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UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

CAMPAIGN PLAN 2000-19



FISCAL YEARS 2019-2023
1 October 2018

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
KELLEY BARRACKS, STUTTGART, GERMANY
UNIT 29951, APO AE 09751-995101
22 June 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR See Distribution

SUBJECT: U.S. Africa Command Campaign Plan 2000-19 for Fiscal Years
2019-2023

1. ~~(U)~~ References:

a. ~~(U)~~ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS),
December 2017 ~~(U)~~.

b. ~~(U)~~ *2018 National Defense Strategy* (NDS), January 2018 ~~(S)~~.

c. ~~(U)~~ *National Military Strategy* (NMS), 11 November 2016 ~~(S)~~.

d. ~~(U)~~ *Contingency Planning Guidance* (CPG) 2018-2020, Draft ~~(TS)~~.

e. ~~(U)~~ *2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan* (JSCP), Draft ~~(S)~~.

2. ~~(U)~~ The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Campaign Plan 2000-19 (ACP 2000-19) is approved for implementation and execution within the Command's area of responsibility.

3. ~~(U)~~ This plan is effective on 1 October 2018. The staff, components, and subordinate commands will begin transitioning to this plan starting on 9 July 2018.

3. ~~(U)~~ This plan supersedes USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan 2000-16 (USAFRICOM TCP 2000-16) Change Two, dated 01 October 2017.

THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander, U.S. Africa Command

Distribution: See Annex Z

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01 October 2018

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND CAMPAIGN PLAN 2000-19 ~~(S)~~
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES

1. ~~(U)~~ Plan Title.
 - a. ~~(U)~~ Long Title: United States Africa Command Campaign Plan 2000-19.
 - b. ~~(U)~~ Short Title: USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19 (ACP 2000-19).
2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ This document is classified ~~SECRET~~. Disseminate plan information only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of this plan.
3. ~~(U)~~ This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, United States Code, sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits transmission, or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person.
4. ~~(U)~~ Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, is prohibited without permission of this headquarters, except as required for the preparation of supporting plans.
5. ~~(U)~~ This plan supersedes USAFRICOM TCP 2000-16 Change Two, dated 01 October 2017.

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE POSTED	POSTED BY

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1 October 2018

USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19
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USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19

(U) PLAN SUMMARY

1. ~~(U)~~ The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Campaign Plan (ACP) implements the *United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2018-2027* and directly supports national policy guidance. A five-year plan, this document informs resource adjustments in the near-term (fiscal years (FY) 19-20) and shapes resources in the mid-term (FY 21-23). The plan will be operationalized at the combatant command level by two means:

a. ~~(U)~~ **Annual Guidance**. Two documents will be critical in operationalizing the plan: the annual USAFRICOM Campaign Guidance (ACG), developed by the USAFRICOM Strategy, Engagement, and Programs Directorate (J5), and the USAFRICOM Campaign Order (ACO), developed by the USAFRICOM Operations Directorate (J3). The ACG will identify priority efforts 18+ months in the future to inform components' resource requests. The ACO, which focuses on the coming fiscal year, provides detailed campaign priorities and integrates outputs from the annual planning cycles from across the campaign ways into an order for synchronized execution. Details of this process can be found in Annex C (Operations).

b. ~~(U)~~ **Battle Rhythm**. USAFRICOM's battle rhythm will operationalize the plan through effective coordination, synchronization, and decision making across the staff. The battle rhythm will include boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WG) and other campaign-focused events.

2. ~~(U)~~ **USAFRICOM Theater Strategy**. Published 23 April 2018, the *USAFRICOM Theater Strategy* articulates a partner-centric strategic approach and five long-term (ten-year) strategic objectives. Derived from national policy documents, the strategy informs the mid-term (five-year) campaign-plan objectives, thereby advancing the command's progress towards its strategic objectives.

3. ~~(U)~~ **Mission**. USAFRICOM, with partners, strengthens security forces, counters transnational threats, and conducts crisis response in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

4. ~~(U)~~ **Campaign Design and Combatant Commander (CCDR) Prioritization**.

a. ~~(U)~~ **Decisive Activities**. Decisive activities are those that directly accomplish the mission. USAFRICOM's decisive activities are those that strengthen relationships and enhance capabilities of African partners: security force assistance (SFA), exercises, and engagements.

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b. ~~(U)~~ Shaping Activities. Shaping activities are operations that create the time and space necessary for USAFRICOM and partners to focus on decisive activities.

c. ~~(U)~~ Sustaining Activities. Sustaining activities preserve or set conditions for shaping and decisive activities throughout the campaign. Sustaining activities mature the theater by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding in order to conduct USAFRICOM's day-to-day, crisis, and contingency operations.

d. ~~(U)~~ Main and Supporting Efforts. This framework describes the CCDR's short-term prioritization of resources in support of campaign objectives. The main effort is the CCDR's designated priority for a period of time but will likely change over the course of the campaign. In contrast, the supporting effort has less priority for resources over periods of time, but remains necessary to accomplish campaign objectives.

5. ~~(U)~~ **Campaign Objectives**.

a. ~~(U)~~ **U.S. Influence is Increased**. The U.S. and its allies are established as preferred regional security partners, and U.S. interests in Africa are protected against destabilizing competitor state influence, activities, and aggression.

b. ~~(U)~~ **African Partners Contribute to Regional Security**. African partners, consistent with the rule of law and respect for human rights, secure their sovereign interests, export security, promote economic prosperity, and provide legitimate, accountable, and effective governance.

c. ~~(U)~~ **VEO Threats are Reduced**. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten U.S. interests are degraded and contained for defeat by African partners in accordance with the rule of law and respect for human rights.

d. ~~(U)~~ **The USAFRICOM Theater is Set**. USAFRICOM forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding are aligned in order to conduct day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.

e. ~~(U)~~ **U.S. Government Personnel and Property are Protected**. USAFRICOM maintains the ability to protect U.S. Government personnel and property.

6. ~~(U)~~ **Lines of Effort (LOEs)**. To accomplish campaign objectives, the operational approach consists of six LOEs. Each LOE supports the accomplishment of all campaign objectives and sets conditions to achieve the theater strategy's objectives. The six LOEs are:

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- a. ~~(U)~~ LOE 1: Strengthen Partner Networks.
 - b. ~~(U)~~ LOE 2: Enhance Partner Capability.
 - c. ~~(U)~~ LOE 3: Develop Security in Somalia.
 - d. ~~(U)~~ LOE 4: Contain Instability in Libya.
 - e. ~~(U)~~ LOE 5: Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region (LCR).
 - f. ~~(U)~~ LOE 6: Set the Theater.
7. ~~(U)~~ The CCDR will use staff synchronization matrices, staff estimates, and assessments to measure progress and adjust resourcing, execution, and priorities of the theater campaign. Adjustments will be directed by the following methods:
- a. ~~(U)~~ Fragmentary orders to the ACO that modify execution. See Appendix 19 (USAFRICOM Campaign Order) to Annex C (Operations) for a detailed discussion.
 - b. ~~(U)~~ Adjustments to resource submissions either directly to the Joint Staff/Office of the Secretary of Defense or through resource requests made from a USAFRICOM component to a service.
 - c. ~~(U)~~ Publishing changes to the campaign plan such as adjusting the objectives, intermediate objectives, or other aspects of the operational approach.

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- a. (U) *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017 (U).
- b. (U) *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*, 3 November 2017 (U).
- c. (U) *U.S. Strategic Action Plan for Somalia*, June 2017 (S//NF).
- d. (U) *U.S. Strategy for Countering Boko Haram / ISIS-West Africa*, March 2017 (S//~~(b)(1)~~1.4d [REDACTED]).
- e. (U) *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, August 2011 (S//~~(b)(1)~~1.4d [REDACTED]).
- f. (U) *2016 National Drug Control Strategy* (U).
- g. (U) *National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking*, February 2014 (U).
- h. (U) *Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking*, February 2015 (U).
- i. (U) *United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan*, June 2014, (U).
- j. (U) Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 5 April 2013 (U).
- k. (U) Presidential Study Directive 10, *Mass Atrocities*, 4 August 2011 (U).
- l. (U) *2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (NDS), 19 January 2018 (S).
- m. (U) *National Military Strategy (NMS)*, 11 November 2016 (S).
- n. (U) *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, March 2015 (U).
- o. (U) *Draft Contingency Planning Guidance 2018-2020 (CPG)*, TBP (TS).
- p. (U) *FY 16-17 Global Force Management Implementation Guidance*, 28 January 2016 (S).
- q. (U) *FY 18 Global Force Management Allocation Plan*, 13 January 2017 (S).

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- r. ~~(U)~~ *FY 20-24 Defense Planning Guidance*, 10 January 2018 ~~(S//NF)~~.
- s. ~~(U)~~ *Principles, Standards, and Procedures for U.S. Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets*, 19 October 2017 ~~(S//NF)~~.
- t. ~~(U)~~ *Department of Defense Operating Principles for Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets in Libya*, 4 January 2018, ~~(S//NF)~~.
- u. ~~(U)~~ *Department of Defense Operating Principles for Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets in Somalia*, 4 January 2018 ~~(S//NF)~~.
- v. ~~(U)~~ *Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, September 2013 ~~(U)~~.
- w. ~~(U)~~ DODD 5205.14 *DoD Counter Threat Finance Policy*, 19 August 2010 ~~(U)~~.
- x. ~~(U)~~ DODD 5135.03 *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, 24 October 2008 ~~(U)~~.
- y. ~~(U)~~ DODI 5000.68 *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, 27 October 2010 ~~(U)~~.
- z. ~~(U)~~ Draft CJCSI 3110.01K *2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) w/included Global Campaign Plans*, TBP ~~(S)~~.
- aa. ~~(U)~~ *Campaign Plan-Global Distribution*, 14 January 2014 ~~(S)~~.
- bb. ~~(U)~~ *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*, 16 March 2018 ~~(U)~~.
- cc. ~~(U)~~ CJCSM 3130.01A, *Theater Campaign Planning Policies and Procedures*, 25 November 2014 ~~(U)~~.
- dd. ~~(U)~~ CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*, 18 October 2012 ~~(U)~~.
- ee. ~~(U)~~ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 16 June 2017 ~~(U)~~.
- ff. ~~(U)~~ Joint Publication 3-15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*, 09 January 2012 ~~(U)~~.
- gg. ~~(U)~~ Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, 23 May 2017 ~~(U)~~.
- hh. ~~(U)~~ Joint Publication 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 03 January 2014 ~~(U)~~.
- ii. ~~(U)~~ *United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2018-2027*, April 2018

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~~(S)~~.

jj. ~~(U)~~ ACI 3200.07A, *Non-Lethal Weapons Program*, 28 July 2015 ~~(U)~~.

kk. ~~(U)~~ ACI 3200.08A, *Command Succession and Commander Availability* (Change 2), 3 March 2016 ~~(U)~~.

ll. ~~(U)~~ ACI 3800.01, *Meteorology and Oceanography Concept of Operations*, 30 November 2016 ~~(U)~~.

mm. ~~(U)~~ ACI 3900.06, *Running Staff Estimates*, 7 June 2016 ~~(U//FOUO)~~.

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oo. ~~(U)~~ ACI 5800.05, *International Agreements*, 18 October 2010 ~~(U)~~.

pp. ~~(U)~~ ACI 5800.08a, *Status of Forces Policies and Information*, 11 May 2015 ~~(U)~~.

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USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19

1. (U) **Situation.**

a. (U) **Purpose.** The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Campaign Plan (ACP) implements the *United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2018-2027* (reference ii) and directly supports national policy guidance. A five-year plan, this document informs resource adjustments in the near-term (fiscal years (FY) 19-20) and shapes resources in the mid-term (FY 21-23).

b. (U) **Scope.** The plan synchronizes the Combatant Commander's (CCDR) campaign ways (security force assistance, exercises, engagements, operations, and maturing the theater) with available means (funding, personnel, forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, senior leaders' time, international and interagency relationships, and the National Guard State Partnership Program) to achieve campaign objectives. The annual USAFRICOM Campaign Guidance (ACG) will provide guidance beyond the upcoming fiscal year. Further details on execution of the campaign will be found in the annual USAFRICOM Campaign Order (ACO), fragmentary orders to the ACO, and operations orders. The semi-annual USAFRICOM campaign assessment will assess effectiveness of efforts to achieve intermediate objectives and provide recommendation to enhance effectiveness.

c. (U) **U.S. Policy Goals.** U.S. policy that informs this plan includes the 2017 *National Security Strategy* (reference a), 2018 *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) (reference l), draft 2018 *Contingency Planning Guidance* (CPG) (reference o), 2016 *National Military Strategy* (NMS) (reference m), draft *Joint Strategic Campaign Plan* (JSCP) (reference z), and regional and country-specific strategies and action plans.

d. (U) **Geographical Areas of Interest and Responsibility.**

(1) (U) **Area of Interest (AOI).**

(a) (S//)(b)(1)1.4d

USAFRICOM's (b)(1)1.4c

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Additionally, other regional powers such as India in the

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U.S. Indo-Pacific Command¹ (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) and Brazil in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR have maritime or economic interests adjacent to the USAFRICOM AOR.

(b) (U) Because many threats to U.S. national interests in Africa are transregional in nature, USAFRICOM coordinates across seams with other geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and functional combatant commands to mitigate risk. USAFRICOM coordinates with the following commands to identify and manage transregional issues: U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) along the Mediterranean coast of Africa to the Egyptian border; U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) along the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the Egyptian borders with Sudan and Libya; USINDOPACOM along the Indian Ocean boundary; and USSOUTHCOM along the Atlantic Ocean boundary.



Figure 1. (U) USAFRICOM and Adjacent Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility.

1 (U) USAFRICOM currently relies on bases located in the USEUCOM AOR, and USAFRICOM service components are headquartered in and project forces from the USEUCOM AOR.

2 (U) While the specific countries within each GCC's AOR that are of interest to USAFRICOM may change during the campaign, countries within other GCCs' AORs that are consistently of interest include:

¹ Name changed from U.S. Pacific Command on 30 May 2018, and is not reflected in Figure 1.

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a ~~(U)~~ USCENTCOM: Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

b ~~(U)~~ USEUCOM: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom.

c ~~(U)~~ USINDOPACOM: Australia, China, DPRK (North Korea), India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea (South Korea).

(2) ~~(U)~~ **Areas of Responsibility (AOR).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ **U.S. Africa Command.**

1 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ As directed in the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) (reference b) the USAFRICOM AOR (depicted in Figure 1) includes the entire continent of Africa (minus Egypt) and adjacent portions of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.²

2 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Where a boundary between two GCCs meets at the water-land interface (Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean), the demarcation line is twelve nautical miles from the baseline as determined by international law.³ The Straits of Gibraltar and Bab el-Mandeb are assigned to USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, respectively, for the portion of the straits where distances between the baselines are less than 24 nautical miles.

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).** CJTF-HOA is a subordinate command that conducts activities within a designated joint operations area (JOA) consisting of the following countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Burundi, Eritrea, Tanzania, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, and Seychelles. The JOA extends from the air and water-land interface to 12 NM from the low-water line, with the exception of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait noted above.

(3) ~~(U)~~ **Sub-Regions.** USAFRICOM works with its partners in their bilateral, sub-regional, and continental groupings. The African Union (AU)

² ~~(U)~~ The USAFRICOM AOR includes those portions of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans west and south of the line from Antarctica at 068° E, north to 01°40' S/068° E, and west to the African coast at 01°40' S. The southern extent of USAFRICOM's AOR is the Antarctic coastline between 024° W and 068° E.

³ ~~(U)~~ Although the U.S. has not ratified the *1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, the U.S. complies with most of its provisions, to include territorial water demarcation, as a matter of long-standing policy.

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designates the following sub-regions (depicted in Figure 2): East, North, West, Central, and Southern. West African littoral states and their international partners, to include the U.S. Government, designate the Gulf of Guinea, where USAFRICOM engages on maritime security. The Sahel and Maghreb are adjacent geographical and cultural regions, which the Africans and their partners engage as such. The Western Sahel and Lake Chad are regions based on African and partner operational considerations. While useful, regional division of the continent can create seams that affect planning and problem framing. It is therefore beneficial for planners and leaders to realize that formal state boundaries co-exist with pre-colonial and pre-independence links of commerce, culture, language. Transnational criminal groups, to include VEOs, are not bound by geographic regions or internationally recognized political boundaries.



Figure 2. (U) African Union Regions.

(a) (U) **AU East Region.** Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda. Geographically, this region also includes two overseas French departments: Reunion and Mayotte.

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(b) ~~(U)~~ **AU North Region.** Algeria, Egypt (within the USCENTCOM AOR), Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia. Geographically, this region also includes areas within the USEUCOM AOR: the Canary Islands (Spain), Madeira (Portugal), and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the African coast bordering Morocco.

(c) ~~(U)~~ **AU West Region.** Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte-D'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

(d) ~~(U)~~ **AU Central Region.** Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe.

(e) ~~(U)~~ **AU Southern Region.** Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Also within the USAFRICOM AOR are the South Atlantic British island territories of St. Helena, Ascension, and Tristan Da Cunha, as well as Bouvet Island, an uninhabited Norwegian dependency.

(f) ~~(U)~~ **Gulf of Guinea Region.** Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte-D'Ivoire, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Togo.

(g) ~~(U)~~ **Maghreb Region.** Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.

(h) ~~(U)~~ **Sahel Region.**⁴ Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan.

(i) ~~(U)~~ **Western Sahel.**⁵ Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal.

(j) ~~(U)~~ **Lake Chad Region (LCR).** Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria.

⁴ ~~(U)~~ This is the geographically defined Sahel.

⁵ ~~(U)~~ This portion of the Sahel is the focus of Line of Effort 5, Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region.

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e. (U) **Operational Environment and Regional Trends.**

(1) (U) **Strategic Overview.** The next five years in Africa will largely resemble the previous five, with advances in governance, economic development, and conflict resolution, as well as retreats. The primary security challenge for Africa and Africans will be the failure of weak or repressive states to prevent or defeat violent insurgencies that arise from poor governance. The security threats to the U.S. and its allies will be the expansion of foreign VEOs in internal African conflicts. The policy challenge will be to address both phenomena simultaneously through a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. Attempts to limit or curtail U.S. military access and freedom of action by competitor nations such as China, and to a lesser extent Russia, also present challenges. For details and updates on the operational environment and problem framing, visit the electronic-Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (eJIPOE) on USAFRICOM's SIPRNET portal at: <https://portal.usafricom.smil.mil/tools/eJIPOE/Pages/EjipoeApplication.aspx>.

(2) (U) **Framing the Operational Environment.**

(a) (U) **Political Systems and Impact.** Political systems in African states range across the spectrum from fully democratic to fully authoritarian. Even in democracies, flawed elections and low confidence in national institutions often will spark protests and drive unrest. The combination of weak or repressive governance likely will increase internal and transnational stability challenges, to include VEOs. Within the context of unprecedented population growth, environmental degradation and urbanization, these governance issues will also lead to civilian displacement, food insecurity and human rights abuses. States that already struggle to meet the basic needs of their people will be challenged by their diminished institutional capacity and resilience, their uneven economic growth, and their inability to generate employment for the world's youngest populations. Governance that favors one constituency over others, particularly when it is weak and ineffective, will drive grievance-based opposition that becomes violent and radicalized absent democratic alternatives. Weak governance also exacerbates inequality, stunts economic growth, increases the likelihood of illegal activities, and causes or contributes to instability.

(b) (U) **Military Systems and Impact.**

1 (U) The U.S. is represented in all 53 countries of the USAFRICOM AOR, and all 53 present opportunities for a wide range of engagement. That engagement, however, can be circumscribed by law or by policy, as well as by the Department of State (DoS). Appendix 3 (Prioritization) of Annex BB (Security Cooperation) contains lists of priority countries as well


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
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as those that should not be engaged absent an affirmative signal from the command and the interagency.


2 ~~(S//)~~(b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



3 ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



4 ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



5 ~~(S//)~~(b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



6 ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



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(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(c) ~~(U)~~ **Economic Systems and Impact.**

1 ~~(U)~~ Africa's economic performance, like its political record, ranges from superb to terrible. In general terms, however, Africa countries predominate on the bottom rungs of social and economic indicators. While conflicts in Africa generally reflect poor or biased governance more than poverty alone, the combination of lack of employment and rapid population growth provides a deep reservoir of manpower for criminal groups, to include VEOs.

2 ~~(U)~~ The weakness of security sectors and the states they underpin makes military and law enforcement personnel highly susceptible to the corrupting influences of illicit commerce, to include trafficking in narcotics, human beings, minerals, as well as flora and fauna.

3 ~~(U)~~ One challenge to Africa and its supporters is the number of people who are obliged by economic policy to make their living in illicit or semi-legal activities. These behaviors are so commonplace that an attempt to eradicate them would be tantamount to attack on the basic subsistence livelihoods of large populations. U.S. support for such eradication efforts could therefore lead to popular backlash against the U.S. and our partner governments.

4 ~~(U)~~ In most of Africa's struggling economies, corruption is a major disincentive to legitimate investment, and a major draw for the illegitimate kind. In addition to impoverishing entire populations of affected countries, corruption that benefits a small defined group within a society feeds discontent. When that discontent is met by violent repression, including under the guise of the rule of law, insurgencies can arise. Furthermore, corruption in partner militaries degrades their readiness and destroys morale.

(d) ~~(U)~~ **Social Systems and Impact.**

1 ~~(C//)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4d~~ Rapid population growth, a young median age, and increasing urbanization will strain African countries' resources and ability to govern. Weak state institutions and weakened customary authorities will diminish the indigenous conflict resolution capacity of partner states and their societies. At the same time, increased access to formal education, coupled with greater technological integration into global dialogues, will create expectations of a growing aspirational class of frustrated young people within countries that are unable to meet expectations. The near-

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eradication of some diseases, such as polio and smallpox, and progress against HIV/AIDS and malaria, will be imperiled by new public health threats.

2 (C//~~(b)(1)~~)1.4d [REDACTED] One result of internal instability in Africa will be migration, both internal and external. The internal migration will be towards megacities that lack the capacity to provide social services. Most of the external migration will be to neighboring countries in Africa, which can create land-use and other resource-based conflicts with local communities. A small percentage of the overall migration will be to Europe and beyond, but this migration represents a political and public policy challenge for some key U.S. international partners. Global migration facilitation networks also have the potential to finance transnational criminal networks, to include VEOs.

(e) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e [REDACTED]

(f) (U) **Infrastructure Systems and Impact.** Infrastructure across Africa is generally poor and many areas are inaccessible. Inadequate access to electricity, potable water, and paved roads remains a major barrier to development. China is the leading investor in African infrastructure, but its goal is access to mineral resources and critical national infrastructure. Western infrastructure investment is significantly lower in dollar terms, but is general aimed at improving economic performance at both the micro and macro levels. The overall lack of infrastructure complicates military support and compounds effects of basic needs shortages and the delivery of humanitarian aid.

(3) (U) **Problem Framing and Outlooks.**

(a) (U) **African Internal Security Actors, Factors, and Outlooks.**

1 (C//~~(b)(1)~~)1.7e [REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED]

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2 (S//)(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4c

3 (S//)(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4c

4 (U) VEO Outlooks.

a (S)(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

b (S)(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4c

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c ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d




(b) ~~(U)~~ **African External Security Actors, Factors, and Outlooks.**

1 ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

approximately 2,200 Chinese troops and advisors are
deployed to seven UN operations in Africa. (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d



2 ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4d



(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

3 (S//)(b)(1)1.4d

Iran.

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

4 (S//)(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c

(4) (U) **eJIPOE**. For updated details on the operational environment and regional trends, visit the eJIPOE on USAFRICOM's SIPRNET portal at: <https://portal.usafricom.smil.mil/tools/eJIPOE/Pages/EjipoeApplication.aspx>.

f. (U) **Friendly Forces and Partners.**

(1)(S//)(b)(1)1.4d

National Planning Guidance.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(a) (U) **National Defense Strategy (NDS).**

1 (U) The NDS directs the Department of Defense (DoD) to build a more lethal Joint Force, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and reform the department for greater performance and affordability. This will improve DoD's ability to defend the homeland, remain the preeminent global military power, ensure favorable balances of power, and advance an international order conducive to U.S. security and prosperity.

2 (U) Globally, the long-term competitions with China and Russia are the priority due to the magnitude of the threats they pose today and the potential for those to increase in the future. Concurrently, DoD will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat

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terrorist threats to the U.S., and consolidate our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.

3 (U) For Africa, DoD will bolster existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships and develop new relationships to address significant terrorist threats that threaten U.S. interests and contribute to challenges in Europe and the Middle East. The focus will be to work by, with, and through African and international partners to degrade terrorists; build the capability required to counter violent extremism, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal arms trade with limited outside assistance; and limit the malign influence of non-African powers.

(b) (U) **Draft Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).**


1 (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d



2 (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d



(c) (S) **National Military Strategy (NMS).** (b)(1) 1.4 a
(b)(1) 1.4 a



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of traditional armed conflict, deter conventional attack, deter the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and respond to threats.

(d) (U) **Draft Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).**

1 (U) The 2018 JSCP, which supersedes the 2015 *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, is the CJCS's primary document to guide and direct Joint Force planning. It also assists the President and Secretary of Defense in operationalizing the *National Security Strategy*, NDS, and NMS.

2 (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a

3 (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4d
(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(2) (U) **Partners and Adjacent Forces.** USAFRICOM works with multiple partners to build mutually beneficial relationships and advance shared interests. For the purposes of this plan, USAFRICOM groups our diverse partners into the following general categories:

(a) (U) **Interagency Partners.** Interagency partners are organizations across the U.S. Government that USAFRICOM partners with to accomplish shared goals. While we work with all interagency partners, the DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the command's primary non-DoD partners in accomplishing U.S. objectives in Africa.

(b) (U) **African Partners.** All 53 countries within the AOR are current or potential partners. However, USAFRICOM adheres to national policy limiting engagements with some countries based on legal or other political factors. For a list of these countries, see Appendix 3 (Prioritization) of Annex BB (Security Cooperation).

(c) (U) **Campaign Partners.** Campaign partners are a subset of USAFRICOM African partners prioritized by line of effort (LOE) or functional

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area as described in paragraph 3.i. and in Appendix 3 (Prioritization) of Annex BB (Security Cooperation).

(d) ~~(U)~~ **International Partners.** International partners include those countries outside the AOR the command works with in order to accomplish shared goals linked to USAFRICOM objectives.

(e) ~~(U)~~ **Multilateral Partners.** USAFRICOM works with a variety of multilateral organizations to accomplish shared goals linked to USAFRICOM objectives. These partners include international organizations created by formal agreements (e.g., treaties) between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis. The below list includes some of the primary USAFRICOM multilateral partners.

1 ~~(U)~~ African Union (AU). USAFRICOM's partnership with the AU includes a working relationship with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which includes the following troop contributing countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.⁶

2 ~~(U)~~ European Union (EU). USAFRICOM coordinates with multiple EU military organizations (e.g. EU Naval Forces, EU training missions, and EU capacity-building missions).

3 ~~(U)~~ G5 Sahel. The G5 Sahel, made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, recently stood up a joint force for counter-VEO operations.

4 ~~(U)~~ Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). USAFRICOM supports this coalition of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

5 ~~(U)~~ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO, which includes 29 countries, supports AMISOM and the African Standby Force.

6 ~~(U)~~ Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Facilitating regional economic integration, RECs are groups of African states that USAFRICOM interacts with regularly. Critical RECs include the following:

a ~~(U)~~ Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). CEMAC is made up of six countries focused on improving exchange and cooperation: Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and ROC.

⁶ ~~(U)~~ AMISOM also includes police from six contributing countries: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.

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b ~~(U)~~ East African Community (EAC). EAC represents six East African countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania.

c ~~(U)~~ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). USAFRICOM supports security efforts by this economic union of 15 West African nations.

d ~~(U)~~ Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS includes 11 Central African states.

e ~~(U)~~ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD is an eight-country East African trade bloc focused on promoting regional cooperation.

f ~~(U)~~ Southern African Development Community (SADC). 15 countries make up this Southern African regional economic community.

7 ~~(U)~~ United Nations (UN). USAFRICOM works with multiple UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and other UN organizations and affiliates operating in Africa.

(f) ~~(U)~~ **DoD Partners**. USAFRICOM coordinates closely with a variety of organizations across DoD to accomplish national strategic security objectives. For the execution of this campaign, partnerships with the below are particularly important.

1 ~~(U)~~ Combatant Commands: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

2 ~~(U)~~ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

3 ~~(U)~~ Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

4 ~~(U)~~ Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and its subordinate component, the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization.

5 ~~(U)~~ National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

6 ~~(U)~~ Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

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7 ~~(U)~~ Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

8 ~~(U)~~ National Security Agency (NSA).

9 ~~(U)~~ Defense Health Agency (DHA).

10 ~~(U)~~ Security Cooperation Agencies. To execute its security cooperation mission, USAFRICOM works with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and corresponding service agencies: the Deputy Under-Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs; the United States Army Security Assistance Command; and Navy International Programs Office.

(g) ~~(U)~~ **Non-governmental Organizations and Private Companies**. USAFRICOM coordinates as necessary with certain private, self-governing, profit-centered, or not-for-profit organizations. Although these organizations are not formal partners, their goals are often compatible with U.S. Government, USAFRICOM, and partner objectives.

(h) ~~(U)~~ **Components and Subordinate Commands**. USAFRICOM assigned forces are detailed in Annex A (Task Organization) & Annex J (Command Relationships). USAFRICOM is allocated forces annually via the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. USAFRICOM's task organization below the service component and subordinate command headquarters changes annually.

g. ~~(U)~~ **Assumptions**.

(1) ~~(S)~~ USAFRICOM will maintain authorities and funding derived from current execution orders, but will see some decrease in resources as DoD curbs non-essential activities.

(2) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM will obtain the necessary authorities and permissions to provide security force assistance (SFA) for campaign partners.

(3) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM will maintain its agreements with Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, and Italy for the staging of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; crisis response forces; and other resources.

(4) ~~(U)~~ Campaign partners will continue to provide access and support at current locations.

(5) ~~(S)~~ ~~(U)~~ ~~(b)(1)~~ 1.4d

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d

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(6) (U) Interagency partners will have fewer resources to invest in African long-term development, governance, and human rights issues.

(7) (S//)(b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a

(8) (U) (b)(1)1.7e
(b)(1)1.7e

(9) (U) The AMISOM mandate and EU funding will be extended through the campaign, with AMISOM troop-contributing countries continuing to support AMISOM.

(10) (U) International and multilateral partners will continue to cooperatively invest in African stability and security at current level, both on a bilateral basis and through multilateral partners such as the MNJTF and G5 Sahel.

h. (U) **Gender Considerations.**

(1) (U) **African Perspectives.** Understanding the various ways in which conflict and instability on the continent affect men, women, boys, and girls differently is critical to addressing African challenges. The socially constructed roles, rights, responsibilities, entitlements, and obligations appropriate for men, women, boys, and girls differ across each African culture or sub-culture and impact the effectiveness of USAFRICOM efforts across the continent.

(2) (U) **USAFRICOM Responsibilities.** USAFRICOM planning and day-to-day operations must reflect an understanding of the extent that gender norms and behaviors affect operations, actions, and investments; desired effects; and objectives across Africa. The *Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act* of 2017 provides national policy and objectives for a variety of initiatives. Specific guidance for analyzing gender in Africa, the command's obligations under the WPS Act, and the effects of gender upon USAFRICOM operations are found in Annex I (Women, Peace, and Security).

i. (U) **Legal Considerations.**

(1) (U) USAFRICOM utilizes all forms of international law, specifically international agreements, to advance objectives related to posture, access, freedom of movement, logistics support, and status protections. International law and agreement matters should normally be coordinated with OSD and may further require consultation with the DoS.

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(a) ~~(U)~~ **Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA).**

1 ~~(U)~~ SOFAs and status protection agreements define the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. SOFAs and status protection agreements generally provide a variety of privileges, immunities, exemptions, and benefits to the visiting force. Provisions in these agreements describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or the authority of local officials.

2 ~~(U)~~ Under U.S. law, SOFAs must be negotiated by DoS and are generally based on template agreements incorporating comprehensive privileges, immunities, and other provisions that facilitate access and freedom of movement.

3 ~~(U)~~ In Africa, most U.S. status protection agreements are diplomatic notes under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. These agreements are referred to as administrative and technical status agreements because they typically confer upon DoD personnel the status protections equivalent to those accorded to administrative and technical staff of the U.S. embassy.

4 ~~(U)~~ SOFAs and status protection agreements attempt to standardize and define the terms and conditions under which U.S. activities will be carried out, particularly in joint and combined environments. See USAFRICOM Command Instruction (ACI) 5800.05 (reference oo) and ACI 5800.08a (reference pp) for detailed information.

(b) ~~(U)~~ **Logistics Agreements.** Logistics agreements, which include acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) and fuel-servicing agreements, ensure U.S. and partner forces have the logistical capability to conduct the full range of military operations.

(2) ~~(U)~~ African country law studies, legal engagement activities, and military-to-military exchanges enable USAFRICOM to develop understanding of the law and practices of African states. These laws and practices must be taken into account during the planning and execution of the campaign.

(3) ~~(U)~~ The planning and execution of military operations in peacetime and during periods of hostilities must be in compliance with domestic and international law. These efforts include, but are not limited to, applying the Law of Armed Conflict across the conflict spectrum; development of rules of engagement; and applying laws relating to security assistance, training, mobilization, pre-deployment preparation, deployment, overseas procurement,

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the conduct of military combat operations, ISR, combating terrorism, illicit trafficking, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations.

(4) (U) Fiscal, administrative, and civil law ensure prompt, efficient, and appropriate conduct of military operations at all levels. While some fiscal authorities fall within Title 10 authority, many fiscal authorities linked to SFA fall under Title 22 authorities. SFA programs that require DoS and DoD approval are referred to as dual-key programs and emphasize the criticality of USAFRICOM's interagency partnerships.

2. (U) **Mission.** USAFRICOM, with partners, strengthens security forces, counters transnational threats, and conducts crisis response in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Commander's Intent.**

(1) (U) **Purpose.** Synchronize, prioritize, and implement operations and activities to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

(2) (U) **Method.** Provide military support to U.S. diplomatic and development efforts at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; work by, with, and through local and international partners to increase capacity of African nations to ensure their own security within the rule of law; and maintain pressure on VEO networks.

(3) (U) **Essential Tasks.**

(a) (U) Strengthen partner nation security sector capacity and defense institutions.⁷

(b) (U) Build the capability required of local partners to counter violent extremism, proliferation of WMD materials, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal arms trade with limited assistance.⁸

⁷ (U) Section 333, Title 10 U.S. Code provides the authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces. All 333 activities must include institutional capacity building.

⁸ (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a
(b)(1) 1.4 a



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(c) (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.d
(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.d

.⁹

(d) (U) Work by, with, and through local and international partners to degrade terrorists.¹⁰

(e) (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.d
(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.d

(f) (U) Secure required access and freedom of movement to protect U.S. interests and enable timely response to crisis events and execution of contingency operations.¹²

(g) (S) Provide timely protection of U.S. Government personnel and property.¹³

(4) (U) **Future State.** VEOs contained for local defeat, transnational threats mitigated, security for strategic partners improved within the rule of law and with respect for human rights, African partners provide greater regional security, and USAFRICOM postured to support contingencies.

b. (U) **USAFRICOM Campaign Elements.** The campaign consists of all plans, orders, and operations. Its elements include the campaign plan and order; posture plan (annex to the campaign plan); theater logistics and distribution plans (annexes to the campaign plan); country-specific security cooperation sections (CSCS)/country plans; subordinate, supporting, and campaign support plans; contingency plans; and operations in execution.

⁹ (U//FOUO) Derived from the JSCP, NSS, NDS, and NMS. Most directly from GCP-C and GCP-R IMOs.

¹⁰ (U) 2018 NDS Summary, p. 10.

¹¹ (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a

¹² (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a

¹³ (S) (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a

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c. (U) (b)(1)1.7e

These are complementary means guiding how staff processes govern campaign execution.




Figure 3. (S) USAFRICOM Campaign Elements.

(1) (U) **USAFRICOM Campaign Plan (ACP)**. This plan, in line with the theater strategy, provides broad guidance and synchronization for the campaign. It outlines campaign objectives and details an operational approach to broadly structure the methodology and assign campaign execution responsibility to specific senior leaders. As the command executes the campaign, the Combatant Commander (CCDR) may direct an update to account for changed circumstances or a complete re-write of the plan.

(2) (U) **Annual Direction**. Two annual documents will be critical in operationalizing the plan: the USAFRICOM Campaign Guidance (ACG), developed by the J5, and the annual USAFRICOM Campaign Order (ACO),

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


Figure 4. (U) Campaign Plan in Execution.

developed by the J3. The ACG will synchronize efforts beyond the upcoming fiscal year (approximately 18+ months after publication) in order to inform future planning cycles and components' resource requests. The ACO will focus on the coming fiscal year, refine campaign priorities, and integrate outputs from the annual planning cycles across the campaign ways into an order for synchronized execution. The ACO is published no later than six months prior to start of each FY.

(3) (U) **Battle Rhythm.** USAFRICOM's battle rhythm will support operationalizing the plan through effective coordination, synchronization, and decision making across the staff. The battle rhythm will include boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WG) and other campaign-focused events, such as semi-annual USAFRICOM campaign assessments. B2C2WG structure and staff processes mitigate inherent synchronization risks in the campaign. These forums facilitate monitoring campaign progress and identifying execution issues that must be raised to the appropriate level for resolution. Lastly, these processes provide inputs to campaign assessments that drive adjustments to resource submissions and the annual ACG and ACO.

d. (U) **Campaigning Time Horizons.**

(1) (U) USAFRICOM consistently campaigns day-to-day across the continuum from deliberate planning to current operations. Three general time horizons for the campaign help guide responsibilities:

- (U) Future (deliberate) plans (J5): 1-5 years in the future
- (U) Future and current operations (J3): 0-12 months in the future
- (U) Assessment (J8): previous 12 months

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(U) Depending on the pace of operations, these horizons can shift, but the critical piece is the transition to the J3 to facilitate the development and publication of the ACO no later than 6 months prior to the next fiscal year.

e. (U) **Strategic Approach.** The theater strategy outlines a **partner-centric** approach comprising three cross-cutting themes:

(1) (U) **Military Support to Diplomacy and Development.** Africa's security challenges cannot be resolved through the use of military force as the primary agent of change. Therefore, USAFRICOM provides military support to diplomatic and developmental efforts by the applicable interagency lead, most often DoS or USAID. The combined effort of U.S. departments and agencies help African partners address strategic challenges.

(2) (U) **By, With, and Through.** Our approach recognizes that African solutions to African challenges are critical to sustainable, long-term success. For this reason, we work *by, with, and through* our various partners. This means that security operations are executed almost exclusively **by** partnered security forces, we work **with** these forces based on their operational and institutional needs, and we achieve shared strategic objectives **through** a cooperative relationship with USAFRICOM in a supporting role.

(3) (U) **Pressure on the Network.** Persistent pressure on terrorist networks (operational, logistic, financial, and political) is necessary to prevent destabilization of our African partners. Our principal means for applying pressure is working through our African and international partners, increasing their security capabilities and, when necessary, augmenting with direct action.

f. (U) **Campaign Objectives.** USAFRICOM's activities are focused on achieving five campaign objectives describing the desired environment in five years. These objectives are derived from, and set the conditions for, the strategic objectives described in the theater strategy. All USAFRICOM objectives are achieved in support of broader U.S. diplomatic and developmental efforts.

(1) (U) **U.S. Influence is Increased.** The U.S. and its allies are established as preferred regional security partners, and U.S. interests in Africa are protected against destabilizing competitor state influence, activities, and aggression.

(2) (U) **African Partners Contribute to Regional Security.** African partners, consistent with the rule of law and respect for human rights, secure

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their sovereign interests¹⁴, export security, promote economic prosperity, and provide legitimate, accountable, and effective governance.

(3) ~~(U)~~ **VEO Threats are Reduced.** VEOs that threaten U.S. interests are degraded and contained for defeat by African partners in accordance with the rule of law and respect for human rights.

(4) ~~(U)~~ **The USAFRICOM Theater is Set.** USAFRICOM forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding are aligned in order to conduct day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.

(5) ~~(U)~~ **U.S. Government Personnel and Property are Protected.** USAFRICOM maintains the ability to protect U.S. Government personnel and property.

g. ~~(U)~~ **Operational Design.** The campaign design consists of three types of activities: decisive activities, shaping activities, and sustaining activities. This framework articulates the long-term logic of the campaign. Additionally, depending upon the challenges and opportunities, the CCDR designates main and supporting efforts to provide short-term prioritization of campaign activities.

(1) ~~(U)~~ **Decisive Activities.** Decisive activities are those that directly accomplish the mission. USAFRICOM's decisive activities are those that strengthens relationships and enhance capabilities of African partners: **security force assistance (SFA), exercises, and engagements.**

(2) ~~(U)~~ **Shaping Activities.** Shaping activities set the conditions that allow USAFRICOM and its partners to focus on decisive activities. USAFRICOM's shaping activities are **operations** that create the time and space necessary for capacity building and strengthening relationships.

(3) ~~(U)~~ **Sustaining activities.** Sustaining activities preserve or set conditions for shaping and decisive activities throughout the campaign. Sustaining activities **mature the theater** for the campaign by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding to facilitate USAFRICOM's day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.

(4) ~~(U)~~ **Main Effort.** The CCDR designates the main effort to prioritize particular activities for a finite period of time. This allows the command to shift

¹⁴ ~~(U)~~ Sovereign interests refers to (among other things) the actual control of territory, border management, and international legal recognition by other sovereign states.

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resources in response to emerging direction or changes in the operational environment. For example, shaping or sustaining activities may be temporarily designated as the main effort to align resources or create time and space for decisive activities.

(5) (U) **Supporting Effort**. Supporting effort activities are critical for accomplishing campaign objectives, but are resourced at levels below the main effort.

(6) (U) **Campaign Design Concept**. USAFRICOM's campaign is designed to increase African partners' capabilities to secure their own sovereign interests by working *by, with, and through* both African and international partners. The model is for these security operations to be African-led, internationally assisted, and USAFRICOM-supported. As African-partner security forces improve and share more of the security burden, the U.S. Government will benefit by having to expend fewer resources to address security concerns in the USAFRICOM AOR.

h. (U) **Campaign Integration and Synchronization**.

(1) (U) **Integration**. USAFRICOM's ability to successfully campaign is reliant on our ability to use, adjust, and shape limited resources. Many of our resources are linked to annual submissions and interactions with interagency and DoD partners. Figure 5 shows the alignment of internal and external processes to ensure timely assessments are informing prioritized resource submissions and helping to synchronize limited resources across the campaign ways. USAFRICOM staff processes and command battle rhythm will synchronize the campaign.

2) (U) **Campaign Synchronization Board (CSB)**. The CSB is a standing forum chaired by the Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) to synchronize the detailed planning and execution of the campaign. It will be attended by each joint director serving as LOE offices of primary responsibility (OPR) as well as other joint directors as required. On behalf of the commander, the DCMO has day-to-day oversight of the campaign and is responsible for ensuring that the staff, components, and subordinate commands integrate operations across all LOEs. The DCMO will identify issues or proposed changes requiring the CCDR's decision.

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Campaign Synchronization



(b)(1)1.7e

Figure 5. (U) Campaign Synchronization. See glossary for acronyms.

i. (U) **Operational Approach**. To coordinate execution of the campaign, USAFRICOM will use lines of effort to coordinate operations, activities, and investments (OAI). The command will work to achieve specific effects, working toward intermediate objectives, which culminate in accomplishing the campaign objectives. For the full operational approach, including all intermediate objectives and effects, see Annex DD (Operational Approach).

(1) (U) **Lines of Effort (LOEs)**. The campaign's operational approach focuses the command on achieving five campaign objectives through six LOEs led by OPRs at the director level:

- (U) LOE 1 – Strengthen Partner Networks (OPR: J5)
- (U) LOE 2 – Enhance Partner Capability (OPR: J5)
- (U) LOE 3 – Develop Security in Somalia (OPR: J3)
- (U) LOE 4 – Contain Instability in Libya (OPR: J3)
- (U) LOE 5 – Support Partners in the Sahel & Lake Chad Region (OPR: J5)
- (U) LOE 6 – Set the Theater (OPR: J4)



Figure 6. (U) Campaign Plan Placemat.

(a) (U) **LOE Execution.** LOEs logically link intermediate objectives and effects to realize each LOE's desired future states. Each intermediate objective will be accomplished by executing tasks across the five campaign ways to achieve a set of desired effects. In most cases, LOE future states are accomplished through the cumulative rather than sequential achievement of intermediate objectives.

(b) (U) **LOE Leadership.** A GO/FO from the designated OPR will serve as LOE lead. Each OPR will coordinate overall LOE planning efforts, identify staff support and working group attendance requirements, monitor execution, initiate campaign assessments, and recommend adjustments to the campaign. However, the coordinating authority role does not usurp the normal functions and responsibilities of staff directorates. Thus, responsibility for detailed planning, programming, and execution is still retained within the appropriate directorate. For example, an exercise executed in support of a J5-led LOE will still be the responsibility of the J3 for detailed planning and execution.

(2) (U) **Intermediate Objectives.** Intermediate objectives serve as waypoints or focus areas that support achievement of LOE future states and campaign objectives. The achievement of each intermediate objective requires synchronization across the campaign ways to achieve a set of subordinate desired effects.

(3) (U) **Ways.** The five campaign ways are defined as follows:

(a) (U) **Security Force Assistance (SFA)**. SFA is a decisive activity.

1 (U) SFA is the set of DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. These activities include organizing, training, equipping, building, and advising partner forces to help them defend against internal and transnational threats to security. SFA is a subset of security cooperation, the broader set of DoD activities with partner security forces that build relationships to promote U.S. interests, improve U.S. access, or build partner capacity (BPC).

2 (U) USAFRICOM adopts a balanced approach to SFA that includes capacity-building efforts across all three of the security-force functional areas: executive direction (ED), generating force (GF), and operating force (OF). ED includes national-level organizations or key individuals responsible for providing policy and resources for a partner nation's security force. GF develops and sustains operating forces by providing the necessary doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. OF includes units from the corps to the squad level that employ military capabilities through the application of maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, command and control, and information. For details on USAFRICOM SFA execution, see Annex BB (Security Cooperation).

3 (U) Defense institution building (DIB) is security cooperation conducted to establish or reform partner capacity and capabilities at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. DIB is the primary form of DoD support to security sector reform, a comprehensive set of U.S. Government activities intended to improve partners' safety, security, and justice.

(b) (U) **Exercises**. Exercises are a decisive activity.

1 (U) USAFRICOM's Joint and Combined Exercise program ensures the joint readiness of enduring and rotational forward deployed forces, builds and maintains strong relationships across the U.S. Government, develops and maintains strong relationships with international and African partners, increases access and cooperation, and serves as a method to build and assess African partner capacity and interoperability. The exercise program provides opportunities to work with interagency, international, multilateral, DoD, and, if possible, non-governmental partners in order to enhance broader security sector assistance efforts on the continent and to leverage relationships as a resource for success.

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2 (U) Annex EE (Exercises) provides broad exercise guidance to USAFRICOM directorates, service components, and subordinate commands. The annex aligns the exercises program with campaign objectives and intermediate objectives across LOEs. Further details on the exercise design methodology, near and long-term goals, and host nations are developed through the individual exercise life cycles.

(c) (U) **Engagements.** Senior leader engagements include contacts or meetings of the CCDR, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Engagement, DCMO, Chief of Staff, Joint Directors, Command Senior Enlisted Leader, and subordinate commanders with a key official or senior leader from any of our partners. In some circumstances, special staff engagements may be considered senior leader engagements depending on the level or impact of the engagement. The purpose of all USAFRICOM engagements is to strengthen partnerships and facilitate execution of other ways and the means associated with those ways. Engagements should be executed according to the commander's communication strategy, linked to the execution of the campaign, and assessed as part of the campaign cycle. In many cases, engagements will be focused on increasing the willingness of partners, promoting U.S. influence, or facilitating agreements related to maturing the theater. Engagements are a decisive activity.

(d) (S//~~(b)(1)~~1.4d) **Operations.** An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme or a military action that carries out a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. Operations are shaping activities that create time and space for decisive activities to be successful over time.

(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(e) (U) **Maturing the Theater.** Maturing the theater ensures USAFRICOM is enabled to effectively conduct day-to-day operations, activities, and investments and is prepared to execute crisis response or contingency operations by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding. The requirements to protect U.S. Government personnel and property will remain the pacing priority for maturing the theater. Posture will address our enduring and expeditionary footprints and supporting agreements. USAFRICOM agreements or authorities will support freedom of action across all domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace). Joint force power projection addresses the range of capabilities and capacity necessary to enable day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations. In addition, the campaign will place emphasis on information and intelligence

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functions to understand the operational environment and develop an advantage over competitors and adversaries. USAFRICOM will work with partners to coordinate support capabilities not available to USAFRICOM. Maturing the theater is a sustaining activity.

(4) (U) **Means.** Means are the resources required to achieve campaign objectives. Campaign means include funding, personnel, forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, senior leaders' time, international and interagency relationships, and the National Guard State Partnership Program. The aforementioned means may have associated limitations for their employment; however, if properly organized, aggregated, and aligned, the means can be used to resource multiple activities and achieve the intended effects. USAFRICOM's ability to successfully campaign is reliant on the command's ability to synchronize limited resources. Resource submissions are linked to campaign ways and include items such as policy change submissions for the National Defense Authorization Act. USAFRICOM staff processes and command battle rhythm will inform the CCDR's resource decisions.

(5) (U//FOUO) **Communication Synchronization.** The achievement of campaign objectives is directly tied to the command's ability to effectively communicate its intentions, both internally and externally, in a manner that is aligned and amplified through operations, engagements, and other public-facing interactions. The operational approach and strategic themes guide implementation of the overarching campaign narrative. Successful campaign execution aligns the command's actions, images, and words by integrating the overarching themes and messages through the ways to reinforce the campaign narrative. Leaders at every level must deliberately plan all internal and public engagements to demonstrate and reinforce specific aspects of the campaign narrative to relevant stakeholder groups. Specifically, the communication synchronization process will directly support the CCDR's intent by enhancing partner capacity; building support for USAFRICOM operations, activities, and investments; and contributing to the deterrence of regional adversaries.

j. (U) **Prioritization Framework.** In a resource-constrained AOR that includes 53 African nations, USAFRICOM must set priorities in order to achieve LOE future states and campaign objectives. To inform decision making, the command applies a framework with two priority categories: 1) **enduring strategic partners** and 2) **campaign partners** grouped into tiers by LOE or functional areas. While the former prioritizes long-term relationships built on strategic significance, the latter reflects near-term national security and campaign objectives. These priorities allow the command to balance its resources appropriately between partners contributing to objectives that span the planning horizon. This framework should not limit options for command activities, but it should instead inform resourcing and execution priority decisions.

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(1) (U) **Enduring Strategic Partners.** USAFRICOM designates and prioritizes long-term (8-20 years) strategic partners that possess at least one of three characteristics: strong potential to serve as a security exporter, a critical geostrategic location, or a central role in multiple LOEs. Some of these countries have not yet shown a significant desire to collaborate, but these countries could prove to be important partners in the future if engagements or political changes improve their willingness.

(a) (U) **Security Exporters.** Security exporters are willing and capable of providing security-related capabilities regionally within the rule of law to further effective and legitimate governance. Exporters not only secure their own sovereign interests, but they also provide bilateral security assistance to other African partners and contribute to multilateral efforts such as peacekeeping missions and disaster response. Such countries improve regional stability during crises and, more importantly, build the security capacity of their African neighbors in the long-term. Security exporters therefore decrease the need for U.S. or international security assistance over time, supporting a key campaign objective. While willingness and security capabilities are critical prerequisites for enduring strategic partners, USAFRICOM also accounts for political and economic factors indicating the likelihood of partners remaining stable and aligned with U.S. values and objectives.

(b) (U) **Geostrategic Importance.**

1 (U) USAFRICOM enduring strategic partners include African partner nations whose locations make them uniquely important to both USAFRICOM strategic objectives and broader national security interests.

2 (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4d

(c) (U) **Cross-LOE Effects.** African partners that have the potential to help USAFRICOM achieve effects under multiple LOEs are critical to campaign success. These countries may include those that are not only important in counter-VEO (C-VEO) efforts, but also have the potential to be destabilized by coercive activities by non-African competitor states. In these cases, USAFRICOM may prioritize additional resources toward strengthening relationships and expanding access to ensure the partners remain willing and capable to support U.S. objectives.

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(d) (U) **Partners.** (b)(1)1.7e



(2) (U) **Campaign Partners.** (b)(1)1.7e



(a) (U) **Tier 1.** (b)(1)1.7e



(b) (U) **Tier 2.** (b)(1)1.7e



(c) (U) **Tier 3.** (b)(1)1.7e



(d) (U) **Partners.** See Appendix 3 of Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for the table detailing the prioritization of USAFRICOM campaign (near-term) partners. This table will be updated as required.

(b)(1)1.7e

Figure 7. (U) Line of Effort (LOE) to Campaign Objective Crosswalk.

k. (U) **LOEs.** (b)(1)1.7e



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LOE 1	LOE 2	LOE 3	LOE 4	LOE 5	LOE 6
Strengthen Partner Networks (J5)	Enhance Partner Capability (J5)	Develop Security in Somalia (J3)	Contain Instability in Libya (J3)	Support Partners in the Sahel and LCR (J5)	Set the Theater (J4)
Intermediate Objectives (OPR)					
1.1. U.S. Influence (J5)	2.1. Defense Institutions (J5) 2.2. Counter Illicit Trafficking (J5) 2.3. Maritime Security (J5) 2.4. CWMD (J5) 2.5. Improvised Threats (J5) 2.6. PKO (J5) 2.7. Humanitarian Assistance (J5) 2.8. Infectious Disease (J004) 2.9. Regional Security Orgs (J5) 2.10. AMISOM BPC (J5) 2.11. Maghreb BPC (J5)	3.1. E. Africa CT (J3) 3.2. SSF BPC (J5)	4.1. Libya / Maghreb CT (J3) 4.2. Libyan BPC (J5)	5.1. G-5 Sahel BPC (J5) 5.2. LCR BPC (J5) 5.3. Security Institutions in Western Sahel and LCR (J5)	6.1. Posture (J4) 6.2. Freedom of Action (J4) 6.3. Joint Force Power Projection Capabilities (J4) 6.4. Information / Decision Advantage (J2)

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Table 1. (U) Lines of Effort (LOEs) and Intermediate Objectives with OPRs (Modified).

(1) (U) **LOE 1: Strengthen Partner Networks. OPR: J5.**

(a) (U) USAFRICOM, in coordination with interagency partners, will expand partner networks by engaging with African, international, and multilateral partners to further U.S. interests, enhance U.S. access, and mitigate destabilizing influences, activities, and aggression. Activities will span from competition to cooperation in order to maintain the U.S. or appropriate partner as the preferred regional security partner within the USAFRICOM AOR.

(b) (U) **Future State.** The U.S. or its allies are established as the preferred regional security partner, and U.S. interests in Africa are protected against destabilizing competitor state influence, activities, and aggression.

(c) (U) **Campaign Partners.**

1 (U) Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda.

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2 (U) See Appendix 3 (Prioritization) to Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for tiered priority campaign partners. Campaign partners will be updated each fiscal year in the ACO.

(d) (U) **Interagency Partners.** DHS, DoS, TREAS, USAID.

(e) (U) **International Partners.** Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and the UK.

(f) (U) **Multilateral Partners.** AU, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, EU, NATO, SADC, UN.

(g) (U) **Operations.** None.

(h) (U) **Intermediate Objective 1.1. U.S. Influence. OPR: J5.** USAFRICOM has expanded influence and access to advance U.S. interests and values while collaborating with campaign and international partners on shared goals in all domains.

(i) (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d

(j) (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d

(k) (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d

(l) (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d
(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d

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(2) (U) **LOE 2: Enhance Partner Capability. OPR: J5.**

(a) (U) USAFRICOM will build the security-sector capability of campaign partners across the continent with focus areas of institution building, countering illicit trafficking, maritime security, countering WMD (CWMD), improvised threats, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, infectious disease control, regional security organizations, and C-VEO in the Maghreb and for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In support of these capability-building efforts, USAFRICOM will conduct engagements and exercises to strengthen key relationships while evaluating and advancing partner willingness and capabilities. In support of diplomatic and developmental initiatives, USAFRICOM will coordinate capability-building efforts with the appropriate U.S. Government lead federal agency.

(b) (U) LOE 2 will coordinate all capability-building campaign activities not tied to LOE 5 objectives or focused on Somali and Libyan security forces.

(c) (U) **Future State.** Campaign partners, consistent with the rule of law and human rights, secure their sovereign interests, export security, provide good governance, and promote economic prosperity.

(d) (U) **Campaign Partners.**

1 (U) Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte-D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia.

2 (U) See Appendix 3 (Prioritization) of Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for tiered priority campaign partners by intermediate objective. Campaign partners will be updated each fiscal year in the ACO.

(e) (U) **Interagency Partners.** Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of Interior, Fish & Wildlife; Department of Justice (DOJ); DoS; Department of Treasury (TREAS); Intelligence Community (IC), USAID.

(f) (U) **International Partners.** Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK.

(g) (U) **Multilateral Partners.** AU, East Africa Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East Africa Standby Force

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(EASF), EU, G7 Friends of Gulf of Guinea, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), North Africa Standby Force (NASF), NATO, Southern African Development Community (SADC), UN, AMISOM.

(h) (S) Operations. (b)(1) 1.4.a [REDACTED].

(i) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.1 Defense Institutions. OPR: J5.
Campaign partner security sector institutions are able to direct and sustain professional forces capable of conducting operations with reduced external support.

(j) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.2. Counter Illicit Trafficking. OPR: J5.
Campaign partners are capable of detecting, interdicting, degrading, prosecuting and neutralizing illicit activities, including those of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that threaten U.S. interests or regional stability.

(k) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.3. Maritime Security. OPR: J5.
Campaign partners in the Gulf of Guinea and other regions have the ability to independently deter, disrupt, or prevent piracy and maritime illicit activities contributing to regional instability or supporting VEOs.

(l) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.4. Counter WMD. OPR: J5.
Campaign partners maintain security of their chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and explosive materials of concern; detect and disrupt illicit CBRN activities; and effectively respond to consequences of deliberate or accidental CBRN incidents.

(m) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.5. Counter Improvised Threats. OPR: J3.
Campaign partners operate effectively in an improvised threat environment and disrupt improvised threat networks in accordance with a unified standard.

(n) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). OPR: J5.
Campaign partners are willing and increasingly capable of conducting PKO.

(o) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.7. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. OPR: J5.
Campaign partners are prepared to respond to all types of catastrophic natural and man-made disasters, such as mass migration and forced population displacement, in support of civil authorities with limited external assistance.

(p) (U) Intermediate Objective 2.8. Infectious Disease Control. OPR: J004.
Campaign partners and their regional economic communities are able to prevent, detect, diagnose, treat, and contain disease in their own

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militaries, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease in support of civil authorities with decreasing external assistance.

(q) (U) **Intermediate Objective 2.9. Regional Security**

Organizations. OPR: J5. Campaign partners and multilateral organizations are willing and increasingly capable of preventing crises, conducting operations, and executing security cooperation with other African partners bilaterally, multilaterally, or through regional and international frameworks.

(r) (U) **Intermediate Objective 2.10. Build AMISOM Capacity. OPR:**

J5. No later than (NLT) FY 21, AMISOM maintains security in Somalia with minimal external operational support and meets milestones for transitioning security responsibility to Somali Security Forces (SSF) in accordance with the 2017 Somali National Security Architecture.

(s) (U) **Intermediate Objective 2.11. Maghreb C-VEO BPC. OPR: J5.**

NLT FY 23, campaign partners in the Maghreb contain designated priority VEOs with minimal external support.

(3) (U) **LOE 3: Develop Security in Somalia. OPR: J3.**

(a) (U) USAFRICOM will conduct operations and support AMISOM and SSF operations to degrade designated priority VEOs to create time and space for capability and capacity building of the SSF. In support of these C-VEO efforts, USAFRICOM will conduct SFA, engagements, and exercises to strengthen key relationships while evaluating and advancing SSF willingness and capabilities.

(b) (U) C-VEO capability-building efforts tied to AMISOM troop-contributing countries will be coordinated through LOE 2.

(c) (U) **Future State.**

1 (U) Al-Shabaab, ISIS-Somalia, and other VEOs are unable to execute plots that threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, or the interests of international partners.

2 (U) Al-Shabaab, ISIS-Somalia, and other VEOs are degraded and on the path to defeat by AMISOM or SSF.

3 (U) AMISOM is on the path to transitioning security responsibility by FY 27 to SSF that are capable of securing the country's sovereign interests and defeating VEOs consistent with the rule of law.

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4 (U) U.S. or allies serve as preferred regional security partner over competitor states for efforts to develop security in Somalia.

(d) (U) **Campaign Partners.**

1 (U) Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.

2 (U) See Appendix 3 (Prioritization) of Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for tiered priority campaign partners by functional area. Campaign partners will be updated each fiscal year in the ACO.

(e) (U) **Interagency Partners.** DHS, DoJ, DoS, IC, TREAS, USAID.

(f) (U) **International Partners.** Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Turkey, UK.

(g) (U) **Multilateral Partners.** AMISOM, AU, EU, NATO, UN.

(h) (S) **Operations.** (b)(1) 1.4 a

(b)(1) 1.4 a

(i) (S) (b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(1) 1.4 d

(i) (U) **Intermediate Objective 3.2. Build SSF Capacity. OPR: J5.**

(b)(1)1.7e

(4) (U) **LOE 4: Contain Instability in Libya. OPR: J3.**

(a) (U) USAFRICOM will conduct operations to degrade designated priority VEOs, improve core security functions of the internationally recognized government of Libya, and, when appropriate, strengthen national security forces aligned with a functioning and inclusive government that is broadly accepted in Libya. In support of these C-VEO efforts, USAFRICOM will conduct engagements and exercises to strengthen key relationships while evaluating and advancing partner willingness and capabilities.

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(b) (U) Capability-building efforts in the Maghreb not focused on Libyan security forces will be coordinated through LOE 2.

(c) (U) **Future State.**

1 (U) ISIS, AQIM, and other designated priority VEOs are unable to threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, or the interests of international partners.

2 (U) ISIS, AQIM, and other designated priority VEOs are unable to destabilize Libya or the greater Maghreb region.

3 (U) Under the direction of a unified, internationally recognized government, Libyan national security forces, with limited external assistance, secure the country's sovereign interests consistent with the rule of law and human rights.

4 (U) The U.S. or its allies serve as preferred regional security partners over competitor states for efforts to contain instability in Libya and the Maghreb region.

(d) (U) **Campaign Partners.**

1 (U) Algeria, Chad, Libya, Morocco, Niger, Sudan, Tunisia.

2 (U) See Appendix 3 (Prioritization) to Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for tiered priority campaign partners. Campaign partners will be updated each fiscal year in the ACO.

(e) (U) **Interagency Partners.** DHS, DoJ, DoS, IC, TREAS, USAID.

(f) (U) **International Partners.** Canada, Germany, Egypt, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Turkey, UK.

(g) (U) **Multilateral Partners.** AU, EU, NATO, UN.

(h) (S) **Operations.** (b)(1) 1.4.2

(i) (U) **Intermediate Objective 4.1. Conduct Libya/Maghreb CT.**
OPR: J3. By FY 21, ISIS, AQIM, and other designated priority VEOs in Libya and the Maghreb are degraded and cannot cause significant harm to U.S. interests.

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(j) (U) **Intermediate Objective 4.2. Build Libyan Security Forces Capacity. OPR: J5.** When conditions permit, forces aligned with the internationally recognized Libyan government maintain security of critical regions and institutions within Libya with minimal external support.

(5) (U) **LOE 5: Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region (LCR). OPR: J5.**

(a) (U) USAFRICOM will provide capabilities and support to C-VEO operations and build C-VEO capacities of campaign partners in the Western Sahel and LCR. The focus of these efforts will be with the member countries of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria) and G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). In support of these efforts, USAFRICOM will conduct engagements, exercises, and limited operations to strengthen key relationships while evaluating and advancing partner willingness and capabilities.

(b) (U) For Sahel and LCR countries, capability-building efforts not focused on C-VEO objectives will be coordinated through LOE 2.

(c) (U) **Future State.**

1 (U) ISIS affiliates (to include ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) and ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS)), al-Qaida affiliates (to include Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)), Boko Haram, and other designated priority VEOs in the Western Sahel and LCR do not threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, or the interests of international partners.

2 (U) Campaign partners have contained ISIS-WA, Boko Haram, and other VEOs in the LCR and degraded them to the point that they no longer destabilize the region.

3 (U) Campaign partners have contained JNIM, ISIS-GS, and other VEOs in the Western Sahel region and degraded them to the point they no longer destabilize the region.

4 (U) The U.S. or its allies serve as preferred security partners over competitor states to support partners in Sahel and LCR.

(d) (U) **Campaign Partners.**

1 (U) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal.

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2 (U) See Appendix 3 (Prioritization) to Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for tiered priority campaign partners. Campaign partners will be updated each fiscal year in the ACO.

(e) (U) **Interagency Partners.** DHS, DoS, IC, TREAS, USAID.

(f) (U) **International Partners.** Canada, Denmark, France, Germany Israel, UK.

(g) (U) **Multilateral Partners.** AU, ECOWAS, EU, G5 Sahel, Lake Chad Basin Commission, MNJTF, UN.

(h) (S) **Operations.** (b)(1) 1.4.a

(i) (U) **Intermediate Objective 5.1. Build G5 Sahel Partner Capability. OPR: J5.** G-5 Sahel partners have the security capacity and capability to contain ISIS-GS, JNIM, and other VEOs in the Western Sahel.

(j) (U) **Intermediate Objective 5.2. Build LCR Partner Capability. OPR: J5.** LCR partners have the security capacity and capability to contain and degrade ISIS-WA, BH, and other VEOs in the region.

(k) (U) **Intermediate Objective 5.3. Enhance Security Institutions in Western Sahel and the LCR. OPR: J5.** NLT FY 23, security institutions of campaign partners in the LCR and Western Sahel region are in the process of sustainable reforms to secure their sovereign interests and defeat VEOs while complying with the rule of law.

(6) (U) **LOE 6: Set the Theater. OPR: J4.**

(a) (U) USAFRICOM will align with national policy, support interagency efforts, enhance processes, and engage with partners to ensure the command has the necessary posture, capabilities, intelligence and freedom of action to effectively conduct day-to-day activities, crisis response, including protection of U.S. Government personnel and property, and contingency operations.

(b) (U) **Future State.** USAFRICOM maintains forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding to efficiently execute day-to-day operations and activities, and is prepared to execute crisis response and contingency operations.

(c) (U) **Campaign Partners.**

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1 (U) Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda.

2 (U) See Appendix 3 (Prioritization) to Annex BB (Security Cooperation) for tiered priority campaign partners. Campaign partners will be updated each fiscal year in the ACO.

(d) (U) **Interagency Partners.** DHS, DoJ, DoS, IC, TREAS, USAID.

(e) (U) **International Partners.** Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, UK.

(f) (U) **Multilateral Partners.** AU, EU, NATO, UN, and other specific multilateral partners.

(g) (S) **Operations.** (b)(1) 1.4.a

(h) (U) **Intermediate Objective 6.1. Posture. OPR: J4.** USAFRICOM aligns the forces, footprints, and agreements necessary for receipt of forces and power projection in order to conduct day-to-day activities, enable crisis response, and support contingencies.

(i) (U) **Intermediate Objective 6.2. Freedom of Action. OPR: J4.** USAFRICOM has necessary forces, agreements, and authorities to enable freedom of action across all domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber).

(j) (U) **Intermediate Objective 6.3. Joint Force Power Projection Capability. OPR: J4.** USAFRICOM maintains capabilities, forces, and authorities to effectively conduct day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.

(k) (U) **Intermediate Objective 6.4. Information/Decision Advantage. OPR: J2.** By FY 21, USAFRICOM has sufficient understanding of the operational environment to achieve information and decision advantage at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels over competitors and adversaries.

1. (U) **Tasks to USAFRICOM Staff.**

(1) (U) **Special Instructions for LOE OPRs.**

(a) (U) Maintain updated staff synchronization matrix and running staff estimates per Africa Command Instruction (ACI) 3900.06 (reference mm) and Annex AA (Assessments). Use the synchronization matrix to guide LOE

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efforts and the running staff estimates to monitor, assess, and adjust LOE activities to streamline efforts and optimize effects.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Provide guidance and coordination for planning and execution of all activities linked to campaign ways for assigned LOEs.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Submit validated LOE requirements and tasks that need execution by USAFRICOM staff or another subordinate command to Campaign Synchronization Board (CSB) and Commander's Decision Board (CDB) as appropriate. Requirements include any resources and activities needed to accomplish intermediate objectives and effects.

(d) ~~(U)~~ Review and provide recommendations for proposed LOE-specific activities including SFA, exercises, engagements, operations, and maturing the theater to USAFRICOM CSB for final approval and inclusion in the annual campaign order or subsequent fragmentation order (FRAGORD).

(e) ~~(U)~~ Provide recommended adjustments or cancellation of operations, activities, or investments to the CSB for adjudication.

(f) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with J3, J5, and subordinate commands as required to develop SFA plans for inclusion in country-specific security cooperation sections (CSCS)/country plans and direct SFA planning efforts for respective LOEs. Publish SFA plans as part of the annual USAFRICOM campaign order (ACO) or FRAGORDs.

(g) ~~(U)~~ Submit recommendations for forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and other requirements to the Set the Theater LOE for validation and further action. The CSB, JSB, and/or CDB adjudicate when necessary.

(h) ~~(U)~~ Provide assessments to CSB for concurrence in accordance with Annex AA (Assessments).

(i) ~~(U)~~ Upon requirement approval by the CSB, JSB, and/or CDB, prepare and staff required inputs for inclusion in the ACO or subsequent FRAGORDs.

(j) ~~(U)~~ Ensure working group meetings are accessible for USAFRICOM, components, subordinate commands, defense attaché/office of security cooperation staffs, and when appropriate interagency partners outside of USAFRICOM.

(2) ~~(U)~~ **J1 (Manpower and Personnel Directorate).** Provide staff estimates on personnel and manpower management; personnel augmentation;

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personnel accountability; and strength reporting for military, civilian, foreign liaison officers, and interagency personnel in accordance with ACI 3900.06 (reference mm).

(3) ~~(U)~~ **J2 (Intelligence Directorate).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex B (Intelligence). Provide input to the annual USAFRICOM Campaign Guidance (ACG) and USAFRICOM Campaign Order (ACO) as required.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for intermediate objective 6.4 and support LOE 6 (Set the Theater) lead.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for: Intelligence Planning; Collection Management and ISR Operations; Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Signals Intelligence; Geospatial Intelligence; Measurements and Signatures Intelligence; Identity Intelligence; All-Source Analysis and Intelligence Assessments; Intelligence Support to Operations, Targeting, Information Operations, Cyberspace Operations, Security Cooperation and Engagement; Intelligence Systems and Architecture; Intelligence Sharing and Foreign Disclosure; and Management of the USAFRICOM Intelligence Enterprise.

(d) ~~(U)~~ Integrate intelligence operations into all LOEs to achieve decision advantage, support counterterrorism, and protect against destabilizing activities of state and non-state actors.

(e) ~~(U)~~ Track and determine classified military information (CMI) sharing authorities, agreements, and dissemination for African, international, and interagency partners per applicable statutes and in coordination with the Office of the Legal Counsel (J05) and J5.

(f) ~~(U)~~ Provide direction, oversight, and assessment of USAFRICOM intelligence engagement efforts in coordination with J3 and J5.

(g) ~~(U)~~ Provide willing-and-capable assessments of African partners in support of the campaign assessment.

(4) ~~(U)~~ **J3 (Operations Directorate).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for the ACO and required FRAGORDs.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for LOE 3 (Develop Security in Somalia). Coordinate with CJTF-HOA as required to ensure efforts are integrated.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for LOE 4 (Contain Instability in Libya).

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- (d) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex A (Task Organization).
 - (e) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex C (Operations).
 - (f) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex J (Command Relationships).
 - (g) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex EE (Exercises).
 - (h) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex N (Space Operations).
 - (i) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex S (Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations).
 - (j) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for USAFRICOM support to the coordinating authority (U.S. Cyber Command) for the DoD Functional Campaign Plan for Cyberspace Operations.
 - (k) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with J5 to identify linkages between SFA activities and exercises to ensure events complement one another and that units and personnel that receive training or equipment through SFA are sourced to participate in applicable exercises.
- (5) ~~(U)~~ **J4 (Logistics Directorate)**.
- (a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for LOE 6 (Set the Theater).
 - (b) ~~(U)~~ Synchronize the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) in support of USAFRICOM operations.
 - (c) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex D (Logistics).
 - (d) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex L (Environmental Considerations).
 - (e) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex O (Theater Distribution Plan)
 - (f) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex P (Theater Posture Plan (TPP))
 - (g) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex W (Operational Contract Support).
 - (h) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for USAFRICOM support to the coordinating authority (U.S. Transportation Command) for the DoD Functional Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution.

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(i) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with J5 to provide direction and oversight for SFA efforts which develop African military logistical capabilities.

(j) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with country teams, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and LOE OPRs to identify and track status of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) and land-use agreements.

(6) ~~(U)~~ **J5 (Strategy, Engagement, and Programs Directorate).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for the annual ACG.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for LOE 1 (Strengthen Partner Networks).

(c) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for LOE 2 (Enhance Partner Capability).

(d) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for LOE 5 (Support Partners in the Sahel and LCR).

(e) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for intermediate objective 3.2 and support LOE 3 (Develop Security in Somalia) lead.

(f) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for intermediate objective 4.2 and support LOE 4 (Contain Instability in Libya) lead.

(g) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19 Base Plan.

(h) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate publishing of annexes to USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19.

(i) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex G (Civil-Military Operations).

(j) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex I (Women, Peace, and Security).

(k) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex U (CWMD Day-to-Day Operations).

(l) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex V (Interagency Coordination).

(m) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex Z (Distribution)

(n) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex BB (Security Cooperation).

(o) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex CC (Contingency Plans and JSCP Support).

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(p) (U) Serve as OPR for Annex DD (Operational Approach).

(q) (U) Serve as OPR for Annex FF (Counter Threat Finance).

(r) (U) Serve as OPR for Annex GG (Glossary).

(s) (U) Serve as OPR for USAFRICOM support to the coordinating authority (U.S. Special Operations Command) for the DoD Functional Campaign Plan for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(t) (U) Serve as OPR for USAFRICOM support to the coordinating authority (U.S. Southern Command) for the DoD Regional Campaign Plan for Defending the Southern Approaches.

(u) (U) Develop CSCSs/country plans that support ACP objectives and chief of mission integrated country strategies.

(v) (U) Synchronize security cooperation programmatic resource allocation with ACP end states and intermediate objectives.

(w) (U) Maintain Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS) and the Integrated USAFRICOM Theater Synch System (IATSS) as the command's authoritative data sources for SFA estimates.

(x) (U) Coordinate with country teams, OLC, and LOE WGs to identify and track status of forces agreements (SOFA), administrative and technical status (A&T), and land-use agreements.

(y) (U) Refine accountability process by which SFA assessments are conducted, recorded, prioritized, and maintained for execution in order to standardize SFA assessments across USAFRICOM efforts in accordance with ACI 3900.08 (reference nn).

(7) (U) **J6 (C4 Systems Directorate).**

(a) (U) Serve as OPR for Annex K (Communications Systems).

(b) (U) Plan and direct C4 support for U.S. Africa Command.

(c) (U) Conduct defensive cyberspace operations and coordinate with the Joint Cyber Center to protect C4 support networks.

(d) (U) Provide direction and oversight to expand and improve African partner C4 support and cybersecurity capability.

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(8) ~~(U)~~ **J8 (Resources and Assessments Directorate).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex AA (Assessments).

(b) ~~(U)~~ Facilitate comprehensive assessments of each objective and intermediate objective achievement. Coordinate with LOE OPRs, directorates, subordinate commands, and country teams as required.

(9) ~~(U)~~ **J05 (Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Assist J2 with tracking and coordination of intelligence sharing authorities and agreements.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Advise the command on relevant authorities, status protections, and agreements.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with J5 to provide direction and oversight to security cooperation efforts that develop African military institutionalization of respect for rule of law, to include international humanitarian and human rights law

(d) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with J3 to support the Joint and Combined Exercise Program in addressing rule-of-law-related exercise objectives and assessments.

(e) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with J3, J4, and J5 to facilitate status protections, access, freedom of movement, and mutual logistics support with African partners during planning and operations.

(f) ~~(U)~~ Assist LOE OPRs and USAFRICOM staff with tracking and attaining CSB-validated requirements for agreements.

(10) ~~(U)~~ **J001 (Foreign Policy Advisor).** Provide expert guidance on diplomatic efforts to ensure whole-of-government coordination.

(11) ~~(U)~~ **J002 (USAID Development Advisor).** Provide expert guidance on development, stabilization, and other relevant topics to the Combatant Commander (CCDR), directorates, and components/subordinate commands, to ensure whole-of-government coordination.

(12) ~~(U)~~ **J003 (Inspector General).** Coordinate with J5 and USAFRICOM components/subordinate commands to provide direction and oversight to establish and/or professionalize African partners' military inspectors general.

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(13) ~~(U)~~ **J004 (Command Surgeon).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for intermediate objective 2.8 and support LOE 2 (Strengthen Partner Capability) lead.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex Q (Medical Services).

(c) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for USAFRICOM support to the coordinating authority (U.S. Northern Command) for the DoD Functional Campaign Plan for Pandemic Influenza and Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response.

(d) ~~(U)~~ Provide subject matter expertise to J5 and components/subordinate commands on African partner military health SFA.

(e) ~~(U)~~ Provide subject matter expertise to J3, components/subordinate commands, and partners for exercises that have medical equities.

(f) ~~(U)~~ Represent USAFRICOM equities during coordination with U.S. Government partners on activities that build African partner capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats under the framework of the Global Health Security Agenda.

(g) ~~(U)~~ Synchronize the Health Service Support continuum in support of USAFRICOM operations.

(14) ~~(U)~~ **J034 (Chaplain).** Coordinate with J5 and USAFRICOM components/subordinate commands to provide direction and oversight to establish and professionalize African partners' military chaplaincies.

(15) ~~(U)~~ **J035 (Public Affairs and Communications Synchronization).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex Y (Communication Synchronization).

(b) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for Annex F (Public Affairs).

(c) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate messaging guidance and communication strategies with DoS, other U.S. Government agencies, and other partners.

(d) ~~(U)~~ Serve as OPR for senior leader engagements (SLE) oversight to monitor, nominate, and coordinate significant command group engagements that advance the campaign objectives and intermediate objectives.

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(16) (U) **J036 (USAFRICOM Liaison Office)**. Monitor Joint Staff and Office of Secretary of Defense actions that impact USAFRICOM authorities and resourcing to execute operations, activities, and investments.

(17) (U) **J037 (Knowledge Management)**. Serve as OPR for development and maintenance of data management infrastructure and supporting processes to capture data from operations and activities of USAFRICOM staff and components/subordinate commands.

(18) (U) **J038 (Command Historian)**. (U) Coordinate with J5 and LOE OPRs to ensure appropriate documentation of campaign planning and execution is preserved.

(19) (U) **Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches/Offices of Security Cooperation.**

(a) (U) As the primary interlocutor between USAFRICOM and the country team, coordinate and support campaign and CSCS/country-plan objectives in support of this campaign plan.

(b) (U) Provide host nation coordination issues with respect to prioritized intermediate objectives to J5 regional engagement divisions or CJTF-HOA.

(c) (U) In consultation with the country team, provide input to LOE OPRs and J8 for comprehensive assessment of intermediate objective achievement.

(d) (U) In coordination with J5, provide assessment inputs on engagements, capability and willingness of African partners, and SFA gaps in accordance with ACI 3900.08 (reference nn).

(e) (U) When necessary, conduct civil-military coordination with the USAID mission civil-military coordinators to de-conflict humanitarian and development activities and USAFRICOM operations.

(f) (U) Countries within the CJTF-HOA joint operations area (JOA) coordinate campaign tasks with CJTF-HOA to enhance unity of effort.

1. (U) **Tasks to Service Components and Subordinate Commands.**

(1) (U) **Commander, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF).**

(a) (U) On order, serve as:

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1 ~~(U)~~ Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).

2 ~~(U)~~ Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF-HQ)

3 ~~(U)~~ Joint Force Commander (JFC).

4 ~~(U)~~ Commander, Army Forces (CDRARFOR).

5 ~~(U)~~ Mission Command Cell (MCC).

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Maintain the core of a deployable joint task force (JTF) headquarters that can operate as a combined JTF (CJTF) or as part of a larger coalition for short duration contingencies by maintaining an early entry command post capability to establish mission command.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with Headquarters Department of the Army and supporting agencies for their support in building the generating and operating force capabilities and capacities of African partners, in accordance with Appendix 3 (Prioritization) to Annex BB (Security Cooperation), focusing on sustainment, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and command and control (C2).

(d) ~~(U)~~ Meet Theater Army support responsibilities by establishing and operating common user logistics.

(e) ~~(U)~~ Plan, manage, and execute responsibilities as the designated lead component for surface distribution to include common user land transportation.

(f) ~~(U)~~ Serve as the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager and develop the required medical logistics concepts of support for the USAFRICOM AOR.

(g) ~~(U)~~ Develop plans, policies, and procedures to leverage assets and resources into a viable, sustainable communications architecture that will set the theater and enable information sharing with our mission partners.

(h) ~~(U)~~ Develop, coordinate, and plan participation of U.S. Army forces in USAFRICOM operations, exercises, contingencies and directed activities.

(2) ~~(U)~~ **Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ On order, serve as Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).

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(b) (U) Develop, coordinate, and plan participation of U.S. Navy forces (less naval special operations forces) in USAFRICOM operations, exercises, contingencies and directed activities.

(c) (U) Conduct regionally focused training, operations, and exercises that enhance the maritime capacity and capability of campaign partners.

(3) (U) **Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF).**

(a) (U) Develop, coordinate, and plan participation of U.S. Marine Corps forces, less U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command forces and any Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), in USAFRICOM operations, exercises, contingencies and directed activities.

(b) (U) When directed, support and/or augment:

1 (U) NAVAFLed Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC).

2 (U) AFAFRICA-led Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).

3 (U) Combined Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC).

(c) (U) Provide C2 of assigned or attached U.S. Marine Corps forces operating in the AOR, less U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command forces and the ARG/MEU.

(d) (U) In coordination with USAFRICOM staff, plan and coordinate service-related requirements for protection of U.S. Government personnel and property in the USAFRICOM AOR.

(4) (U) **Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA).**

(a) (U) Serve as JFACC per Commander, USAFRICOM (CDRUSAFRICOM) memo dated 06 October 2016.

(b) (U) Serve as lead for common user air mobility, to include subject matter expertise and safety review of commercial contract airlift.

(c) (U) Develop, coordinate, and plan participation of U.S. Air Force forces in USAFRICOM operations, exercises, contingencies, and directed activities.

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(5) ~~(U)~~ **Commander, Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ On order, serve as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander. Provide multiple options for a scalable C2 capacity.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Be prepared to establish, equip, and deploy an organic, scalable Joint Special Operations Task Force with ability to self-sustain for 15 days.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with USAFRICOM J3 to integrate planning and execution of Somalia Line of Effort (LOE 3) activities.

(6) ~~(U)~~ **Commander, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).**

(a) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate all activities inside the assigned JOA as the supported operational commander. See Annex J for command relationships.

(b) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate with DoS and DoD country teams within the CJTF-HOA JOA.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate planning and execution of operations and activities with USAFRICOM J3.

m. ~~(U)~~ **Coordinating Instructions.**

(1) ~~(U)~~ All plans and orders generated by the command or its subordinate elements addressing day-to-day activities are subordinate to this campaign plan and must reflect and support its priorities.

(2) ~~(U)~~ All staff sections, components, and subordinate commands will provide each LOE OPR appropriate action officer support and, when required, O6-level representatives to battle rhythm events supporting this plan.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Phase-zero requirements for contingency plans will be articulated in Annex CC (Contingency Plans and JSCP Support). Requirements are focused on setting the theater, which include forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and collection requirements. Detailed collection requirements are classified above this base plan and are located on Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System requirements databases.

(4) ~~(U)~~ Execute SFA, exercises, and engagements as part of the CCDR's decisive activities.

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- (5) ~~(U)~~ Execute operations as part of the CCDR's shaping activities.
- (6) ~~(U)~~ Set the theater as part of the CCDR's sustaining activities.
- (7) ~~(U)~~ Upon publication of this campaign plan, component and subordinate commanders may, but are not required to, prepare and publish a campaign support plan.
- (8) ~~(U)~~ NLT 120 days after publication of each fiscal year's ACO, components and subordinate commands will prepare and publish a campaign support order.
- (9) ~~(U)~~ NLT 120 days after receiving the ACO for each fiscal year, components and subordinate commands will be prepared to provide a back brief on relevant specified tasks to CDRUSAFRICOM.
- (10) ~~(U)~~ Assist with the writing of draft orders, plans, and proposals across the campaign ways through the battle rhythm and orders processes.
- (11) ~~(U)~~ Participate in USAFRICOM boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups events to facilitate effective campaigning.
- (12) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM directorates and special staff elements will maintain running staff estimates on their respective functional areas in accordance with ACI 3900.06 (reference mm) and Annex AA (Assessments).
- (13) ~~(U)~~ Enter all security cooperation activities in the G-TSCMIS and/or the IATSS as appropriate.
- (14) ~~(U)~~ Be prepared to conduct crisis response to protect U.S. Government personnel and property or secure U.S. access, if directed.
- (15) ~~(U)~~ Component and subordinate commands will coordinate all health engagement activities with the USAFRICOM Command Surgeon, and provide after-action review, lessons learned, and recommendations NLT 30 days after completion of each engagement activity approved for execution.
- (16) ~~(U)~~ Component and subordinate commands will identify CMI sharing requirements for validation in order to facilitate CMI agreements with USAFRICOM partners.
- (17) ~~(U)~~ Shape the information environment to degrade, disrupt, exploit, and deny adversarial efforts.

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(18) (U) Coordinate all activities executed in the CJTF-HOA JOA with CJTF-HOA at least thirty days prior to execution of the activity.

(19) (U) Coordinate all activities executed in USAFRICOM area of operation (AOR) outside the CJTF-HOA JOA with the USAFRICOM J3 through the USAFRICOM J3 prior to execution of the activity. Coordination must occur at least thirty days prior to execution of the activity. USAFRICOM J3 monitors all operations and activities in the USAFRICOM AOR.

(20) (U//FOUO) Intelligence community requests will be requested and coordinated through the USAFRICOM J2 in accordance with Annex B (Intelligence).

(21) (U//FOUO) Headquarters, USAFRICOM is responsible for the synchronization of day-to-day activities in support of this campaign except for specific named operations or for operations within assigned combined joint operations areas (CJOAs) or JOAs.

(22) (U) USAFRICOM components will manage and provide oversight of designated cooperative security locations and other contingency locations as directed by the USAFRICOM TPP.

(23) (U) USAFRICOM components will coordinate to ensure parent service-led activities planned for the USAFRICOM AOR are both coordinated through the USAFRICOM Headquarters (HQ) and in support of USAFRICOM priorities. All activities within the USAFRICOM AOR must be reported to the USAFRICOM HQ.

(24) (U) The senior defense official (SDO) serves as the single DoD point of entry into a U.S. country team. In those countries where a SDO is not physically assigned as a member of the U.S. country team, an SDO of another U.S. country team will be assigned this responsibility as a collateral duty.

(25) (U) USAFRICOM will make every effort to integrate international, multilateral, interagency, DoD, and non-governmental partners into all activities being executed with African partners in support of campaign objectives. Planning of all partner activities will be coordinated through USAFRICOM J5. Coordination of all current partner activities will be through USAFRICOM J3.

(26) (U) When National Guard support is required, coordinate through the National Guard Integration Office.

(27) (U) USAFRICOM and subordinate commands will identify authorities, permissions, agreements, access, and funding required to

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accomplish their assigned tasks and missions. USAFRICOM staff will coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and all of its partners to create, obtain, or maintain required authorities.

(28) (U) Prior to conducting all SFA activities, subordinate commands must ensure that the proper fiscal authority has been coordinated and approved in accordance with applicable law and policy.

(29) (U) USAFRICOM and subordinate commands will integrate force protection into the planning and execution of all activities linked to this plan. Considerations will include, but are not limited to, the use of vulnerability assessments; non-lethal weapons, munitions, and devices; countering improvised explosive devices tactics, techniques, and procedures; explosive ordnance disposal; security plans; and coordination with involved partners.

(30) (U) USAFRICOM and subordinate commands will plan and conduct military activities in accordance with DoD Implementation Guide for the *U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* (reference v). See Annex I (Women, Peace, and Security) of this plan for details.

(31) (U) USAFRICOM and subordinate commands will align with USAFRICOM communication goals and objectives that are supported by the campaign narrative and themes. See Annex Y (Communication Synchronization) of this plan for detailed information on goals, objectives, campaign narrative, and themes.

(32) (U) Components and subordinate commands will plan, coordinate, and integrate operational contracting support planning and execution. See Annex W (Operational Contract Support) for details.

(33) (U) All efforts linked to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials will be coordinated with USAFRICOM DTRA liaison personnel and respective LOE OPRs. See Annex U (CWMD).

(34) (U) Country-level objectives and country-level effects will be informed by SFA assessments and incorporated into CSCSs/country plans in accordance with Annex BB (Security Cooperation). All country-level objectives/country-level effects will nest with campaign objectives and effects. CSCSs/country plans will be completed no later than 1 May 2019 and updated annually.

(35) (U) Exercise objectives and effects will be listed in exercise plans and will nest with campaign objectives and effects.

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(36) (U) Requests for activities, tasks, and requirements from LOE OPRs for countries that fall under more than one LOE will be coordinated with other relevant LOE OPRs prior to submission to the CSB for approval.

(37) (U) All component and subordinate commands will develop intelligence collection support plans. Coordinate with USAFRICOM J2-ISR Collection Management and Operations Branches.

(38) (U) Components and subordinate commands be prepared to serve as lead service, base operating support integrator (BOS-I), communications integrator, senior airfield authority (SAA), senior port authority, or tactical control for force protection when directed.

4. (U) **Administration and Logistics.**

a. (U) **Concept of Sustainment.** USAFRICOM will integrate, synchronize, and optimize Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) support for the campaign. This provides unity of effort to oversee theater access, flow of forces, equipment, replacements, sustainment, engineering projects, operational contract support, support services, and health service support.

b. (U) **Logistics.** USAFRICOM J4 synchronizes planning, coordinating, integrating, and optimizing sustainment logistics, air/surface lift, operational contract support, engineering oversight and other logistics activities. This will ensure that the logistics network is in place and provides effective and efficient supply chain operations and services to designated forces or organizations across the USAFRICOM AOR. These activities will occur across the designated JTFs, Joint Force, component commands, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), service logistics agencies, interagency and intergovernmental partners, African partners, as well as other international and industrial commercial resources. See Annex D (Logistics) of this plan for a detailed discussion.

(1) (U) **Build Logistics Capacity of our African Partners.** In line with the decisive activities to build African partner capacity, USAFRICOM develops the organic logistics capability of African partners. USAFRICOM J4 coordinates with J5 to provide direction and oversight for SFA efforts which develop African military logistical capabilities. Means used include the Africa Logistics Symposium, the Continental Movement Control Center (CMCC), Vertically Integrated Logistics Approach, logistics instruction at the Kofi Annan Center, African Standby Force, Continental Logistics Base, and other methods. USAFRICOM harnesses and optimizes the combined efforts of the African partners to better support themselves and their neighbors' distribution layered overlapping the development, training, and education of the capability of all who face similar logistics challenges.

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(2) ~~(U)~~ **Deployment and Distribution.**

(a) ~~(U)~~ **Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC).** USAFRICOM J4 maintains the ability to stand up a JLOC. In the event of a crisis, increased operational tempo, or as directed by the J4, the JLOC will monitor, control, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate the execution of theater logistics in support of on-going operations based on command priorities.

(b) ~~(U)~~ **USAFRICOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (ADDOC).** The ADDOC synchronizes and optimizes inter and intra-theater multi-modal transportation resources in order to maximize distribution, force movement, and sustainment logistics throughout the USAFRICOM AOR. ADDOC responsibilities include the establishment of distribution priorities, transportation feasibility determination (in coordination with the USAFRICOM J3), and direction of intra-theater airlift requirement support to components and subordinate commands. Additional capabilities include monitoring and directing intra-theater surface distribution support to components and subordinate commands, adjudicating identified USAFRICOM distribution and intra-theater shortfalls, coordinating additional USTRANSCOM support, and providing total asset visibility and in-transit visibility for inter- and intra-theater forces and materiel.

(c) ~~(U)~~ **Africa Logistics Network (ALN).** The emerging ALN establishes regional distribution networks on the African continent that improve intra-theater distribution of supplies and movement of personnel in support of DoD sustainment needs, ultimately providing predictability and effectiveness of sustainment in an austere, remote, and contentious operating environment.

1 ~~(U)~~ The West African Logistics Network repositions right-sized aircraft from a primary logistics hub to spoke locations throughout West Africa to facilitate distribution.

2 ~~(U)~~ The East African Logistics Network (EALN) streamlines distribution from a logistics hub in Djibouti. Efforts are ongoing to improve the management and integration of operational support at locations throughout East Africa; facilitate joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of joint task forces that may be deployed or established in support of contingency operations; and regulate the EALN.

(d) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Component Roles and Responsibilities for Theater Distribution.** USAFRICOM J4 provides guidance to components and subordinate commands to allow lateral coordination with logistics enablers to effectively and efficiently distribute goods and services throughout the USAFRICOM AOR. Theater distribution is the responsibility of the service

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components. Components should maintain the ability to deploy across the AOR in order to facilitate movements with their logistics enablers. USARAF is designated lead component for surface distribution, to include common user land transportation. AFAFRICA is lead service for common user air mobility, to include subject matter expertise and safety review of commercial contract airlift. Any service component may be designated (by location or operation) as lead service for planning and common user logistics functions. This designation includes contracting, including for joint theater opening and force reception responsibilities. Components are authorized to coordinate and de-conflict with USTRANSCOM and DLA in compliance with the *Campaign Plan – Global Distribution* (reference aa). Designated strategic access locations will be used for receiving equipment and forces in support of USAFRICOM missions to ensure continuity and sustainability.

(e) ~~(U)~~ **Leveraging External Networks.** The USAFRICOM J4 harnesses, leverages, and contributes to partners' existing distribution networks. Along with Africa Distribution Network Forum, Movement Coordination Control Centre Europe, Heavy Airlift Wing, and Air Transport/Air-To-Air Refueling Exchanges of Services, USAFRICOM works to develop solutions between international external partners in Africa to ease the logistical burden for all parties.

(f) ~~(U)~~ **Transnational Movement of Goods and Services.** USAFRICOM J4 improves the ease of movement of goods and services across the continent. USAFRICOM works with the development and standardization of legal, transportation, distribution, and other agreements and process improvements in order to ease the logistics burden, providing quicker support to crises and contingency operations. USAFRICOM relies on "Africa First" enhanced procurement authority, customs exonerations, defense and joint travel regulations, and increased numbers of ACSAs, which all contribute to this effort.

(3) ~~(U)~~ **Supply, Maintenance, and Logistics Services.** Supply support to operations rely heavily upon sources outside of Africa. Efforts to mature the theater such as DLA Distribution Depot Africa and expanding prime vendor support increase logistical responsiveness while reducing costs. Limited petroleum, oil, and lubricants sources and infrastructure in Africa also present major challenges to support operations and contingencies. The Joint Munitions Office manages and monitors munitions inventory in coordination with USAFRICOM J3 Fires and service components, and are supported by Joint Staff and service headquarters. Additionally, close coordination with USEUCOM and USCENTCOM is vital to enabling the storage, movement, and munitions resupply for USAFRICOM. Maintenance is planned and conducted by the service component owner of the equipment. For employment of a Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) task order (or other similar

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capability) as a source of services support, planners must engage in backward planning to accommodate the time needed for the LOGCAP performance contractor to increase operational capability to perform service requirements.

(4) (U) **Engineering Support.** Engineering and construction equities most closely align with, but are not exclusive to, USAFRICOM LOE 6, Set the Theater. These equities focus on optimizing posture locations, building partner capacity, reacting to crisis, and supporting operations. Construction projects (including military construction (MILCON), operations and maintenance, and exercise-related construction), environmental engagements and compliance, and posture initiatives are prioritized to best support personnel and enable mission accomplishment.

c. (U) **Personnel.** USAFRICOM J1 will synchronize, coordinate, integrate, and optimize personnel management. This includes manpower management; personnel augmentation; joint personnel training and tracking activities; personnel accountability and strength reporting; rotation policy; civilian employees; pay and entitlements; postal operations; morale, welfare, and recreation; as well as casualty operations and casualty reporting. The J1 will also oversee awards and decorations throughout all aspects of the sustainment process of the campaign plan.

d. (U) **Public Affairs (PA).** General information is below, see Annex F (Public Affairs) for details.

(1) (U) **PA Guidance.** The USAFRICOM Public Affairs Office (PAO) will provide strategic OSD/PA-approved guidance. This will address the approval process for media operations, access, embarks, and for releasing information, to include news stories, videos, and photos.

(2) (U) **Release Authority.** Until delegated, the PAO will retain release authority and will be the release point of any and all print, video, and photo products, pending review and approval of supported nations.

(3) (U) **PA Posture.** While the PAO will adjust the PA posture to best suit each operation, action, or activity, the guiding principal is an active PA posture in an effort to maximize transparency and public awareness. The PAO will further refine PA posture guidance for subordinate plans and orders based on OSD/PA direction, operational considerations and command directed goals and objectives.

e. (U) **Civil-Military Operations.** USAFRICOM and subordinate commands will integrate non-lethal weapons into mission planning, SFA, exercises, and operations as appropriate. See Appendix 20 (Non-Lethal Weapons) to Annex C

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(Operations) and ACI 3200.07A (reference jj) for guidance on the use of non-lethal weapons.

f. ~~(U)~~ **Meteorological and Oceanographic Services (METOC).**

(1) ~~(U)~~ **General Information.** DoD entities engaged in operations in the USAFRICOM AOR shall ensure accurate, consistent, relevant, and timely METOC data, information, and products are available to support U.S. Government personnel, equipment, and operations in the AOR. Responsibility for BOS-I, SAA, and mission execution weather forecasting shall be designated by the responsible unit or assigned component. To the extent possible, all forecasting products will be shared across USAFRICOM METOC personnel. See ACI 3800.01 (reference ll) for details.

(2) ~~(U)~~ **Supporting METOC Organizations.** These include the 557th Weather Wing and Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command. Specific units directly supporting operations in the USAFRICOM AOR include the 21st Operational Weather Squadron, 23d Special Operations Weather Squadron, Fleet Weather Center Aviation Detachment Kapaun, and Fleet Weather Centers Norfolk and San Diego.

g. ~~(U)~~ **Environmental Considerations.** Environmental security advances the goals of political stability and economic development by encouraging cooperation among nations and regions to solve environmental problems. Additionally, addressing the environmental components of potential security threats could assist in the conflict resolution process. Lastly, U.S. personnel in the USAFRICOM AOR will conduct activities in a manner protective of human health and the environment. Refer to Annex L (Environmental Considerations) for additional details.

h. ~~(U)~~ **Concept of Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S).** USAFRICOM units will deploy with sufficient maps and charts for sustained operations. GI&S products for planning and execution should normally be held by participating elements prior to receipt of a warning order. The HQ GI&S staffs, USAFRICOM National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Support Team, component-appropriate elements of NGA, and the DLA will coordinate to provide the most efficient support to operations, including (as required) production, distribution and stockage of GI&S products. Per the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (reference e), NGA may establish a crisis management team (CMT) and can be tasked with quick response support. Tasking of the NGA CMT will be through the HQ USAFRICOM GI&S Officer. See Appendix 7 (Geospatial Information and Services) of Annex B (Intelligence) for detailed information.

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i. ~~(U)~~ **Health Service Support.** The USAFRICOM Command Surgeon provides coordination and oversight to establish health service support (HSS), to include force health protection, within the USAFRICOM AOR by maximizing efficiency of scarce medical resources. The focus is to ensure a seamless continuum of care that incorporates and synchronizes forward resuscitative care, patient movement (tactical and strategic), damage control surgery, patient regulation, and disease prevention. The AOR's geography creates multiple challenges in providing an effective continuum of care with limited U.S. medical resources. Because of this, collaboration with USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, and our European partners (primarily France, the UK, and Germany) is essential in areas where significant gaps in U.S. medical capabilities exist. For a comprehensive overview of medical services, refer to Annex Q (Health Service Support) of this campaign plan.

j. ~~(U)~~ **Operational Contract Support (OCS).** Effective integration of OCS throughout the command requires proactive planning for contracted support, refining contractor accountability, maturing vendor vetting to prevent security threats, and understanding/mitigating the operational risk associated with relying on contracted solutions. In concert with DoD contracting policies, USAFRICOM will seek to use local contract support from African partners for required services within the AOR and international partners for required services in Europe. USAFRICOM recognizes that African and international partner contract support assists with boosting local economies in and outside the AOR and strengthens partnerships required for the campaign. OCS details can be found in USAFRICOM Command Instructions and Annex W (Operational Contract Support).

5. ~~(U)~~ **Command and Control.**

a. ~~(U)~~ **Command.**

(1) ~~(U)~~ **Command Relationships.**

(a) ~~(U)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM is responsible for the execution of the campaign through the staff and subordinate commands. The staff and subordinate commands will abide by the guidance and priorities set forth in this plan.

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM is the joint force commander (JFC) and exercises combatant command authority (COCOM) over the following service components: USARAF, NAVAf, MARFORAF, and AFAFRICA.

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM exercises operational control (OPCON) over CJTF-HOA.

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(d) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM exercises OPCON authority over Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA). USSOCOM exercises COCOM authority over SOCAFRICA.

(e) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM exercises COCOM authority over assigned forces and OPCON over allocated forces (with the exception of active-duty forces participating in exercises) through supporting service component commanders, sub-unified commands, functional components, CJTFs, or JTFs.

(f) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM may establish subordinate JTFs to perform specific missions within the AOR.

(g) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM staff may liaise with other U.S. Government agencies in the conduct of this campaign plan.

(h) ~~(U)~~ **Chiefs of Mission and USAFRICOM.**

1 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Authority.** As the senior U.S. Government officials residing in host countries, chiefs of mission (U.S. ambassadors or, in their absence, chargés d'affaires) are the final coordinating authorities for all peacetime military activities within their respective countries, unless CDRUSAFRICOM is provided additional authorities for specific missions.

2 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **USAFRICOM Responsibilities.** USAFRICOM, service components, SOCAFRICA, and CJTF-HOA will seek concurrence for U.S. military activities in each country from respective chiefs of mission through SDOs, offices of security cooperation (OSCs), and/or country coordination elements (CCEs).

3 ~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Humanitarian Assistance.** USAFRICOM and its component and subordinate commands will coordinate foreign humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief activities with appropriate chiefs of mission and USAID missions and offices through appropriate coordination mechanisms. These include USAID mission civil-military coordinators, USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance advisors, SDOs, OSCs, and CCEs.

(i) ~~(U)~~ For additional information on command relationships and task organization, see the current annual USAFRICOM campaign order (ACO). The ACO provides detailed guidance for command and control during the execution of all day-to-day activities linked to the ACP.

(2) ~~(U)~~ **Command Posts.**

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ CDRUSAFRICOM is designated the JFC, with headquarters at KELLEY BARRACKS, STUTTGART, GERMANY. The

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USAFRICOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) serves as the 24/7 contact for campaign activities and operations-related issues.

(b) (U//FOUO) Commander, USARAF is designated as the Army service component commander, with headquarters at CASERMA EDERLE, VICENZA, ITALY.

(c) (U//FOUO) Commander, NAVAf is designated as the Navy service component commander, with headquarters at NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, NAPLES, ITALY.

(d) (U//FOUO) Commander, MARFORAF is designated as the Marine Corps service component commander, with headquarters at PANZER KASERNE, BOEBLINGEN, GERMANY.

(e) (U//FOUO) Commander, AFAFRICA is designated as the Air Force service component commander, with headquarters at RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, RAMSTEIN, GERMANY.

(f) (U//FOUO) Commander, SOCAFRICA is designated as the Special Operations functional, sub-unified commander, with headquarters at KELLEY BARRACKS, STUTTGART, GERMANY.

(g) (U//FOUO) Commander, CJTF-HOA is designated as a CJTF commander, with headquarters at CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI CITY, DJIBOUTI.

(3) (U) **Succession of Command.** USAFRICOM succession of command policy is outlined in ACI 3200.08A (Change 2) (reference kk).

b. (U) **Joint Communications System Support Guidance.**

(1) (U) Use existing theater and component communications systems to provide connectivity and services wherever possible. Maximize use of commercial communications.

(2) (U) Provide concept of communications support brief showing planned communications architecture to USAFRICOM J63, Operations and Plans Division, prior to deployment of communications equipment and personnel. This brief will include proposed communications control, strategic satellite, tactical satellite, SIPR/NIPR network architectures, and any known personnel, equipment, or resource shortfalls.

(3) (U) Submit all satellite access requests/gateway access requests through component channels to USAFRICOM J6 Satellite Communications

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(SATCOM) branch for validation and prioritization. USAFRICOM shared email is (b) (6) @mail.smil.mil.

(4) (U) Submit all frequency requests in standard frequency action format through appropriate component channels to the USAFRICOM J6 Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) for validation, coordination, and assignment. USAFRICOM JFMO shared email addresses are:

- (U) (b) (6) @mail.smil.mil
- (U) (b) (6) @mail.mil

(5) (U) Submit communications security (COMSEC) requests through appropriate component channels. USAFRICOM J6 Theater COMSEC Management Office will validate COMSEC requirements. Shared email address is: (b) (6) @mail.smil.mil.

(6) (U) Report any outages or degradation in accordance with ACI 6000.01A (reference qq). USAFRICOM Network Control Center contact information is DSN (b) (6) VoSIP (b) (6) SLAN/SIPR email: (b) (6) @mail.smil.mil.

THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander, U.S. Africa Command

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Annexes

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Annex EE	Exercises
Annex FF	Counter Threat Finance
Annex GG	Glossary

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