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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND



FY23 THEATER POSTURE PLAN 01 NOVEMBER 2022

(b)(1)1.4a

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
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~~(U)~~ Executive Summary

1. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

2. ~~(U)~~ Posture Status.

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ The National Military Strategy (NMS) directs USAFRICOM, as one of eleven joint unified combatant commands within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

geography to ensure each posture location can respond to a breadth of mission requirements. This has long been the case and USAFRICOM posture has expanded and contracted throughout the AOR since the Combatant Command's (CCMD) inception, responding to evolving threats, priorities, and crises. ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ USAFRICOM ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

2) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

c. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM's approach to posture integrates its posture initiatives within three logical mission areas, "Build the Team," "Compete for Advantage," and "Advance Innovative Methods."

1) ~~(S//REL)~~ Mission Area 1: Build the Team. Drawing on a teaming and competition metaphor, this mission area incorporates posture initiatives that seek to advance posture-related partnering opportunities. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Within the scope of the USAFRICOM AOR and USAFRICOM's theater strategic objectives, partnering is essential to generate the military capacities, including a functional posture footprint network, that are required to address the full range of USAFRICOM missions.

2) ~~(S//NF)~~ Mission Area 2: Compete for Advantage. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3) ~~(U)~~ Mission Area 3: Advance Innovative Methods. Mission area 3 concludes the competition metaphor, seeking advantage by changing USAFRICOM's approach to theater posture to conform to Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance to develop new ways of operating in response to posture and resource limitations. Advancing innovative methods improves flexibility within the USAFRICOM posture footprint network that incorporates a close analysis of existing, posture-related processes to better align forces, footprint, and agreements with a dynamic set of operational demands

d. ~~(U)~~ Summary of Gaps. The 2022 USAFRICOM Posture Planning Conference - attended by the USAFRICOM staff, component commands, subordinate commands, USTRANSCOM, the

OSD, and the Joint Staff - assessed the following four capability gaps as current posture deficiencies limiting USAFRICOM's operations, activities, and investments (OAI).

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Gap One: (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Gap Two: (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

3) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Gap Three: Underdeveloped partnering opportunities. SecDef guidance to all Combatant Commands includes a requirement to maximize partnering opportunities, both as a way to share the burdens of operational activities as well as to generate the moral authority needed to undergird the pursuit and defense of U.S. national interests. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

e. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM is advancing the following seven posture footprint initiatives during FY23.

1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]

a) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

b) (~~S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4b

[REDACTED]

2) (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Establish TCL Gaborone at Sir Seretse Khama International Airport, Gaborone, Botswana. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3) (~~S~~) Establish TCL Berbera. TCL Berbera, Somaliland was established to support both (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4d

4) (CUI) Recommend proper designation of existing posture locations based on OSD instruction. (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

5) (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

To optimize limited resources and limit posture growth, USAFRICOM will look to economize its efforts by consolidating posture locations when feasible.

6) (CUI) ICW DOS and partners (FRA, CAN, SEN), evaluate the potential relocation of CSL Dakar, Senegal. To guarantee access to suitable infrastructure in support of NEW NORMAL EXORD and protection of U.S. personnel and facilities, USAFRICOM will look to potentially relocate CSL Dakar from Ouakam Airbase to Blaise Diagne International Airport.

7) (CUI) Develop a deployable expeditionary basing capability. In implementation of the Mission Areas discussed above, CDRUSAFRICOM must maximize the utilization of agreement and non-binding arrangement authorities to clearly message U.S. contingency response readiness to partner nations and to reduce the risk of access negotiations during crisis response. In response to posture and resource constraints and limitations in the AOR, USAFRICOM seeks to fortify key relationships with nations and international organizations in the AOR to underscore mutual interests in security and stability. The result of these efforts will provide operational access to and joint use of suitable infrastructure for U.S. forces when needed with timely host nation approval.

f. (U) Agreement Priorities.

1) (U) USAFRICOM establishes agreement priorities based on a tiered risk framework, prioritizing the establishment of agreements to enable risk-mitigated operations, activities and investments. These priorities are subject to change after the TPP is signed out based on reordered priorities arising from DOD decisions on the employment of forces throughout the AOR.

2) ~~(U)~~ Current U.S. agreement priorities are:

a) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4b .

b) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4b .

c) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ A(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

d) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

e) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b .

f) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ A(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

g) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d .


3. ~~(S//NF)~~ Timing and Context of Submission. At the point of submission of the USAFRICOM FY23 TPP, the (b)(1)1.4a

These reviews will more fully assess USAFRICOM's forces, footprint, and agreements to support a holistic approach to posture in the USAFRICOM AOR.

4. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Conclusion. USAFRICOM continues to deploy its forces, footprint, and agreements in a strategically-informed and operationally-flexible manner. This approach optimizes its potential to achieve U.S. strategic objectives and USAFRICOM theater objectives across the span of assigned missions. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

FY23 USAFRICOM Posture Footprint ~~(U)~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



~~(U)~~ Chapter 1: Strategic Narrative

1.1. ~~(U)~~Theater Vision and Objectives. The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Campaign Plan (ACP) has four objectives: Gain and Maintain Strategic Access & Influence and ~~(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e~~ Disrupt Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) Threats to U.S. Interests, Respond to Crises to Protect U.S. Interests, and Coordinate Action with Allies & Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives. ~~(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e~~

~~(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e~~ prevented VEOs from posing a threat to the U.S. homeland; and retained the strategic and operational access, influence, and partnerships necessary to conduct crisis and contingency operations ~~(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e~~

~~(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e~~ All of these efforts contribute to Department of Defense (DOD) and whole of government efforts to enhance regional security, stability, and prosperity.

1.2. ~~(U)~~Theater Strategy.

1. ~~(U)~~ Africa measures nearly 5,000 miles from north to south and more than 4,600 miles at its widest point from east to west. This accounts for a total land area of more than 11.7 million square miles in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR), or 3.5 times the size of the continental U.S. The continent sits astride geostrategic global maritime crossroads critical to U.S. security and economic interests. The population of the continent is home to significant social, economic, political, resource, and infrastructural diversity. However, low confidence in national institutions, growing urbanization, changing weather patterns, growing demand for water, burgeoning youth populations, persistent economic inequality, and pervasive corruption fuel political, religious, economic, and social instability. Chronic instability, driven by the lack of representative institutions, and the inability of many states to govern effectively, permits VEOs and other malign actors to leverage ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, and accomplish goals at odds with African stability, security, and prosperity.

2. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ The ACP was written to align with national strategic guidance over a five year period. It is informed by national policy outlined in the INSSG, the National Security Strategy (NSS), the NDS, and other policy documents. Specifically, as directed in the INSSG, the ACP ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g~~

USAFRICOM views operational access as the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ The key to campaign success is effective employment (campaign “ways”) of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAI), (campaign “means”) to align with USAFRICOM’s four interrelated campaign objectives (campaign “ends”). ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~

ally enabling infrastructure to optimize operational access. A footprint network utilizes key enduring locations to project power and maintain strategic access across a region. USAFRICOM posture development can support the theater strategic objectives by a) encouraging constructive, mutually-beneficial international and multinational partnerships; b) assuring access to, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

delaying and disrupting VEO expansion by providing support to partners, Allies, and multinational efforts. To advance these aims and establish the necessary degree of flexibility, USAFRICOM has formulated three posture-focused mission areas for the FY23 – FY28 TPP: “Build the Team,” “Compete for Advantage,” and “Advance Innovative Methods.” The command developed these mission areas in detail following its review of relevant environmental conditions in the USAFRICOM AOR.

2. ~~(S)~~ Strategic guidance per the Secretary of Defense-issued Global Posture Review Outcomes memorandum (29 Nov 2021), (b)(1)1.4a

That same document acknowledges the dynamism within the USAFRICOM AOR, particularly with respect to “the fluid threat picture across Africa and the need for DOD to adjust posture based on Secretary of Defense direction.” Acknowledging these realities, USAFRICOM also notes the need to work “In concert with [the] whole-of-government,” and to develop “new ways and means...to achieve theater strategic ends of ensuring U.S. enduring interests.” (b)(1)1.4a

3. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

4. ~~(U)~~ Africa is also the poorest continent in the world in both absolute and per capita terms. Excluding Egypt, African states represent just over two percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and earn a per capita GDP one-fifth the global mean. Many African states continue to contend with the consequences of colonialism, including political disunity arising from enduring colonial political boundaries that integrate distinct cultures, ethnicities, and languages. Political disunity is a proximate cause of corruption, coups, and civil war. Africa is perceived as the most corrupt region on the globe, which is closely associated with a spate of ineffective regional governance. A number of corrupt governments further render their associated societies vulnerable to predatory practices by external actors. Africa continues to experience coups at a rate much higher than the global average, despite an absolute decline from

the 1960s to present. Problematically, coups often limit the ability of USAFRICOM to partner with the affected states, including through security cooperation and with foreign aid. Civil war on the African continent presents the greatest challenges to USAFRICOM's ability to establish lasting partnerships. (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

5. ~~(S//NF)~~ These political conditions, i.e., a lack of effective governance in many African states, high rates of political instability, and U.S. legal restrictions related to political violence, make partnering with some African states highly dynamic and unpredictable. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~

At the same time, VEOs, which are widespread in Africa, have had significant success expanding their influence in countries with weak, corrupt governments. Thus, the need for these states to partner with, e.g., the U.S. in the security space, USAFRICOM's primary focus in Africa, is increasing. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED] the U.S. can leverage its associated security commitments (i.e., that are reliant on the posture location) as diplomatic influence to explicitly exclude other actors from influential regional roles.

7. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM's approach to posture. As noted above, USAFRICOM has integrated its posture initiatives within three logical mission areas, "Build the Team," "Compete for Advantage," and "Advance Innovative Methods."

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ Mission Area 1: Build the Team. Drawing on a teaming and competition metaphor, this mission area incorporates posture initiatives that seek to advance posture-related partnering opportunities. National Security Strategic Guidance states partnering is one of the primary mechanisms to generate global legitimacy in the struggle between authoritarian and democratic states. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Mission Area 2: Compete for Advantage. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(U)~~ Mission Area 3: Advance Innovative Methods. Mission area 3 concludes the competition metaphor, seeking advantage by changing USAFRICOM's approach to theater posture to conform to OSD guidance to develop new ways of operating in response to posture and resource limitations. Advancing innovative methods improves flexibility within the USAFRICOM posture footprint network that incorporates a close analysis of existing, posture-related processes to better align forces, footprint, and agreements with a dynamic set of operational demands.

I.4. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Posture Initiatives.

1. ~~(U)~~ West Africa.

a. ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL-USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

1) ~~(S//REL-USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)I.4a [REDACTED]

2) (S) (b)(1)I.4a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Employment of expeditionary assets will meet the temporary nature of this need, maximizing partner infrastructure, and minimizing the use of military construction.

(b)(1)I.4a [REDACTED]

3) (S) (b)(1)I.4a, (b)(1)I.4b, (b)(1)I.4d [REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

4) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

5) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

6) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)~~ Evaluate partnering with the French (b)(1)1.4a

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] Aligned with Mission Area 1, Mission Area 2, and Mission Area 3, this effort may necessitate development of a posture location, although USAFRICOM prefers to rely on French support for services utilizing an ACSA on an existing French posture location.

2) ~~(S//NF)~~ USAFRICOM's charter is to limit the VEO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

4) ~~(S//NF)~~ Second, burden sharing and bolstering the capacity and capabilities of our Allies and partners is a cornerstone of our approach. Working by, with, and through African and international partners and Allies, and in coordination with the U.S. interagency, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b

5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a (b)(1) 1.4d

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

6) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4a

e. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3) 10 USC § 130e

1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4d

To optimize limited resources and limit posture growth, USAFRICOM will look to economize its efforts by consolidating posture locations when feasible.

2) ~~(S//NF)~~ Tunisia is a priority country (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]

f. ~~(CUI)~~ ICW DOS and partners (FRA, CAN, SEN), evaluate the potential to relocate CSL Dakar, Senegal.

1) ~~(CUI)~~ To guarantee access to suitable infrastructure in support of NEW NORMAL EXORD, defense of U.S. citizens, interests, and facilities, operations conducted from Senegal, (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

[REDACTED]

2) ~~(CUI)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

[REDACTED]

3) ~~(CUI)~~ The USAFRICOM Security Augmentation / Military Assisted Departure EXORD, USAFRICOM's response to the CJCS New Normal EXORD, clearly describes the required capabilities for CSL Dakar to successfully meet mission intent. CSL Dakar needs access to a runway capable of day and night operations for (b)(1) 1.7c, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] t. USAFRICOM will require support from the country team and OSD to gain host-nation consent for access, land use, aircraft parking, and cargo staging.

4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]

2. Southern Africa.

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

1) (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] longstanding void in the U.S. posture footprint in southern Africa, a region the size of the continental United States. USAFRICOM requires a location to stage response forces to more rapidly to react to (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] crises in defense of U.S. personnel, interests, and facilities, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and other contingencies in Southern Africa. (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]

2)-(S) The vision of posture location in Botswana remains that this location would be expeditionary in nature. Much like USAFRICOM's new normal posture locations, the posture location in Botswana would require only minimal investment for rudimentary infrastructure/storage. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

Exercise EPIC GUARDIAN 22 will be conducted utilizing TCL Gaborone, as well as other future exercises to include JUSTIFIED ACCORD and SOUTHERN ACCORD. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

6) ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

7) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OSD(P), will ensure the nature this location is appropriately categorized for either contingency plan or enduring mission.

3. ~~(U)~~ East Africa.

a. ~~(U)~~ Establish TCL Berbera.

1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2) ~~(U)~~ Berbera, Somalia is an exceptionally unique location with extensive potential to support USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM operations. Berbera is a multi-modal location incorporating ground, seaport, and airport facilities within a small radius. It is currently under development by two United Arab Emirate-based corporations (Berbera International Airport Company (BIAC) for the airport and DP World for the seaport). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Somali authorities are collaborating on the development of these facilities to enable the establishment of a commercial corridor from the Gulf of Aden to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, Somali authorities have demonstrated significant interest in using the same facilities to enable parallel security cooperation activities with the United States. (b)(1) 1.7c, (b)(3)10 USC § 1305

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) 1.7c, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e
[REDACTED]

3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The airfield itself is in good working order, though the aircraft parking apron is in poor condition overall. Operational throughput is constrained by the lack of a parallel taxiway and a single entrance to the parking ramp from the center of the runway.

4) ~~(S)~~ Berbera is also proximate to the BAM waterway that forms a chokepoint at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The U.S. has other basing in the Horn of Africa. The USAFRICOM base at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is the most robust location the U.S. has on the continent. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(1) 1.4d
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

7) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Importantly, Berbera represents infrastructure with extensive operational potential. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

8) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9) ~~(S)~~ The Federal Government of Somalia's intends to undertake increased security cooperation with the Federal Member States to better disrupt al-Shabaab. USAFRICOM will seek to expand its security cooperation activities with both the FGS and the Somaliland political authorities, beginning with targeted KLEs to help establish a relationship with Somaliland forces and improve collaboration with FGS security forces. (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

10) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM will seek to initiate small, Mil-Mil programming activities focused on agreed-upon topics to iteratively expand the operational capacity of Somaliland and FGS security forces.

4. ~~(CUI)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

use. USAFRICOM currently operates from a number of posture locations labeled as CSLs, but in factual terms should be designated as Forward Operating Sites (FOS) due to the sustained presence of allocated U.S. forces. CSLs are characterized primarily by the periodic presence of allocated U.S. forces, with little or no permanent U.S. military presence or U.S.-controlled infrastructure. The key difference between the two is the enduring force presence and more robust investments permitted at the FOS. Properly designating existing posture locations in accordance with DOD definitions will enable the military Services to plan for base utilization in support of enduring operational requirements, with infrastructure and quality of life amenities consistent with sustained presence. This will allow efficient use of existing bases by enabling longer-term investments, thus avoiding the perpetual cost to purchase and replacement of primarily expeditionary capabilities.

a. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1) 1.7c, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e [REDACTED]

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]

2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]

3) ~~(S)~~ The primary U.S. military objective in Somalia is to neutralize al-Shabaab's capability to conduct external operations (EXOPS) which threaten the U.S. homeland.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]

4) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ To guarantee the availability of this location, USAFRICOM and French Forces Djibouti are coordinating a cost-effective repair to the Chebelley runway that will enable it to function for at least ten more years. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]. Long-term projects represent necessary improvements to many facilities, infrastructure, and utility systems, such as electricity production and distribution, water distribution, and wastewater collection required for maintaining current operational tempo into the future.

5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

6) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4c

7) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b
in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

8) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] To improve force protection concerns brought when transiting personnel from life support areas at Camp Lemonnier, Chebelley Airfield will house and (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]. Collocating RPA aircrew and maintenance personnel would reduce commute time and force protection concerns associated with movement between CLDJ and CADJ. Heavy aircraft operations, such as C-17s and C-130s, will be limited to the runway and hot cargo pad only.

b. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1) 1.7c, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e [REDACTED].

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Currently CSL Manda Bay, Kenya is the crucial hub for U.S. operations in Somalia. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S)~~ Manda Bay is the premier, long-term posture solution required for C-VEO airborne ISR basing and force projection in, to, and through Somalia. (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

c. ~~(U)~~ Evaluate the potential to nominate CSL Niamey, Niger to FOS.

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Currently CSL Niamey, Niger is the crucial West Africa hub for U.S. operations. (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As an objective under Mission Area 2 and Mission Area 3, the

(b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Niamey as a key posture network hub for operational support to posture locations in West Africa in an enduring time horizon. Niamey is at personnel and aircraft parking capacity for steady state operations and regularly reaches, and periodically exceeds, its surge capacity during regional force RIP/TOAs. Per USAFRICOM order, the base commander is working to maximize space at Niamey to support operational demand for forces consolidated to this location from many regional spokes closed over the last five FYs. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3.) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Evaluate the potential to nominate CSL Agadez, Niger to FOS. Currently CSL Agadez, Niger (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

e. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mogadishu International Airport compound ("green zone"), in which the U.S. posture locations are located, also hosts the U.S. DoS mission in Somalia. USAFRICOM assists with force protection measures for the USEMB, as well as UN and AU missions. As an objective under Mission Area 1, Mission Area 2, and Mission Area 3, the persistent and enduring nature of operations stemming from and through Mogadishu that

(b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

f. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

g. ~~(U)~~ Evaluate the potential to transition CL Misrata, Libya to an enduring location.
1) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3) ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Beyond the VEO threat, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5) (~~S~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. (~~U~~) Develop a deployable expeditionary basing capability.

a. (~~CUI~~) USAFRICOM must maximize its agreement and arrangement utilization to clearly message contingency response intent to the host nation, and reduce the burden of access negotiation during crisis. In response to posture and resource constraints and limitations in the AOR, USAFRICOM seeks to codify important enabling relationships with key countries in the AOR that underscore mutual interests in security and stability. The purpose of this codification will be to provide for operational access to and joint use of suitable infrastructure by U.S. forces when needed, and on the basis of host nation approval. Joint use and access to existing infrastructure within the AOR that is not explicitly designated as a posture location will enable USAFRICOM to operate in the AOR with greater flexibility and lower cost, albeit with an increased administrative and expeditionary burden. While no posture location will be designated, nor a lead service component assigned, no improvements would be initiated on the chosen location unless future conditions require activation.

b. (~~CUI~~) In consideration of the investment required in terms of human and fiscal resources to maintain permanent posture locations, USAFRICOM will develop a mobile, expeditionary capability that can be rapidly deployed within the AOR to provide essential life and mission support. USAFRICOM will work to identify partners willing to host this contingency and crisis response capability. USAFRICOM component commands will conduct an assessment of

required forces and equipment to establish an expeditionary base in the USAFRICOM AOR. USAFRICOM will use this assessment to create RFF requirements to inform CCMD and Service relationships that will likely be aligned to the pertinent USAFRICOM problem set. USAFRICOM will also look at pre-positioned wartime reserve material to potentially fill a portion of the required capability, specifically U.S. Army force provider sets aligned to USAFRICOM mission. Identified shortfalls will be coordinated through the joint logistics enterprise to determine the best method to fulfill the CDR's stated need. Coupled with joint use agreements with these prioritized partners, a deployable expeditionary basing capability would enable a response force to more quickly and more effectively respond to contingency and crisis posture needs on the continent.

c. ~~(CUI)~~ Agreement for joint use without designating a posture location negates the generally long turnaround time of initial negotiation with the HN. As a contingency develops, and the requirement beyond expeditionary assets becomes clear, USAFRICOM can then work with the HN and OSD to establish operational control, resulting in a quicker establishment of a posture location in the future, if needed. If conditions require activation, USAFRICOM will assign a lead Service component, and the location will be added to the USAFRICOM Contingency Location Master List.

d. ~~(S)~~ Opportunities for USAFRICOM to explore this method of expeditionary basing capability employment include: (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

1.5 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ *Emerging Requirements.* The evolving security dynamic in the USAFRICOM AOR necessitates an ongoing assessment to anticipate and respond with posture adjustments as required. The primary emerging requirements will confront USAFRICOM within the next two years. (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

Chapter II: Forces

II.1 ~~(S)~~ Forces Gaps/Risks. (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

3. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1)1.4g

II.2-~~(U)~~ Force Movements.


1. ~~(C)~~ Overseas Force Structure Changes (OFSC). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(U)~~ Movement of Rotational/Allocated Forces. USAFRICOM presently has no planned movements of rotational/allocated forces that may have policy significance.

Table 1.-(U) Overseas Force Structure Changes (Table Classified SECRET)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g



~~(U)~~ Chapter III: Footprint

III.1 ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Footprint Gaps/Risk. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

1. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ East Africa. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Current force laydown results in transit times consuming a significant percentage of each airborne ISR asset's time-on-station potential. (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(U)~~ West Africa.


1) ~~(S//NF)~~ USAFRICOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

2) ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4b




2. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g




a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g



b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4g



improvements to Manda Bay (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
while committing to a constructive and mutually beneficial partnership with a tier one partner.
AFAF has provided an initial engineering assessment to the KDF for this project.

c. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Camp Lemonnier's missions have expanded incrementally since inception such that today it supports a wide range of missions and functions, including hosting Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA), supporting operations for USCENTCOM, supporting the East Africa Response Force and crisis response, and supporting Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) with PR and CASEVAC. (b)(1)1.4g

growth has created a need for expanded infrastructure, including providing sufficient, and reliable power due to the lack of electrical infrastructure and power production capabilities. Growing mission and life support demands at CLDJ necessitate an expanded power production capability in response. Additional projects are planned, as indicated in appendices 3 and 4. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Underdeveloped partnering opportunities. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

a. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4g

(b)(1)1.4b The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) lacks important governmental capacities and is significantly reliant on external states and international organizations, including the U.S., Great Britain, Turkey, and the European Union. Finding ways to assist the FGS with improving or increasing its capacities will reduce its dependence on external actors.

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

III.2 ~~(U)~~ Enduring Locations

1. ~~(U)~~ Forward Operating Sites (FOS). (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

a. ~~(U)~~ Ascension Island is a sovereign British overseas territory hosting U.S. forces and capabilities, including (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

Ascension Island incorporates a modern military airfield (ICAO: FHAW). Among other responsibilities, (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

The FOS consists of capabilities located at the airfield maintained by the U.S. However, FOS Ascension Island has no USAFRICOM equities. It is manned by service-retained forces, supports the activities of USTRANSCOM and USSPACECOM, and provides global capabilities for DOD.

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is a U.S. Navy installation in the Horn of Africa (HOA) adjacent to a Djiboutian commercial port and airfield (ICAO: HDAM). CLDJ supports USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, (b)(1)1.4a

Camp Lemonnier also supports persistent and rotational air, ground, maritime, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducting security cooperation, building partner capacity, humanitarian, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and ISR missions. (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]. CLDJ is a FOS that, while austere, is under continual development from a dominantly expeditionary footprint to a more permanent one to meet its long-term mission requirements.

2. ~~(U)~~ Cooperative Security Locations (CSL). USAFRICOM has 12 CSLs in its AOR engaged in a diverse range of operational missions.

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Dakar, Senegal. CSL Dakar is a Type 2 CSL, meaning it was established to support the Protection of U.S. Personnel and Facilities mission, i.e., C-SA/MAD. CSL Dakar is located at Leopold Sedar Senghor International Airport (ICAO: GOOY) is

(b)(1)1.4g The CSL is located in the downtown capital area,

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Niamey, Niger. CSL Niamey (also referred to as Airbase 101) is located at the Diori Hamani Airfield (ICAO: RVLD), and is supported with an Access Agreement. (b)(1)1.4g

CSL Niamey also supports theater security cooperation engagements, daily manned and unmanned ISR missions, civil-military operations, remotely-piloted aircraft, and PR/CASEVAC operations. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Additionally, USAFRICOM and its lead Service component, United States Air Forces Europe/Africa (AFAFRICA), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Agadez, Niger. CSL Agadez (also referred to as Airbase 201) is located on a purpose-built facility near Agadez, Niger. CSL Agadez supports security force assistance activities (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

CSL Agadez is also a subject of the operational and life support review process alongside CSL Niamey.

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ N'Djamena, Chad. CSL N'Djamena is located at Hassan D'Jamous International Airport (ICAO: FTTJ). U.S. forces share part of the military portion of the airfield with Chadian and French forces, (b)(1)1.4a

is supported with an Access MOU. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

e. ~~(U)~~ Accra, Ghana. CSL Accra is a Type 2 CSL located in Accra, Ghana and comprised of facilities on Kotoka airfield (ICAO: DGAA). (b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

f. ~~(U)~~ Libreville, Gabon. CSL Libreville is a Type 2 CSL located in Libreville, Gabon at the Leon M'Ba International Airport (ICAO: FOOL). (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

g. ~~(U)~~ Entebbe, Uganda. CSL Entebbe is a Type 2 CSL (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e
CSL Entebbe is located on the
military side of Entebbe International Airport (ICAO: HUEN). (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

h. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Chebelley, Djibouti. CSL Chebelley (CADJ) is part of the Djibouti Base Cluster and is located approximately 20km from CLDJ, from which it draws much of its support. (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

i. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Baledogle, Somalia. CSL Baledogle is located at Baledogle airfield, Somalia. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

j. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Mogadishu, Somalia. CSL Mogadishu is located at the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
Collocated with CSL Mogadishu are missions and personnel from the African Union and United Nations. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ The CSL is supported with an Access MOU.

k. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Manda Bay, Kenya. CSL Manda Bay is comprised of Manda Bay Airfield and Camp Simba. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ Manda Bay Airfield and Camp Simba have recently undergone renovations including for Camp Simba, a new power plant, new water plant, new office space, new billeting, new laundry and shower facilities, and new force protection features. Manda Bay Airfield has new helicopter parking pads. ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
l. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Mombasa, Kenya. CSL Mombasa includes two sites, one located at the Moi International Airport and a second at the Mtongwe Navy Base three miles away. CSL Mombasa provides support to stage and sustain forces as required. ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ There are no U.S. personnel permanently assigned to CSL Mombasa. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~

3. ~~(U)~~ Multimodal locations. In addition to USAFRICOM specific posture locations, USTRANSCOM's En route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) identifies en route locations which are crucial to the support of Combatant Command requirements and are worthy of long-term investment. Such investment may be through sustaining existing posture, enhancing infrastructure at overseas locations, or strengthening host nation relationships with a focus on commercial capacity to foster assured access. These locations include not only those identified in this TPP where the U.S. currently enjoys considerable freedom of access, but also those where access is limited or non-existent, and where USTRANSCOM, in coordination with the CCMDs with assigned AORs, intends to pursue access over the next 2 to 5 year period. ~~(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a~~, ERIMP updates are aligned with the latest published DOD

strategic guidance, CCMD TPPs, and other USTRANSCOM products and processes such as the TRANSCOM Posture Infrastructure Steering Committee (TPISC).

III.3 ~~(U)~~ Contingency Locations. USAFRICOM has eight Contingency Locations (CLs) ~~(b)(1)1.7c~~
~~_____~~. Table 2 is a summary of USAFRICOM's CLs.

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ Bizerte, Tunisia. CL Bizerte is located at Sidi Ahmed Airbase (ICAO: DTTB) near Bizerte, Tunisia. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~_____~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~
~~_____~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a~~ CL Bizerte is currently in a cold status after the departure of airborne ISR in early 2020.

2. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Misrata, Libya. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~_____~~

~~(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d, (b)(1) 1.4g~~
~~_____~~

3. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Ouallam, Niger. ~~(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g~~
~~_____~~

~~(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g~~
~~_____~~

4. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Diffa, Niger. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~_____~~

~~(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g~~
~~_____~~

5. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Kismayo, Somalia. ~~(b)(1)1.4a~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

(b)(1)l.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(1)l.4g [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] .

6. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)l.4a [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


7. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)l.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

8. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)l.4a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM is working to set conditions for the use of Gaborone as a crisis response location.

Table 2. (U) USAFRICOM Contingency Locations (Table classified S//REL-USA, FVEY)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



~~(U)~~ Chapter IV: Agreements

IV.1 ~~(U)~~ Status of Current Agreements

1. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1) 1.7c, (b)(3) 10 USC § 130e

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

3. ~~(U)~~ Future and Pending Agreements:

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Kenya Agreement. (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The establishment of “unimpeded access” in an agreement (such as the FAA), or a non-binding arrangement, is the standard for establishing “operational control” at a posture location, which is necessary for undertaking military construction repairs or improvements to existing U.S. facilities. USAFRICOM has an adequate level of operational control for Unspecified Minor Military Construction (UMMC) projects at Mombasa and Nairobi. (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. A recently signed ACSA with Kenya has provided opportunity for a focused discussion with specific KDF officers to facilitate this negotiation.

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Botswana (b)(1) 1.4a

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM supports the establishment of a DCA with the Government of Botswana to facilitate global SOFA text status protections for U.S. DOD personnel, access and use of areas and facilities for personnel conducting security cooperation activities, to assure access for regional crisis planning and response, and to enable other operations.

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ The U.S. and Niger have a 2014 Access Agreement (AA) covering the U.S. use of facilities at Niamey and Agadez. U.S. requirements have matured and expanded since 2014. In accordance with the text of the AA, the U.S. has agreed to define the “exclusive use of the United States forces” jointly with Niger. (b)(1) 1.4a

(b)(1)I.4a

[REDACTED] In addition, USAFRICOM seeks to Nigerien concurrence for unimpeded access to with an expanded footprint for future MILCON projects at Niamey.

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)I.4a, (b)(1)I.4d, (b)(1)I.4b

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

e. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Gabon DCA. USAFRICOM seeks the conclusion of DCA negotiations with the Government of Gabon for status protections of U.S. DOD personnel and access and use of areas and facilities at CSL Libreville, Gabon and routine presence of U.S. DOD personnel conducting security cooperation activities. (b)(1)I.4a

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


f. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Tunisia SOFA. (b)(1)I.4a, (b)(1)I.4g

[REDACTED] USAFRICOM maintains engagements with Tunisia, conducting counterterrorism and security cooperation activities. Additionally, personnel deploy to Tunisia routinely to participate in exercises. USAFRICOM seeks conclusion of ongoing, but stalled, SOFA negotiations to reduce military and strategic risk in Tunisia. (b)(1)I.4a


[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Table 3. ~~(U)~~ Status of Current USAFRICOM International Agreements (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)


(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




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
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
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
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
(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




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
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
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
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
(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




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
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
(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

Table notes:

(b)(1)1.4a

IV.2: ~~(U)~~ Prioritizing Agreement Actions.

1. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM establishes agreement priorities on the basis of a tiered risk framework, prioritizing the establishment of agreements to enable risk-mitigated operations, activities, and investments. These priorities are subject to change after the TPP is signed out on the basis of reordered priorities arising from DOD decisions on the employment of forces throughout the AOR. Note that some locations will have multiple considerations associated with the risk-based framework:

a. ~~(U)~~ Countries in which there are ongoing U.S. operations/deployments, but that provide insufficient legal protections (e.g., C-VEO operations for which there is a legal/status protection risk for participating personnel).

b. ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations, but that provide insufficient legal protections or access guarantees (e.g., New Normal posture locations with access-related mission accomplishment risk).

c. ~~(U)~~ Countries with established posture locations at which U.S. forces are conducting or planning to conduct multilateral exercises for which insufficient legal protections or access guarantees exist.

d. ~~(U)~~ Countries with posture locations with potential priority missions with insufficient legal protections (e.g., competition missions).

2. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM has developed a methodology to prioritize its agreement initiatives based on factors drawn from command strategic guidance. This approach sums an assessment of relevant factors to produce a numerically expressed priority list subject to CCCR review and confirmation. The strategic factors include:

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

c. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

d. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

e. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

f. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

g. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a




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
Table 4.-(U) Priority of Required Agreements (Table classified ~~S//REL-USA, FVEY~~)

Priority	Country	Proposed Agreement and Type	Rationale, Operational Purpose. Risk/Impact if Not Achieved	Desired Date
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d				

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




~~(U)~~ Chapter V: Appendices

~~(U)~~ Appendix 1: Theater Maps. The map below incorporates USAFRICOM posture locations for FY23, and further depicts the USEUCOM posture locations on which USAFRICOM relies for a range of requirements.

FY23 USAFRICOM Posture Footprint ~~(U)~~


(b)(1)1.4a



~~(U)~~ Appendix 2: Charts of Posture by Location

1. Accra, Ghana.....	77
2. Agadez, Niger.....	78
3. Ascension Island, United Kingdom.....	79
4. Baledogle, Somalia.....	80
5. Berbera, Somalia.....	81
6. Bizerte, Tunisia.....	82
7. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.....	83
8. Chebelley, Djibouti.....	84
9. Dakar, Senegal.....	85
10. Diffa, Niger.....	86
11. Entebbe, Uganda.....	87
12. Gaborone, Botswana.....	88
13. Kismayo, Somalia.....	89
14. Libreville, Gabon.....	90
15. Manda Bay, Kenya.....	91
16. Misrata, Libya.....	92
17. Mombasa, Kenya.....	93
18. Mogadishu, Somalia.....	94
19. Niamey, Niger.....	95
20. Mogadishu, Somalia.....	96
21. Ouallam, Niger.....	97


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d




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
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
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
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
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(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d




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
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(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d



~~(U)~~ Appendix 3: Project Summary Sheets. The following military construction projects are ordered in terms of priority by fiscal year.

1. <u>Fiscal Year 24</u>	
a. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Central Energy Plant Construction.....	99
2. <u>Fiscal Year 25</u>	
a. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Enduring Apron Expansion (Phase II).....	99
b. Chebelley, Djibouti: Prime Power Plant and Distribution.....	100
c. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Combined Air Cargo Passenger Terminal.....	100
3. <u>Fiscal Year 26</u>	
a. Agadez, Niger: Construct Mobility Apron.....	101
b. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Unaccompanied Housing Phase III.....	101
c. Chebelley, Djibouti: Perimeter Lighting.....	102
d. Stuttgart, Germany: U.S. AFRICOM HQ Facility and Joint Cyber Center.....	102
4. <u>Fiscal Year 27</u>	
a. Chebelley, Djibouti: Construct Life Support Area/Cantonment.....	103
b. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Galley II.....	103
c. Agadez, Niger: Prime Power Plan.....	104
d. Agadez, Niger: Construct East Ramp, Taxiway, Hangars, and CALA Pad.....	104
5. <u>Fiscal Year 28-29</u>	104

~~(U)~~ Appendix 3: Project Summary Sheets. The following military construction projects are ordered in terms of priority by fiscal year.


1. Fiscal Year 24:

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


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
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


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
3. Fiscal Year 26:

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


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(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d




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


4. Fiscal Year 27:

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d




(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

~~(U)~~ Appendix 4: MILCON Prioritization (Table Classified ~~SECRET~~)

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



~~(U)~~ Appendix 5: Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations (ECN)

1. ~~(U)~~ ECN change recommendations: Refer to *I.4.4.a* thru *I.4.4.g*.

Table 5. ~~(U)~~ Enduring Location Master List Change Nominations

EL Name	Country	EL Category	Broad Purpose / Planned Capability	Change (New / Closure / Redesignation)	Nominated Lead Service
(b)(1)1.4a					

~~(U)~~ Appendix 6: Contingency Location Master List Change Nominations (CCN)

1. ~~(U)~~ CCN: (b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(U)~~ Discussion

1) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2) ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

4) (~~S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

5) (~~S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

2. ~~(U)~~ CCN: TCL Gaborone – Establishment

a. ~~(S)~~ Proposal Summary. A posture location at Sir Seretse Khama International Airport (SSKIA) in Gaborone fills a longstanding void in the U.S. posture footprint in Southern Africa, a region nearly the size of the continental United States. A TCL will better enable DOD response to crises in Southern Africa, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4d

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(U)~~ Discussion

1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

2) ~~(U)~~ The lack of a Southern Africa posture location requires the U.S. to assume risk relative to the four missions described above. The vast distance between U.S. Forces and USG personnel in southern Africa result in prolonged response time leaving U.S. personnel in southern Africa vulnerable during times of crisis. (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

[REDACTED]

3) ~~(U)~~ Recently, the President of Botswana expressed his support for a U.S. posture location, but requested it be located at SSKIA due to political concerns. (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

[REDACTED]

(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

4) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

Table 6. ~~(U)~~ Contingency Location Master List Change Nominations

(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

~~(U)~~ Appendix 7: EL and CL Closures

1. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM proposes the closure of on contingency locations, Thebephatshwa, Botswana.

a. ~~(U)~~ TCL Thebephatshwa was established during FY21. Since then it has had no routine presence by U.S. forces. Accordingly, no lead Service is assigned, no access agreements have been put in place, no U.S. property exists at the location, and no construction is anticipated. The President of Botswana welcomed a U.S. CL in Botswana but his desire is for the CL is at Sir Seretse Khama International Airport in Gaborone. For these reasons, USAFRICOM closed TCL Thebephatshwa. USAFRICOM will coordinate the timing of the closure of TCL Thebephatshwa to maximize the political impact in support of U.S. and allied policy aims.

Table 7.-(U)-Contingency Location Closures

(b)(1) 1.7e, (b)(3)10 USC § 130e

~~(U)~~ Acronyms

AA	Access Agreement
ACP	USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
ACO	USAFRICOM Campaign Order
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
AFAFRICA	U.S. Air Forces Africa
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APIT	Africa Posture Implementation Team
APOE/D	Aerial Port of Embarkation/Debarcation
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASC	Airport Services Contract
ASP	Ammunition Storage Point
ATOC	Air Terminal Operations Center
BAM	Bab al-Mandab
BH	Boko Haram
BOS	Base Operating Support
BPLAN	Base Plan
BM	Ballistic Missile
C2	Command and Control
C2F	Command and Control Facility
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CCMD	Combatant Command
CEMIRT	Civil Engineer Maintenance, Inspection, and Repair Team
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CL	Contingency Location
CLDJ	Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti
CLML	Contingency Location Master List

CLU	Containerized Living Units
CM	Cruise Missile
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMSE	Civil-Military Support Element
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
C-SA/MAD	Crisis Response – Security Augmentation and Military Assisted Departure
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSL	Cooperative Security Location
CT	Counterterrorism
C-VEO	Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
DA	Direct Action
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement
DIPNOTE	Diplomatic Note
DJBC	Djibouti Base Cluster
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DPIT	Diplomatic Security Augmentation Posture Implementation Team
EARF	East Africa Response Force
ECN	ELML Change Nomination
ELML	Enduring Location Master List
ERC	Exercise-Related Construction
ESPCS	Expeditionary Space Control Squadron
EXORD	Execute Order
F/W	Fixed-wing
FAA	Facilities Access Agreement
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FOS	Forward Operating Site

FP	Force Protection
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GFM	Global Force Management
GFMAP	Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GPEC	Global Posture Executive Council
GPR	Global Posture Review
HAF	Headquarters, Air Force
HN	Host Nation
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HTHR	High-Threat/High-Risk
IA	Implementing Arrangement
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INSSG	Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
ISIS	Islamic State
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCC	Joint Cyber Center
JTF-HOA	Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
KNAV	Kenyan Navy
LAMS	Large Area Maintenance Shelter
LSA	Life Support Area
MARFORAF	U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NARF	North and West Africa Response Force
NAVAF	U.S. Naval Forces Africa
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command

NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	Net Square Feet
NSS	National Security Strategy
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OAI	Operations, Activities, and Investments
OJS	Operation JUNIPER SHIELD
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSDP	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
P&D	Planning and Design
PCR	Planning Charette Report
PLANORD	Planning Order
PR	Personnel Recovery
QRC	Quick Reaction Capability
R/W	Rotary-wing
RPA	Remotely Piloted Aircraft
SAP	Special Access Programs
SECFOR	Security Force
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCAFRICA	Special Operations Command Africa
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSA	Secured Sensitive Areas
STO	Special Technical Operations
TPP	Theater Posture Plan
TPISC	USTRANSCOM Posture Initiative Steering Committee

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UFC	Unified Facilities Criteria
UMMC	Unspecified Minor Military Construction
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces Europe
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAG	U.S. Army Garrison
USAREUR-AF	United States Army Europe – Africa
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USG	U.S. Government
USSF	United States Space Force
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations
WRN	Warfighter Recovery Network