

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



USAFRICOM

Country Campaign Plan

BURKINA FASO

J53 Regional Engagement Division

Current as of: 16 Dec 2022

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

U S A F R I C O M



BURKINA FASO CCP

- Situation
 - Key Actors and Strategic Considerations
 - Partner Overviews
- Mission
- Execution
 - Concept of Operations
 - AFRICOM Ways



Situation – Key Actors and Strategic Considerations

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4c

(b)(1) 1.7e

- U.S. Perspective**
- ~~(CUI)~~ The previous transitional government preferred to partner with the U.S. While the current transitional president, Captain Traore, called the U.S. "a partner," it remains to be seen who the transitional government will turn to for security assistance.
 - ~~(CUI)~~ U.S. legal restrictions on security cooperation and assistance programs with Burkina Faso encapsulated in Sec. 7008 Coup Restrictions will remain in place until Burkina Faso transitions to a democracy (earliest possibility is after announced elections in JUL 24).

Strategic Considerations

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4b, (b)(1) 1.4c

- Assumptions**
- ~~(U)~~ U.S. prohibited from security cooperation and assistance programs under Sec. 7008 coup restrictions until the Burkinabe government returns to democracy.
 - ~~(CUI)~~ (b)(1) 1.7e

Situation – Partner Overview

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Partner Priorities

- ~~(U)~~ Disrupt VEO threats in the north and work with the regional partners to prevent VEO expansion in the region.
- ~~(U)~~ Restore government control to insecure regions
- ~~(U)~~ Provide security space to enable government reforms and a timetable for democratic elections

Partner Role In AOR

- ~~(EU)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.7e~~
- ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~
- ~~(EU)~~ Geographically significant location for military overflight and access to the African continent from Europe, especially to the littorals

Willing and Capable

- ~~(EU)~~ Burkina Faso is a willing and minimally capable partner
 - ~~(CU)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.7e~~
- ~~(EU)~~ Attitude: Currently unknown how the new transitional government views the U.S. compared to other partners. Transitional President Captain Traore did call the U.S. "a partner."
- ~~(EU)~~ Initiative: ~~(b)(1)1.7e~~
- ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~
- ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d~~
- ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4g~~
- ~~(U)~~ Stability: ~~(b)(1)1.7e~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

USAFRICOM



Mission

~~SECRET//REL~~

Mission: USAFRICOM, with partners, counters malign actors and transnational threats, responds to crises, and strengthens security forces in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

CCDR Intent: The purpose and end state of USAFRICOM's campaign is to protect and advance U.S. interests by countering malign actors, maintaining and improving U.S. access and influence, responding effectively to crises and strengthening partners' positions so they become more self-sufficient.

Campaign Objectives (PN relevance)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.7e

Regional Objectives

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• (CUI) (b)(1)1.7e• (CUI) Degrade ability of VEOs to threaten the U.S. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• (CUI) Strengthen partners to adapt and respond to the impacts of climate change and instability• (CUI) Support diplomacy and development to prevent, address, and mitigate conflict |
|---|--|

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

~~SECRET//REL~~








Execution – Concept of Operations

| Country Level Objectives | Country Lines of Activity | Desired End States |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Gain Strategic Access and Influence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Burkina Faso continues to be receptive to access and overflight requests, specifically of ISR/Aircraft ISO JS and JM • (U) Russia and PRC access disrupted <p>Disrupt Regional VEOs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Support allied military operations in Burkina Faso through existing authorities • (U) Illuminate VEO networks for the recovery of KFR AMCITS <p>Support Regional Peace & Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Improve Burkina security forces' capacity to stabilize the country and prevent regional VEO expansion <p>Isolate & Delay PRC/RF/IRN military expansion in the AOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) The Burkina transitional authorities do not turn to Wagner/Russia for security assistance | <p>Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) NVA CT, Juniper Shield and Juniper Micron • (U) SOCAF - Maintain or establish 1x CMSE in BF <p>Exercises</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Flintlock 23 (with DoS approval) <p>Posture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) SOFA (2007) / ACSA (2008) • (U) U.S. SOF: TM Sabre co-located with FRA SOF TF Sabre; TM BFA <p>Security Sector Assistance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Designated sec. 7008 Coup Restrictions (No SSA deliveries or activity) (mil2mil engagements, SPP, some SOF activity allowed through "notwithstanding" authority) <p>Engagements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Oct 22: ACJ5 visit – Transitional President | <p>U.S.-centric End States</p> <p>(U) U.S. has access and overflight where needed</p> <p>(U) Burkina Faso-based VEOs unable to further destabilize the country and region</p> <p>(U) Russia PMC Wagner denied inroads and access in Burkina Faso</p> <p>Partner Roles</p> <p>(U) Burkina security forces:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Prevent VEO activity and expansion • (U) Organize, train, and equip forces <p>(U) Burkina transitional authorities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (U) Adhere to election timeline and transition to democratically-elected government |

Execution – AFRICOM Ways

UNCLASSIFIED

Summary of roles PN military performs from previous slide

| AFRICOM Ways | < 6 months | 6 – 24 months | 2+ Years |
|--|---|---|---|
| Operations  | (b)(1)1.7e | | |
| Exercises  | | | |
| Posture  | | | |
| Security Sector Assistance  | | | |
| Engagement  | | | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exercise Participation: No scheduled activities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FLZ3 (with DoS approval) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FL (with DoS approval or return to democratically-elected gov't) Exercise & assess Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) capability to inform future SSA efforts |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designated sec. 7008 Coup Restrictions (No SSA deliveries or activity) SPP activity (D.C. national guard) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designated sec. 7008 Coup Restrictions (No SSA deliveries or activity) SPP activity (D.C. national guard) Plan and begin to build CDU capability (plan, program, build) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designated sec. 7008 Coup Restrictions (No SSA deliveries or activity) SPP activity (D.C. national guard) |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oct 22: ACIS visit – Transitional President | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider key SLE to facilitate crisis ops (as approved) Jan 23: ACIS & ACDI2 visit – DMI (tentative) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider key SLE to facilitate crisis ops (as approved) |

UNCLASSIFIED

USAFRICOM



Execution – Burkina Faso Activity Tracker

UNCLASSIFIED

| Line of Activity | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | FY27 |
|--|------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Notwithstanding authorities activities IMO: 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3, 3.5, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5 | (b)(1)1.7e | | | | | |
| Special Forces * proposed SSCL when/if return to democratically-elected gov't | | | | | | |
| IMO: 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3, 3.5, 4.1 | | | | | | |
| DHAPP IMO: 1.2, 4.4., 4.5 | (b)(1)1.7e | | | | | |
| Civil Disturbance Unit IMO: 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1 | | | | | | |
| MO: 3.1 | | | | | | |

UNCLASSIFIED

