of CCDR, DCME, DCMO, J Directors, and Component Commanders with a key official of an African partner nation, an allied nation, or the USG with the purpose of facilitating other ways and achieving IMOs mostly focused on setting the theater and the force. CCDR views engagements as part of his sustaining effort.

Posture, Presence, Agreements. This way focuses on activities required to set the force and set the theater. Setting the force consists of all actions taken to ensure that the right forces are available and prepared to execute their assigned mission. This includes training of the force and procedures that enable the USAFRICOM to attain the correct forces. Additionally, USAFRICOM will work with Allied partners to coordinate force requirements that are not available through U.S. sourcing solutions. Setting the theater is the process of attaining the right posture and agreements to execute the campaign. The CCDR views this way as a sustaining effort.

~~(U)~~ Table 2-5: Ways & Focus Areas Overview
 (Green indicates support in this CCP)

Levers	Focus Areas	Level	Focus Area Intent
Security Force Assistance	Advise Political Leadership	ED	Military operations adherence to rule of law Military operations adherence to rule of law
	Analysis & Assessment	ED	Baseline SFA assessment
	Building	GF	
	Command & Control	OF	Joint Operation Center C2 Node; Intel Fusion
	Equipping	GF	CVEO Ops Vehicle maintenance
	Fires	OF	
	Forecasting & Budgeting	ED	
	Intelligence	OF	
	Movement & Maneuver	OF	Troop movement support
	Organizing	GF	
	Police Security Forces	OF	
	Protection	OF	Counter-IED
	Recruiting	GF	Civilian Defense Institution Building
	Strategy & Policy Development	ED	Human rights and rule of law
	Sustainment	OF	Deployment and distribution Logistics Units
	Training	GF	Danab Support SNA Support Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) Professional Military Education Information Operations
Exercises	Exercises		Exercise EASTERN ACCORD, CUTLASS EXPRESS, and AFRICA ENDEAVOR Exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR, EASTERN ACCORD, and CUTLASS EXPRESS
Operations	Operations		
Engagements	Engagement		Partner Commitment & Exercise Hosting Relationship maintenance

~~(U)~~ **Table 2-5: Ways & Focus Areas Overview**
(Green indicates support in this CCP)

Levers	Focus Areas	Level	Focus Area Intent
Posture, Presence, Agreements	Posture		USG support to SNA in various locations in Somalia US Embassy in Mogadishu

(3) ~~(U)~~ **Lines of Effort Execution.**

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM (Top Priority).**

1 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **End State.** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

2 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Decisive Effort.** Relying upon the assessments and related resource realignments achieved during IMO 1.1 (NLT 1 Oct 2016), USAFRICOM focuses SFA and exercise ways in appropriate places to build capacity of AMISOM TCCs and the SNA. Along with SFA programs and other activities USAFRICOM will continue to use exercise EASTERN ACCORD to assess and enhance AMISOM TCC capacity to execute AMISOM's mission. Exercise CUTLASS EXPRESS will be used to assess the capacity of African partners to interdict illicit maritime activity and to adjust SFA efforts. USAFRICOM will execute a balanced application of SFA that in many cases will be focused on GF assistance as many of the AMISOM TCCs have sufficient OF capacity to execute their mission. The OF capacity that is still required by AMISOM TCCs mostly consists of enablers found in the sustainment and force protection (includes CIED) warfighting functions. Providing SFA to build SNA capacity inside Somalia will require the presence of sufficient U.S. personnel to enable assessment and development of the SNA. Additionally, AMISOM TCCs need the SNA to assist with security of key population centers and lines of communication. Finally, USAFRICOM SFA efforts will require coordinated and simultaneous efforts with interagency partners, international partners, and multilateral partners in order for the Federal Government of Somalia and Somalia National Police to gain the capacity required for transition to Somali-led mission. IMOs: 1.1; Ways: Operations, SFA, Exercises, and Engagement.

3 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Shaping Effort.** Current U.S. operations contribute to enabling our decisive effort of building the capacity of the SNA, but they are not sufficient of themselves to neutralize al-Shabaab. USAFRICOM will conduct special operations that contribute to overall neutralization of al-Shabaab when authorized. Select operations that are pending approval will provide the opportunity for USAFRICOM to conduct partnered operations and to build the capacity of AMISOM TCCs and the SNA. Ways: Operations, SFA, Engagement.

4 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Sustaining Effort.** USAFRICOM will continue to require its current allocation of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and ISR for its shaping efforts. Subject matter experts (SMEs) in GF assistance are crucial to success in the decisive effort. USAFRICOM will coordinate with MoDA and DIRI programs as well as staff components to assist in the development of Somalia's generating force capability when possible. The most critical element to setting the theater for Somalia securing approvals that allow for sufficient personnel in Somalia to enable assessment and development of the SNA across the ED, GF, and OF functional areas. Engagements with African, international, and multilateral partners will be directly linked to a coordinated effort aimed at achieving transition benchmarks that enable Somalia to move forward without assistance from AMISOM. Engagements with USG senior leaders will focus on articulating authority and resource shortfalls required to be decisive in building SNA capacity. Ways: SFA, Posture/Presence/Agreements, Engagement.

5 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Posture, Presence, and Agreements.** This effort focuses on activities required to set the force and set the theater. Setting the force consists of all actions taken to ensure that the right forces are available and prepared to execute their assigned mission. This includes training of the force and procedures that enable USAFRICOM to attain the correct forces. Additionally, USAFRICOM will work with international partners to coordinate force requirements that are not available through U.S. sourcing solutions. Setting the theater is the process of attaining the right posture and agreements to execute the campaign. Efforts in this lever require constant coordination between USAFRICOM staff, subordinate commands, and partners. USAFRICOM will not make efforts to acquire an agreement, a staging location, forces, or partnerships that are not directly linked to TCP end states or our enduring tasks. Actions to coordinate with country teams within the USAFRICOM AOR as well as forces located on the continent and on U.S. bases located in countries of our international partners are also included in setting the theater. CCDD views posture, presence, and agreements as part of his sustaining effort.

6 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Synchronization.** The efforts under LOE-1 will be synchronized by CJTF-HOA under authorities granted by the TCP and AFRICOM Commander. CJTF-HOA will use a targeting process to approve and synchronize activity. Each month, CJTF-HOA will set targeting priorities informed by intelligence and assessments. With targeting priorities set, CJTF-HOA will approve or reject requests for support.

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(4) ~~(b)~~ **Country Level Objectives.** Based on the guidance provided by Theater Campaign Plan, Somalia has three Country Level Objectives to achieve TCP desired end states. The tables below include Focus Area OPR assignments. OPRs are responsible for progress reporting with the Integrated AFRICOM Theater Sync System (IATSS), program proposal development and recommended prioritization, sequencing Focus Area activities, and coordinating with the DAO/OSC to synchronize activities in a country with other organizations. Per the GEF, all units are required to input their activities into the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS).

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 1)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.1:** NLT 1 Oct 16, USAFRICOM has sufficient information to direct activities and resources to enable AMISOM TCCs and SNA to meet UN/FGS benchmarks. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 1: SOM CLO 1: By 2016, USAFRICOM and its components have a common understanding of the willingness and capacity of Somalia to secure its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA;

Highlight indicates No TSC
Projects Aligned

Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Security Force Assistance	Analysis & Assessment	Baseline SFA assessment	ED	CJTF - HOA	ACJ2, DTRA, ACJ05: Legal, ACJ5, OSC, USARAF, ACJ4, MARFORAF, ACJ004: Surgeon, ACJ3, NAVAF, ACJ6, ACJ7, AFAF, ACJ9, SOCAF	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8					

Milestones

1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Analysis of al-Shabaab's impacts on Somalia and adjacent countries is complete.
2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Analysis of threats emanating from Somalia and their impact on adjacent countries is complete.
3. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baseline SFA assessment for countering illicit trafficking complete by 4th QTR 2016
4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baseline SFA assessment for defense ministries and infrastructure complete by 4th QTR 2016
5. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baseline SFA assessment for ground forces/gendarme complete by 4th QTR 2016
6. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baseline SFA assessment for Information Operations complete by 4th QTR 2016
7. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baseline SFA assessment for maritime forces complete by 4th QTR 2016
8. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baseline SFA assessment for special operation forces complete by 4th QTR 2016

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.3:** NLT 1 Oct 2020, Cohesive SNA (10,000 plus) possess the willingness and capacity to accept security responsibility for key cities and LOC's. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 2: SOM CLO 2: By 2018, Somalia has an assisted capability to assist U.S. and AMISOM efforts to neutralize al-Shabaab, secure territory borders, and deny safe haven to al-Shabaab. Main efforts will focus on creating defense institutions, increasing logistics security force assistance and to include: effective operational control of its forces throughout Somalia; effective, resourced training institutions; an effective counter-IED and engineering capability; and Information Operations Capability.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA; ACJ5; SOCAF; ACJ7;

Highlight indicates No TSC Projects Aligned

Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Security Force Assistance	Advise Political Leadership	Military operations adherence to rule of law	ED	CJTF-HOA	ACJ05: Legal		1	2, 3			
Security Force Assistance	Command & Control	Joint Operation Center	OF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF, ACJ2		4, 5				
Security Force Assistance	Equipping	CVEO Ops	GF	SOCAF				10			
Security Force Assistance	Movement & Maneuver	Troop movement support	OF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF	17, 18		19			
Security Force Assistance	Protection	Counter-IED	OF	CJTF-HOA				27			
Security Force Assistance	Recruiting	Civilian Defense Institution Building	GF	CJTF-HOA		28, 29					
Security Force Assistance	Sustainment	Deployment and distribution	OF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF	30, 31, 32, 33	34	35, 36			
Security Force Assistance	Training	SNA Support	GF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF	37, 38, 39, 40					
Security Force Assistance	Training	Danab Support	GF	SOCAF				41			
Exercises	Exercises	Exercise EASTERN ACCORD, CUTLASS EXPRESS, and AFRICA ENDEAVOR	NA	ACJ7	USARAF, ACJ6, CJTF-HOA, NAVAF		11, 12, 13	14, 15, 16			
Engagements	Engagement	Partner Commitment & Exercise Hosting	NA	ACJ5	ACJ9, USARAF, MARFORAF,		6, 7, 8, 9				

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.3:** NLT 1 Oct 2020, Cohesive SNA (10,000 plus) possess the willingness and capacity to accept security responsibility for key cities and LOC's. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 2: SOM CLO 2: By 2018, Somalia has an assisted capability to assist U.S. and AMISOM efforts to neutralize al-Shabaab, secure territory borders, and deny safe haven to al-Shabaab. Main efforts will focus on creating defense institutions, increasing logistics security force assistance and to include: effective operational control of its forces throughout Somalia; effective, resourced training institutions; an effective counter-IED and engineering capability; and Information Operations Capability.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA; ACJ5; SOCAF; ACJ7;

Highlight indicates No TSC
Projects Aligned

Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
					SOCAF, NAVAF, ACJ2, CJTF- HOA, ACJ6, ACJ7						
Posture, Presence, Agreements	Posture	USG support to SNA in various locations in Somalia	NA	CJTF- HOA	USARAF, MARFORAF, SOCAF, NAVAF, AFAF	20		21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26			

Milestones

1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The SNA has established a Judge Advocate General's (JAG) Corp capability
2. ~~(U)~~ The SNA JAG has developed a code of military law to provide a fair and equal judicial process for the SNA
3. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The SNA JAG is integrated into the Ministry of Defense and Chief of Defense Forces decision making process
4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ National JOC and Signal Command
5. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SNA possesses the capability to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence
6. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Interagency partners are willing to support SFA/SSA to African partners and CVEO operations against al-Shabaab
7. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ International partners support SFA/SSA to Somalia National Army
8. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Multilateral partners are willing to support SFA/SSA to African partners and CVEO operations against al-Shabaab.
9. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia Senior Leadership agrees to participate in Eastern Accord, Cutlass Express, and Africa Endeavor series of exercises
10. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia Advance Infantry Battalion FOC
11. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in ex AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2017
12. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in ex CUTLASS EXPRESS 2017
13. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in ex EASTERN ACCORD 2017
14. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in ex AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2018
15. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in ex CUTLASS EXPRESS 2018
16. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in ex EASTERN ACCORD 2018
17. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Horizontal engineering part 1
18. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Security Vehicle delivery
19. ~~(U)~~ Horizontal engineering part 2
20. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Beletweyne
21. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baidoa
22. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Baledogle
23. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Bosasso
24. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Kismayo
25. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Merka
26. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Mogadishu
27. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Counter-IED capability training and support complete by 2018.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.3:** NLT 1 Oct 2020, Cohesive SNA (10,000 plus) possess the willingness and capacity to accept security responsibility for key cities and LOC's. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 2: SOM CLO 2: By 2018, Somalia has an assisted capability to assist U.S. and AMISOM efforts to neutralize al-Shabaab, secure territory borders, and deny safe haven to al-Shabaab. Main efforts will focus on creating defense institutions, increasing logistics security force assistance and to include: effective operational control of its forces throughout Somalia; effective, resourced training institutions; an effective counter-IED and engineering capability; and Information Operations Capability.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA; ACJ5; SOCAF; ACJ7;

Highlight indicates No TSC
Projects Aligned

Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
28.	(U//FOUO)	Establish a SNA recruitment program									
29.	(U//FOUO)	MoD/CDF staff officer program									
30.	(U//FOUO)	Advance Infantry Company Headquarter / Logistics									
31.	(U//FOUO)	Battalion Sustainment Part 1									
32.	(U//FOUO)	Logistics Hub									
33.	(U//FOUO)	Tactical Logistics Hub									
34.	(U//FOUO)	Battalion Sustainment Part 2									
35.	(U//FOUO)	Battalion Sustainment Part 3									
36.	(U)	Logistics battalion									
37.	(U//FOUO)	Tactical Logistics Hub									
38.	(U//FOUO)	Advance Infantry Company Headquarter / Logistics									
39.	(U//FOUO)	Logistics Hub									
40.	(U//FOUO)	Security Vehicle maintenance and driver training									
41.	(U//FOUO)	SNA Advance Infantry Battalion trained by 2018									

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 3)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.3:** NLT 1 Oct 2020, Cohesive SNA (10,000 plus) possess the willingness and capacity to accept security responsibility for key cities and LOC's. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 3: SOM CLO 3: By 2020, Somalia is willing and capable of conducting and sustaining operations against al-Shabaab in key cities and LOC's.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA; ACJ7; ACJ05: Legal; ACJ5;

Highlight indicates No TSC Projects Aligned

Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Security Force Assistance	Advise Political Leadership	Military operations adherence to rule of law	ED	CJTF-HOA	ACJ05: Legal					1	
Security Force Assistance	Command & Control	C2 Node; Intel Fusion	OF	CJTF-HOA	ACJ6, ACJ2					2, 3	
Security Force Assistance	Equipping	Vehicle maintenance	GF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF, MARFORAF, NAVAF	11	12	13	14	15	
Security Force Assistance	Strategy & Policy Development	Human rights and rule of law	ED	ACJ05: Legal	USARAF, MARFORAF, SOCAF, NAVAF, CJTF-HOA					23, 24	
Security Force Assistance	Sustainment	Logistics Units	OF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF, ACJ4, MARFORAF, NAVAF, AFAF	25	26	27		28, 29	
Security Force Assistance	Training	Professional Military Education	GF	ACJ5	USARAF, MARFORAF, SOCAF, NAVAF, CJTF-HOA, OSC		30	31	32		
Security Force Assistance	Training	Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)	GF	CJTF-HOA	USARAF, SOCAF				33, 34, 35		
Exercises	Exercises	Exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR, EASTERN ACCORD, and CUTLASS EXPRESS	NA	ACJ7	ACJ6, CJTF-HOA, NAVAF, USARAF				16, 17, 18	19, 20, 21	
Engagements	Engagement	Relationship maintenance	NA	CJTF-HOA	ACJ9, USARAF, ACJ4, MARFORAF,	4, 5	6	7	8	9, 10	

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 3)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.3:** NLT 1 Oct 2020, Cohesive SNA (10,000 plus) possess the willingness and capacity to accept security responsibility for key cities and LOC's. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 3: SOM CLO 3: By 2020, Somalia is willing and capable of conducting and sustaining operations against al-Shabaab in key cities and LOC's.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA; ACJ7; ACJ05: Legal; ACJ5;									Highlight indicates No TSC Projects Aligned		
Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
					SOCAF, ACJ3, NAVAF, ACJ2, ACJ5, AFAF						
Posture, Presence, Agreements	Posture	US Embassy in Mogadishu	NA	CJTF-HOA	USARAF, MARFORAF, SOCAF, NAVAF, AFAF					22	
Milestones											

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Rule of law and respect for human rights are institutionalized into SNA operations
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia built a military joint operation center capable of sustaining intelligence fusion while minimizing processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) by 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia created an Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC) capable of producing actionable intelligence for agencies responsible for border security and CVEO by 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ AFRICOM conducted Senior Leader Seminars with senior Somalia leadership in 2016
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Conduct key leader engagements (KLE) with Somalia senior leadership on AFRICOM's programs
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Conduct key leader engagements (KLE) with Somalia senior leadership on AFRICOM's programs
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Conduct key leader engagements (KLE) with Somalia senior leadership on AFRICOM's programs
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Conduct key leader engagements (KLE) with Somalia senior leadership on AFRICOM's programs
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Conduct key leader engagements (KLE) with Somalia senior leadership on AFRICOM's programs
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Senior DoD leaders have relationships necessary to make direct contact with/requests of senior leaders in AMEMB Mogadishu and Somalia's Ministry of Defense by 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Maintenance training and support provided for vehicle inventory in 2016
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Maintenance training and support provided for vehicle inventory in 2017
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Maintenance training and support provided for vehicle inventory in 2018
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Maintenance training and support provided for vehicle inventory in 2019
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Maintenance training and support provided for vehicle inventory in 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in Ex AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2019
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in Ex CUTLASS EXPRESS 2019
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in Ex EASTERN ACCORD 2019
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia host Ex CUTLASS EXPRESS 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia host Ex EASTERN ACCORD 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia participates in Ex AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Support to the Department of State on reestablishing the US Embassy in Mogadishu
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia developed a National Military Strategy, CT Strategy, Land Force Strategy, and Maritime Strategy by 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Somalia leadership enforces a culture of military ethics consistent with international standards of equal opportunity, accountability, civilian oversight, and rules of Engagement (ROE) by 2020
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SNA implemented functional logistics management practices and systems allowing visibility of force and materiel locations, quantities, and status across the military by 2016.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Table 2-6: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 3)
Concept of Operations

LOE 1: Al-Shabaab/AMISOM: LOE 1: Neutralize Al-Shabaab/Transition AMISOM **IMO 1.3:** NLT 1 Oct 2020, Cohesive SNA (10,000 plus) possess the willingness and capacity to accept security responsibility for key cities and LOC's. **End State:** AMISOM's mission has transitioned to a Somali-led mission in which the Federal Government of Somalia secures its own territory, neutralizes al-Shabaab and interdicts illicit flow of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, WMD material, and persons. Al-Shabaab is not able to threaten Somalia or its neighbors, nor to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and U.S. International partners.

SOM CLO 3: SOM CLO 3: By 2020, Somalia is willing and capable of conducting and sustaining operations against al-Shabaab in key cities and LOC's.

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS; CJTF-HOA; ACJ7; ACJ05; Legal; ACJ5;

Highlight indicates No TSC
Projects Aligned

Ways	Focus Area	Intent	Level	OPR	OCR(s)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
26. (U//FOUO) The SNA can effectively tracks all equipment in its inventory by 2017											
27. (U//FOUO) The SNA can effectively identify shortfalls, push resources, and plan for sustainment by 2018.											
28. (U//FOUO) SNA is able to meet all equipment requirements from internal stocks by 2020											
29. (U//FOUO) The SNA is adequately equipped with vehicles, materiel handling equipment and personnel to effectively supply remote locations by 2020											
30. (U//FOUO) Support to the Somalia Military Academy with curriculum development											
31. (U//FOUO) Three senior Somalia officers attend PME in the U.S.											
32. (U//FOUO) MoD/CDF have developed a basic recruitment and training system for troops entering the SNA											
33. (U//FOUO) Establishment of a SNA CIMIC capability by 2019											
34. (U//FOUO) Establishment of a SNA Information Operation capability by 2019											
35. (U//FOUO) Establishment of a SNA Public Information Operation capability by 2019											

b. ~~(U)~~ Programs.

(1) ~~(U)~~ The Program Sync Matrices below are aligned to each of the Country Level Objectives and should be considered as companions to the CLO Concept of Operations. For each Way and Focus Area within a given CLO, the matrices articulate the Capability Packages along with their supporting TSC Projects, resources amounts, resource types, and development timelines.


~~(S)~~ Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Programs Sync Matrix

(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g




(S) Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Programs Sync Matrix

(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g




~~(S)~~ Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Programs Sync Matrix

(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g



~~(S)~~ Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Programs Sync Matrix

(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g



(S) Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 2)
Programs Sync Matrix

(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

~~(S)~~ Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 3)
Programs Sync Matrix


(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g




~~(S)~~ Table 2-7: Country Level Objective (SOM CLO 3)
Programs Sync Matrix

(b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4d



(b)(1) 1.4d



~~SECRET~~

(b)(1) 1.4d

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~~SECRET~~

c. Additional Tasks to Headquarters Directorates and Subordinate Commands.

(1) ~~(U)~~ Table 2-16 lists additional tasks not already covered by the Focus Area assignments provide in the various Country Level Objectives Concept of Operations.

(2) ~~(U)~~ OPRs shall maintain the status of tasks within the Integrated AFRICOM Theater Sync system (IATSS).

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ Table 2-1: Additional Tasks

OPR Colors: HEADQUARTERS;

OPR	Task	Status	Suspense
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~~(U)~~ **3. Appendices List**

~~(U)~~

App A - Executive Summary
App B - Country Assessments (J8)
SFA Assessment
App C - Intelligence (J2)
App D - Operations (J3)
App E - Logistics (J4)
App F - Classified Posture & Programs (J5)
App G - Multi-National Partner Support (J5)
App H - Admin (J5)
App I - C4 Systems (J6)
App J - Exercises (J7)
App K - Engagements (J9)
App L - Special Appendices As Required