

1 **UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND 2017 POSTURE STATEMENT**

2 Chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
3 opportunity to update you on the activities and efforts of United States Africa Command to
4 protect and promote U.S. national security interests in Africa. Since I last spoke with the Senate,
5 I have had nine months to examine the opportunities and challenges the U.S. and our partners
6 face in Africa. As expected in an area of responsibility covering fifty-three countries, issues are
7 complex and varied. I am confident we have the right strategic approach to meet these
8 challenges, and our efforts, in coordination with the efforts of our allies and partners, will have a
9 lasting impact on the security and stability of the African continent. It is an honor to lead the
10 efforts of the men and women of United States Africa Command in this dynamic and rapidly
11 changing strategic environment.

12 Africa remains an enduring interest for the U.S., and the fifty-three nations in the Africa
13 Command Area of Responsibility look to the U.S. for assistance but, more importantly, for
14 leadership—leadership that advantages our partners as they turn challenges into opportunities.
15 We can meet our military objectives and advance American interests with a combination of
16 strategic patience, targeted investments, and strong partnership to achieve shared security
17 objectives and maintain our long-term approach which contribute to the conditions for
18 development and good governance to take root. If we focus on working with our African
19 partners on developing local solutions to radicalization, destabilization, and persistent conflict,
20 we will remain the security partner of choice for the next decade, all while upholding our
21 American values. Africa, our allies, the U.S., and, indeed, the world will benefit from our
22 actions to promote stable and effective nation states and defense institutions in Africa.

23 In order to accomplish this goal, the U.S. must remain engaged on the continent,

24 investing in the capability, legitimacy, and accountability of African defense institutions. We
25 must continue to enable African solutions by building partner capacity, instilling
26 professionalism within defense forces, and increasing their respect for the rule of law. When
27 necessary, we must be ready to conduct military operations to protect U.S. interests, counter
28 violent extremist organizations, and enable our partners' efforts to provide security. To protect
29 and promote U.S. national security interests in Africa, diplomacy and development are key
30 efforts, and our partnership with the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International
31 Development (USAID) is key to achieve enduring success. Together, we work to address the
32 root causes of violent extremism, lack of accountable government systems, poor education
33 opportunities, and social and economic deficiencies to achieve long-term, sustainable impact in
34 Africa. More specifically, I want to thank Congress for the authority to support other USG
35 agencies under the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. We now have the flexibility to
36 facilitate a whole of government approach, which is the best opportunity to assist Africa in
37 creating sustainable African solutions. This approach benefits Africans and Americans and
38 mitigates the considerable security risks we currently face.

39 **STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

40 Africa's sustained economic growth, improved social development, and growing
41 entrepreneur class are unlocking the continent's potential for international investment and trade,
42 raising its geostrategic importance to the U.S while also attracting international competition for
43 access, influence, and trade. Africa's continued commitment to democracy, evidenced by the
44 January 2017 actions of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) to uphold the
45 election results in The Gambia, reinforces the strong foundation of shared values and
46 commitment to good governance the U.S. has with its African partners. As the U.S. pursues

47 opportunities for greater partnership with Africa, we must be cognizant of the negative external
48 and internal forces seeking to counter our shared goals and not be constrained by them.

49 Africa links directly to U.S. strategic interests as the continent strives for inclusion in the
50 rules-based international order. Just as the U.S. pursues strategic interests in Africa,
51 international competitors, including China and Russia, are doing the same. Whether with trade,
52 natural resource exploitation, or weapons sales, we continue to see international competitors
53 engage with African partners in a manner contrary to the international norms of transparency and
54 good governance. These competitors weaken our African partners' ability to govern and will
55 ultimately hinder Africa's long-term stability and economic growth, and they will also
56 undermine and diminish U.S. influence—a message we must continue to share with our partners.

57 Parts of Africa remain a battleground between ideologies, interests, and values: equality,
58 prosperity, and peace are often pitted against extremism, oppression, and conflict. The strategic
59 environment includes instability that allows violent extremist organizations to grow and recruit
60 from disenfranchised populations. Currently, the greatest threat to U.S. interests emanating from
61 Africa is violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Furthermore, these VEOs are competing for
62 primacy over other extremist movements in Africa and aspire to incorporate large portions of the
63 continent into their respective ideologies. They build partnerships with regional VEOs; exploit
64 the vulnerability of Africa's youth population; and take advantage of ungoverned and under-
65 governed spaces to target our partners, our allies, and the U.S. Africa's population faces large
66 scale unemployment and disenfranchisement from corrupt governments and abusive security
67 forces, making them prime targets for exploitation by criminal and terrorist organizations across
68 the continent.

69 In addition to the transregional threats of terrorism, Africa is vulnerable to conflict and
70 instability from political, social, economic, and environmental challenges. These forces are
71 driving the current migrant crisis. The migrant flow between Africa and Europe greatly concerns
72 our European allies. Europe views the migrant crisis as its preeminent security and economic
73 issue. The International Monetary Fund estimates the initial cost of direct support to refugee
74 inflow into the EU will average approximately \$16-32B annually. When the secondary costs of
75 migrant integration, border policing, and regional support are added, the cost increases to an
76 additional \$150B annually for the EU. Unfortunately, this crisis will most likely continue in the
77 near future, as many African countries are not able to stem the flow at home.

78 Globally, 15 of the top 25 most fragile countries of the world are in Africa, according to
79 the 2016 Fund for Peace "Fragile State Index." At the root of this fragility is weak governance.
80 While governance is not a core mission of the Department of Defense, we recognize that
81 building professional, legitimate defense institutions is critical to enabling a population-centric
82 approach to governance that prioritizes the security of the population over the security of the
83 regime. Because of this, our work continues to support the efforts of the Department of State
84 and USAID to develop legitimate, rights-respecting security forces and address the root causes of
85 instability.

86 **COMMAND APPROACH**

87 **THEATER STRATEGY** (5 – 20 Years)

88 In order to address the challenges and secure U.S. interests in the Africa, our strategy
89 articulates a long-term, regionally-focused approach for a safe and stable Africa. Specifically,
90 the strategy outlines an Africa in which regional organizations and states are willing and
91 capable partners addressing security challenges, the security of the African population, and

92 U.S. interests in Africa. Although our strategy is regionally focused, many programs and
93 activities are executed bilaterally further stressing the importance of willing and capable
94 partners. Transregional VEOs not only constitute the most direct security threat to the U.S.
95 emanating from Africa but are also the most dangerous threat to stability in East, North, and
96 West Africa. The 2015 National Security Strategy calls on us to work with Congress to train
97 and equip partners in the fight against VEOs, and the United States Africa Command Area of
98 Responsibility one theater in that broader fight. However, training and equipping African
99 partners for the tactical fight is insufficient to achieve long-term stability. U.S. and
100 international assistance must build our African partners' ability to direct, manage, sustain, and
101 operate their own defense sectors over time. Capable and sustainable defense institutions are
102 critical in providing a secure environment for the deepening of democracy and broad-based
103 development, which together can diminish some of the factors that attract vulnerable persons
104 into violent extremism and criminality.

105 Our approach assumes the continuation of limited available resources, both financial
106 and personnel, to accomplish U.S. objectives. Thus, Africa Command will continue to operate
107 with security force assistance as the decisive effort of our strategy. However, any reduction to
108 our already optimized (but limited) resources would impact Africa Command's ability to
109 support the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy objectives.

110 THEATER POSTURE

111 Our command approach is driven by a light, adaptable footprint enabling joint
112 operations, protection of U.S. personnel and facilities, crisis response, and security
113 cooperation. We continue to maintain one forward operating site on the continent, Camp
114 Lemonnier, Djibouti, home of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Africa Command's

115 lead for East Africa efforts. This base is essential to U.S. efforts in East Africa and the
116 Arabian Peninsula. Camp Lemonnier serves as a hub for multiple operations and security
117 cooperation activities, assuring access in the region, freedom of movement through the Gulf of
118 Aden, and protecting U.S. interests. The importance of our forward operating site was evident
119 during the execution, the past summer, of OPERATION OAKEN STEEL, the reinforcement
120 of the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan, to ensure the protection of embassy personnel
121 during the conflict between rival factions. For this operation, U.S. forces based out of Camp
122 Lemonnier, as well as Moron, Spain, deployed to our cooperative security location in Entebbe,
123 Uganda, which provided an effective staging location for rapid crisis response.

124 As part of the 2017 Theater Posture Plan, Africa Command closed five contingency
125 locations and designated seven new contingency locations on the continent due to shifting
126 requirements and identified gaps in our ability to counter threats and support ongoing
127 operations. These contingency locations strive to provide the necessary access in crucial areas
128 aligned with the Theater Campaign Plan.

129 THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN (2 – 5 Years)

130 Africa Command's Theater Campaign Plan seeks to disrupt and neutralize
131 transnational threats by building African partner defense capability and capacity, as
132 directed in the 2015 National Security Strategy, in order to promote regional security,
133 stability, and prosperity, while always protecting U.S. personnel and facilities and the
134 United States' access on the continent. This approach balances efforts to strengthen
135 defense institutions and conduct counterterrorism operations with African partners and
136 international allies, such as France and the UK, in order to disrupt, degrade, and
137 eventually defeat extremists. Additionally, Africa Command conducts assessments to

138 measure the effectiveness of our security cooperation activities to ensure our Theater
139 Campaign Plan is achieving the desired results.

140 Africa Command is currently operating along five Lines of Efforts (LOE) 1) Neutralize
141 al-Shabaab and transition the security responsibilities of the African Union Mission in Somalia
142 (AMISOM) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS); 2) Degrade violent extremist
143 organizations in the Sahel Maghreb and contain instability in Libya; 3) Contain and degrade
144 Boko Haram; 4) Interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa with willing
145 and capable African partners; and 5) Build peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
146 response capacity of African partners.

147 LOE 1: NEUTRALIZE AL-SHABAAB AND TRANSITION AMISOM TO THE FGS

148 In 2015, AMISOM recaptured significant territory from al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda's pre-
149 eminent affiliate in East Africa. In 2016 after Ethiopian forces, operating independently from
150 AMISOM, withdrew from Somalia, al-Shabaab regained some territory, and, today, the group
151 continues to conduct attacks on AMISOM forces, the FGS, and the Somali National Security
152 Forces (SNSF). We have also seen followers of ISIS begin to make in-roads into Somalia,
153 which will further test AMISOM forces and the FGS. Sustained conflict and prolonged food
154 insecurity have driven approximately one million refugees out of Somalia and into neighboring
155 countries, like Kenya, who struggle with overflowing refugee settlements. Current and
156 anticipated drought conditions have led to poor harvests and increased food insecurity
157 throughout East Africa that has increased the risk of famine in Somalia. Large scale refugee
158 migrations can destabilize regions already stressed to meet the basic needs of its own
159 populations.

160 Ten years of operations in Somalia have left AMISOM troop contributing countries

161 fatigued. Somalia is dependent on AMISOM forces to provide security and conduct counter-
162 terror operations. AMISOM is scheduled to begin withdrawing in 2018, and if this departure
163 begins prior to Somalia having capable security forces, large portions of Somalia are at risk of
164 returning to al-Shabaab control or potentially allowing ISIS to gain a stronger foothold in the
165 country.

166 Africa Command supports our partners' efforts to neutralize al-Shabaab and other
167 violent extremist organizations operating in Somalia and supports the transfer of security
168 responsibilities from AMISOM to the SNSF once conditions allow. Africa Command and the
169 Department of State, working with a substantial international security assistance effort well-
170 coordinated by the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General, operates through the
171 venue of the Security Six (UN, European Union, U.S., UK, Turkey, and the United Arab
172 Emirates). This international effort aims to demonstrate sufficient progress in building the
173 SNSF in 2017 to justify an extension of AMISOM beyond 2019. Central to the U.S. approach
174 in Somalia is our partnership with the FGS. Working with the Department of State, we are
175 encouraging the FGS to come to an inclusive agreement on its security architecture in order to
176 build a sustainable SNSF that accounts for regional dynamics and continue to reach out to the
177 regional and local governments of Somalia.

178 Africa Command continues to support the counter-terrorism efforts, assist AMISOM
179 troop contributing countries, assist in equipping and training the SNSF, enable international
180 partners in their training efforts, and protect U.S. personnel in Somalia and the region. Our
181 advise, assist, and accompany efforts, paired with our deliberate targeting of top-level al-
182 Shabaab leadership, have had a significant impact in degrading al-Shabaab's effectiveness in
183 East Africa, but those two efforts are not enduring solutions to Somalia's problems.

184 With the inauguration of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed in
185 February 2017, Somalia has seen its first-ever peaceful transition of power and first non-
186 transitional government since 2006. President Farmajo’s platform promotes good governance
187 and anti-corruption, and he has indicated further opening the door for increased coordination
188 with the United States and the international community. His widespread popularity within
189 Somalia suggests he has a personal interest in helping push the country towards one-person one-
190 vote elections in 2020.

191 While we continue to work with the Security Six partners to coordinate our efforts in
192 support of the SNSF, our support to AMISOM troop contributing countries is constrained by
193 the use of security cooperation funding and associated processes designed to train and equip
194 forces over the long term rather than to support current operations. The new Chapter 16
195 authorities in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act provide the needed funding
196 flexibility—multi-year monies and up to five years sustainment monies—to further the
197 progress of degrading and ultimately defeating al-Shabaab while protecting U.S. interests in
198 East Africa. Africa Command is working with OSD and Congress to accelerate the
199 notification and approval timelines to better tailor our training and equipping efforts with our
200 AMISOM and Somalia partners.

201 LOE 2: DEGRADE VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SAHEL
202 MAGHREB AND CONTAIN INSTABILITY IN LIBYA

203 The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant, near-term threat to
204 U.S. and allies’ interests on the continent. The multiple militias and fractured relationship
205 between factions in east and west Libya exacerbate the security situation, spilling into Tunisia
206 and Egypt and the broader Maghreb, allowing the movement of foreign fighters, enabling the

207 flow of migrants out of Libya to Europe and elsewhere. Africa Command is working to ensure
208 U.S. interests are protected and to enable our African partners to contain instability originating in
209 Libya, counter violent extremist organizations in the Sahel-Maghreb, and develop the requisite
210 defense institutions to maintain security in the region.

211 Stability in Libya is a long-term proposition requiring strategic patience as the Libyan
212 Government of National Accord (GNA) forms and develops. We must maintain pressure on the
213 ISIS-Libya network concurrently with Libya's efforts to progress with political reconciliation.
214 This is a significant challenge given Libya's absorption capacity for international support
215 remains limited, as is our ability to influence political reconciliation between competing
216 factions, particularly between the GNA and the House of Representatives. We must carefully
217 choose where and with whom we work with to counter ISIS-Libya in order not to shift the
218 balance between factions and risk sparking greater conflict in Libya.

219 *Degrade ISIS-Libya Network*

220 Our operations in Libya support the global coalition's efforts to defeat ISIS-Libya.
221 OPERATION ODDYSEY LIGHTNING (OOL) enabled GNA-aligned forces to successfully
222 liberate the city of Sirte from ISIS control. However, even with the success of Sirte, ISIS-Libya
223 remains a regional threat with intent to target U.S. persons and interests. We will continue to
224 support Libyan partners and an international coalition to defeat ISIS-Libya and build the capacity
225 of the region while limiting civilian casualties. OOL can serve as a model for future U.S.
226 operations in the region by improving the battlefield capabilities and ethics of a partnered force,
227 working on the partner's timeline without following planning-mandated timelines, remaining
228 flexible to keep an international force together and most importantly, limiting civilian casualties.
229

230 *Support the Government of National Accord (GNA)*

231 Despite its success in Sirte, the GNA continues to struggle with controlling Tripoli,
232 providing basic services, and exercising authority over security forces. The political situation in
233 Libya remains extremely dynamic, and the GNA faces a host of political, economic, and security
234 challenges. We continue to support the diplomatic, stabilization, and development activities of
235 the U.S. Interagency. We must also continue to promote development of responsive and
236 effective governance and ensure the rights of all Libyans are respected. These are foundational
237 to long-term regional security. Additionally, the House of Representatives (HoR)—and their
238 military arm, the Libyan National Army (LNA)—must play a constructive role in the
239 development of a unified, functioning Libyan government. While we recognize Libya’s struggle
240 for a unified government remains uncertain and may not materialize within the foreseeable
241 future, a national security structure solution accommodating the HoR and LNA provides a path
242 forward.

243 In an effort to counter regional instability, Africa Command supports partners like
244 Tunisia, a Major Non-NATO Ally. Africa Command is assisting the Tunisian military to
245 develop and sustain Special Forces, border security capabilities and Tunisia’s intelligence
246 capability. Working with the intelligence community and our component commands, Africa
247 Command is training Tunisian intelligence organizations through train, advise, and assist
248 mentors. Our efforts include helping Tunisia to establish an intelligence school, an intelligence
249 fusion center, and the development of a professional intelligence career field within the Ministry
250 of Defense. This model demonstrates an effective means of building initial counterterrorism
251 intelligence capacity, and then transitioning to sustainable intelligence capacity building within a
252 partner’s intelligence organizations, all focused on unit vice individual development. We also

253 work with Tunisia to develop and enhance its rotary wing capabilities. Through foreign military
254 sales and excess defense articles programs, Tunisia has procured eight UH-60M Blackhawks and
255 24 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters. Tunisia expects the Blackhawks to function as a
256 multirole aircraft providing casualty evacuation, troop transport, and air assault capabilities, and
257 the Kiowas to provide much needed reconnaissance, precision strike, and close air support
258 capabilities. With the assistance of ongoing US-provided air-to-ground integration training,
259 these helicopters, added to the Tunisian operational inventory, sustained in part by the
260 Department of State's Foreign Military Financing will provide better speed and response time
261 during crises and a major boost to the modernization and capabilities of the Tunisian Armed
262 Forces to conduct counterterrorism and border security operations in Tunisia.

263 *Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)*

264 Along with the threat posed by ISIS, AQIM remains a significant threat to U.S. interests
265 and the security of our African partners. AQIM in Mali continues to exploit ethnic resentments
266 in central Mali and spread their influence rendering large areas of the country ungovernable.
267 With Operation BARKHANE, France continues to lead the fight to counter violent extremists
268 throughout the Sahel region. However, Mali's path toward greater stability and security remains
269 unclear. The government, ex-rebel armed groups, and pro-government militias have
270 demonstrated little political will to implement the peace accord signed in June 2015 and continue
271 to commit human rights violations against civilians. The framework of political reforms and
272 security measures, though imperfect, are the only existing solution for Mali to emerge, without
273 further bloodshed, from the crisis that began in 2012.

274 We continue to support France's counterterrorism operations in Mali against al-Qaeda
275 affiliate groups and seek to increase our synchronization and coordination with their efforts.

276 Continued airlift and logistical support is essential to France's efforts, and we must continue to
277 provide this support if progress is to happen in this volatile region. Additionally, with the
278 Department of State, we continue to support the troop contributing countries to the UN
279 Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which currently provides some
280 measure of security in northern Mali. We continue to look for opportunities to take a more
281 active role in defeating AQIM and supporting the accountable, inclusive governance that is key
282 to durability and protecting our interests throughout the regions.

283 LOE 3: CONTAIN AND DEGRADE BOKO HARAM AND ISIS-WEST AFRICA

284 A primary focus for Africa Command in West Africa is containing and degrading Boko
285 Haram and its offshoot since last year, ISIS-West Africa. Since 2010, Boko Haram has carried
286 out attacks against civilians and directly targeted partner regional governments and military
287 forces in the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad). Africa Command works
288 with our Lake Chad Basin partners to expand partner capacity and capabilities to support
289 regional cooperation and expand our African partner capacity and capabilities to ensure Boko
290 Haram and ISIS-West Africa does not threaten partner, allied, or U.S. interests and do not
291 destabilize the region.

292 The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), an African-inspired and African-led
293 initiative that includes Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, provides a critically
294 important venue for planning and coordinating security operations and for linking intelligence to
295 these operations. As a result, the MNJTF and its member states have considerable successes in
296 enabling multinational cooperation and coordinating multinational operations, and have placed
297 significant pressure on Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Thanks to this pressure, Boko Haram
298 and ISIS-West Africa are less able to inflict mass casualties than in the past, and they control

309 only a fraction of the territory they occupied in 2014 and early 2015. Nonetheless, through the
300 continuing threat of asymmetric attacks, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa sustain a reign of
301 terror across much of Northeastern Nigeria and the border areas of the neighboring Lake Chad
302 Basin countries, thus preventing millions of displaced persons from returning to their homes.

303 The advent of ISIS-West Africa adds a new dimension to the insecurity of the Lake Chad
304 Basin. This group, with official ties to ISIS, operates in a more disciplined fashion than Boko
305 Haram; by avoiding attacks against Sunni Muslims and by forging relations with the local
306 population, ISIS-West Africa could take deeper root in the Lake Chad Basin region, thus making
307 it a greater threat to our partners. Although determined to defeat Boko Haram and ISIS-West
308 Africa and return stability to the region, the MNJTF faces significant challenges in maintaining
309 pressure on Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa while simultaneously addressing competing
310 individual security requirements in the face of individual financial constraints.

311 Africa Command, while not engaged in direct military operations, supports the efforts
312 of our Lake Chad Basin partners to counter Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa by providing
313 advisors, intelligence, training and equipment to complement other U.S.-provided equipment
314 and logistical support. The P3 (France, U.K., U.S.) Cellule de Coordination et de Liaison
315 (Coordination and Liaison Cell – CCL) coordinates international support to the MNJTF and its
316 member states to ensure that such support is complementary and effective. This past
317 December, the U.S. assumed 6-month rotational leadership of the CCL for the first time, and
318 we are taking full advantage of this opportunity to strengthen P3 support for the MNJTF and its
319 member states.

320 Africa Command provides security force assistance directly to regional military
321 partners in order to enable operations and build institutional capacity over the long term. For

322 example, in 2016, we provided Niger two ISR-equipped Cessnas to enhance Niger's capacity
323 to collect ISR to support its efforts to fight terrorism. This added capacity has had an important
324 impact in bolstering Niger's ability to fight the terrorists. In 2017 we intend to provide Chad
325 and Cameroon each with two ISR-capable Cessnas. Additionally, in Chad, we are working to
326 strengthen border reconnaissance forces with training and equipment to bolster its intelligence,
327 surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Cameroon likewise is a major recipient of
328 U.S. security assistance via train and equip programs. In FY16 and FY17, the U.S. invested
329 over \$123M to expand Cameroonian ISR, command and control, and counter-terrorism force
330 and logistics capabilities.

331 While regional partners have assisted in slowing the progress of Boko Haram and ISIS-
332 West Africa, long-term success requires Nigeria to address development, governance, and
333 economic deficiencies exacerbated by the humanitarian emergency, which serve as drivers of
334 violent extremism in northeastern Nigeria and throughout the Lake Chad Basin region. Under
335 the current Government of Nigeria's leadership, Nigeria is making progress but must still
336 overcome systemic corruption and build the trust of civilian populations, including by protecting
337 human rights abuses and holding accountable those who are responsible for abuses. Nigeria's
338 success in addressing these governance and development issues is key to an enduring solution in
339 the Lake Chad Basin.

340 Despite gains made against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, nearly 2 million people
341 remain displaced from their homes in Nigeria, and over 400,000 others are displaced in Niger,
342 Chad, and Cameroon. Moreover, the international humanitarian community has identified
343 famine conditions throughout the areas of hostility in northeast Nigeria, and continued violence
344 in these areas prevents responders from delivering life-saving assistance, prolonging a man-made

345 food crisis. Refugees and internally displaced persons mostly reside informally in makeshift
346 camps or mixed in with host communities, which are themselves under great stress to meet basic
347 needs and are vulnerable to exploitation. The large numbers flowing into receiving
348 communities—some already stressed to meet basic food and security needs—may have a
349 destabilizing effect on these communities. Africa Command continues to coordinate with the
350 Department of State and USAID, who work closely with the United Nations and non-
351 governmental organizations to alleviate suffering, implement reintegration programs, and
352 promote stability in the region.

353 LOE 4: INTERDICT ILLICIT ACTIVITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AND CENTRAL
354 AFRICA WITH WILLING AND CAPABLE AFRICAN PARTNERS

355 Africa Command also supports our African partners, international partners, and
356 Interagency partners to interdict and counter illicit actors and their activities in Central Africa
357 and the Gulf of Guinea. Our priority effort is to build the institutional capacity of our African
358 partners to address the many forms of illicit activity that threaten their security and regional
359 stability. This mission requires a whole of government approach, and we work closely with the
360 Department of State, Department of Treasury/FBI, and components of the Department of
361 Homeland Security to synchronize our approach and complement each other's efforts. These
362 efforts are enhanced by having the Interagency embedded within Africa Command, a benefit to
363 our mission.

364 ***Countering the Lord's Resistance Army***

365 In Central Africa, led by the efforts of Special Operations Command – Africa, we have
366 focused on working with the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) to counter the
367 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), one of the many illicit actors operating in the region. Uganda,

368 the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan have
369 contributed forces to the AU-RTF, which has led military efforts to reduce the LRA's safe
370 havens, capture key leaders, and promote defections. With advice and assistance from U.S.
371 forces, the AU-RTF has been largely successful.

372 Through the combined efforts of military forces, civilian agencies, and non-governmental
373 organizations, the LRA is not a threat to central governments and populations centers, but
374 reduced to areas of ungoverned spaces. Today, although the group's leader, Joseph Kony,
375 remains at large, we estimate fewer than 150 Lord's Resistance Army fighters remain, and
376 communities are better prepared to protect themselves.

377 *Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea*

378 Despite decreased U.S. reliance on African oil imports over the past three years, the
379 resource-rich Gulf of Guinea region remains a strategic interest to the U.S. due to its role in the
380 global oil market, its strategic location close to a major maritime trade route, the more than
381 74,000 American citizens in the area, and its exploitation as a transit point for illicit trafficking
382 from the Americas to Europe. In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime security sector assistance
383 consists of long-term efforts to build the capacity of African partners to achieve combined
384 maritime law enforcement operations between the partners. Africa Command strongly
385 supports the implementation of the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct through regional strategic
386 zone agreements. The agreements promote shared law enforcement responsibility against
387 piracy and armed robbery at sea; trafficking of drugs, arms, and persons; and illegal,
388 underreported, and unregulated fishing. Cross-water boundary tracking and interdiction
389 missions have been widely successful, and we look forward to working with our partners in the
390 region to expand the capability in the coming years.

391 In 2017, the Gulf of Guinea Commission will meet to finalize the Code of Conduct,
392 converting the document into a binding agreement providing a valuable mechanism to build
393 accountable governance, strengthen port and vessel security, and improve transparency.
394 Furthering the building of maritime capacity, Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK regularly
395 participate in regional maritime exercises and operations. Africa Command's efforts, led by
396 U.S. Naval Forces Africa, target assistance and capacity building through the African
397 Partnership Station, EXERCISE OBANGAME EXPRESS, and the Africa Maritime Law
398 Enforcement Partnership Program.

399 LOE 5: BUILD PEACEKEEPING, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DISASTER
400 RESPONSE CAPACITY OF AFRICAN PARTNERS

401 Africa Command supports U.S. governmental efforts that enable African partners across
402 the African continent to support disaster response and peace operations within their region or
403 throughout Africa. Through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), our implementing
404 partner, we build our partner's capacity to secure pathogens of security concern and improve
405 partners' capabilities to respond to the deliberate or accidental release of materials of concern
406 and to support civilian-led responses to infectious diseases. The Africa Partner Outbreak
407 Response promotes effective military-civilian partnerships in the health and security
408 communities and leverages best practices among African partners. Africa Command's support
409 to this initiative maintains health security and mitigates the risks of another epidemic emanating
410 from the continent.

411 Another important implementing partner to Africa Command's crisis and disaster
412 response efforts is the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP and their
413 African partners have improved disaster management competency and readiness to support

414 civilian-led efforts. Currently, SPP has established partnerships with thirteen African nations to
415 advance Africa Command and partner objectives. Africa Command continues to see the value of
416 the National Guard's continuous engagement and fully support SPP's efforts.

417 Additional programs building the capacity of our African partners are the Global Peace
418 Operations Initiative (GPOI), the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP)
419 and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) programs. In partnership with the Department of
420 State, GPOI is working to strengthen international capacity and capabilities to execute UN and
421 regional peacekeeping operations. Though it is a global program, the preponderance of GPOI
422 work is on the African continent, with 22 active African partner countries. Through GPOI, we
423 aim to build sustainable, self-sufficient peace operations proficiencies in almost half of the
424 countries in Africa to deploy and operate in UN and regional peace operations. We are also
425 working collaboratively with U.S. and international stakeholders to improve the operational
426 effectiveness of these missions. APRRP supplements the work we do through GPOI, enabling a
427 deeper investment in six of the most capable African peacekeeping contributing countries to
428 build their capacity to rapidly respond to emerging crises on the continent. Through APRRP, we
429 are developing key enabling capabilities such as aviation; medical; engineering; logistics;
430 command, control, communications, and information systems; and formed police units. GPOI
431 and APRRP do not only help us to build the peacekeeping capabilities of partners in Africa (both
432 for long-term sustainment or expansion of current contributions and for rapid response to
433 emerging crises), but they also help to professionalize militaries through our training and
434 equipping support, enhance defense institutions through their capacity building approach, and
435 deepen our mil-mil partnerships.

436 Africa Command recognizes for capacity building efforts to be effective, they need to

437 align with Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) objectives. We do this by integrating a gender
438 perspective into our military activities through two main efforts: 1) staff training and awareness,
439 and 2) integration into the Theater Campaign Plan. For training and awareness, Africa
440 Command hosts the Gender in Military Operations program, which solicits perspectives from
441 African partners on gender issues within their military and during operations. For campaign
442 planning, we integrate WPS concepts into peacekeeping capacity building, mil-to-mil
443 engagements; training on human rights, rule of law, gender-based violence; and peacekeeping
444 exercises. WPS works to professionalize our partners' militaries and build their effectiveness to
445 meet security challenges.

446 Africa Command's primary engagement with Southern Africa is also through this line of
447 effort. Along with being the most stable region in Africa, the region fields some of the most
448 professional and capable military forces on the continent. For example, at the August 2016
449 Southern Africa Regional Leaders Seminar, topics such as climate change, environmental issues,
450 uncontrolled migration, and health and disease capacity building were discussed, which speaks to
451 Southern Africa's capacity to address advanced, global security issues. In the past year, South
452 Africa, Zambia, and Malawi have contributed to United Nations peacekeeping operations in
453 Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
454 Furthermore, Malawi will host the upcoming Africa Land Forces Summit and Exercise AFRICA
455 ENDEAVOR, and South Africa is hosting Exercise SHARED ACCORD to further develop its
456 capacity to support peacekeeping operations. We are complementing Department of State efforts
457 to train and deploy peacekeepers with development of the defense institutions necessary to
458 promote sustained regional stability over time. Africa Command will also continue to develop
459 the capacity of Southern African troop contributors to the UN Missions in the Central African

460 Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan.

461 Our efforts, and those of the Department of State to build sustainable and self-sufficient
462 peace operations capacity, to include rapid response capabilities, sustainable force generation
463 and training institutions, and modest improvements to strategic mobility, enable our partners
464 across East, North, West, Central, and Southern Africa to lead the response to the threats, man-
465 made or natural, facing their regions.

466 **IMPLEMENTING OUR APPROACH**

467 *Synchronization with Partners*

468 Africa Command relies on our strong international, Interagency, and multinational
469 relationships to achieve our objectives. Africa Command works with international partners to
470 synchronize operations and security force assistance on the continent. Fourteen of our
471 international partners are represented at Africa Command, co-located in our Multi-National
472 Coordination Cell (MNCC). One particularly powerful enabler is the Regionally Aligned
473 Forces (RAF) concept (managed via U.S. Army Africa), which allows for relatively easy access
474 to unassigned forces. The RAF executes a significant share of the Theater Security Cooperation
475 activities in Africa, contributing meaningfully to mission success. Additionally, the U.S. leads
476 and participates in multilateral planning groups for East Africa, North Africa, the Sahel
477 Maghreb, and Naval Forces Africa recently concluded flag-level staff talks with its French
478 service component counterpart to synchronize our combined strategic approach in the Gulf of
479 Guinea. In East Africa, we are synchronizing security force assistance to AMISOM troop
480 contributing countries and the SNSF. In North Africa, international partners are positioned to
481 support international planning in support of stabilization efforts in Libya as conditions allow. In
482 the Sahel Maghreb, we have begun to coordinate activities and do multilateral planning in

483 support to the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin and operations in Mali.

484 Also important to Africa Command's efforts are the diplomatic and development efforts
485 of our Interagency partners, Department of State and USAID. Over the past three years, we
486 have established an annual Africa Strategic Dialogue and Africa Strategic Integration
487 Conference to coordinate and integrate our activities with the Department of State and USAID,
488 working hand in hand to build the capacity of our partners and strengthen African defense
489 institutions. In partnership with the Department of State, the Security Governance Initiative
490 (SGI) builds the capacity of civilian and defense institutions who provide oversight to the
491 security sector. With the six SGI partners (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia), we
492 support efforts to strengthen governance across the security sector. These long-term SGI
493 efforts will improve the effectiveness and sustainability of U.S. security assistance investments
494 and activities.

495 Also essential to our mission is our relationship with other combatant commands. We
496 coordinate with European Command for shared response forces. We rely heavily on our
497 European allies such as Spain, Italy, and Greece for force projection out of southern Europe.
498 Without these relationships, we could not execute our missions on the continent. We also
499 coordinate with Central Command for shared response forces as well as Egypt and Arabian
500 Peninsula equities. Lastly, we coordinate with Special Operations Command (through Special
501 Operations Command – Africa) for counter-terrorism strategy and operations. An example of
502 our cooperation with other combatant commands, both OPERATION ODYSSEY LIGHTNING
503 and OPERATION OAKEN STEEL required assets outside of Africa Command's assigned
504 forces for extended periods of time, and this close cooperation helped achieve mission success
505 in an efficient manner.

506 ***Security Force Assistance Resources***

507 Our recent success in building the capacity and defense institutions of our African
508 partners was only possible with funding provided by Congress through the Counter-Terrorism
509 Partnership Fund (CTPF) and other programs. This funding, and the authorities provided to
510 build the capacity of foreign security forces, has been essential to our success in enabling
511 African partners and enhancing their capability to counter extremist organization within their
512 borders and in support of collective regional efforts. Africa Command appreciates the
513 flexibility provided by Congress with the new Section 333 authority. We will continue to
514 prioritize crucial airlift, ISR, command and control systems, sustainment, and force structure
515 development of our African partners. We will ensure our investments in African defense
516 institutions continue to directly support U.S. national interests.

517 Programs such as the before-mentioned Security Governance Initiative and Counter-
518 Terrorism Partnership Fund provide us the ability to work with our partners to strengthen their
519 institutions. Institutions fashioned in accordance with the rule of law, protecting African
520 citizens, and providing inclusive opportunities. Sustaining our efforts at current if not
521 increased level of priority will ultimately determine if building partner capacity succeeds and if
522 our African partners can improve security environments and progress toward good governance.

523 ***Capability Constraints***

524 Africa's security environment is dynamic and complex requiring innovative solutions.
525 Even with limited resources or capabilities, Africa Command leans forward, working with
526 partners and allies, to execute its mission and mitigate risk. While the command has been able
527 to succeed in multiple efforts, our mission is impacted by inconsistent resourcing of key
528 requirements and capabilities. These constraints risk our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines,

529 Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians executing activities on the African continent. For example,
530 only approximately 20-30% of Africa Command's ISR requirements are met. This limits
531 situational understanding, support to operations, and fails to offer threat indications and
532 warnings. For personnel recovery, Africa Command relies heavily on contract Search and
533 Rescue assets due to lack of dedicated assets to support operations. Furthermore, African
534 partners lack the capability and capacity to assist with personnel recovery missions.
535 Integrating personnel recovery and surgical stabilization/medical sustainment capabilities are a
536 moral obligation and essential for the proper care of U.S. service members who risk their lives
537 to protect our nation. Africa lacks a theater distribution network to support our forces. This
538 issue manifests itself most significantly in West Africa where we have approximately 1,000
539 personnel conducting 12 named operations across a nine nation region. This capability gap
540 forces our personnel to revert to costly and ineffective ad hoc solutions. An effective hub and
541 spoke distribution system would consolidate cargo, replace multiple commercial contracts, and
542 eliminate the use of heavy military cargo planes and deliver an efficient low volume/low
543 frequency sustainment solution. In OPERATION ODYSSEY LIGHTNING (OOL), the U.S.
544 military effort to support the Libyan government against the ISIS, incorporating Afloat
545 Forward Staging Base and amphibious ship capability into operational planning added to the
546 successful execution of the mission. Currently, Africa Command has an unfilled requirement
547 to maintain this capability, which would serve to fill critical personnel recovery and casualty
548 evacuation shortfalls. Additionally, this amphibious capability, during OOL, supported
549 maritime-based ISR operations, and Africa Command could further exploit this capability to
550 support additional operations against regional threats.

551 Our capability constraints are most profound in our support to the Department of

552 State-led mission to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. Flexible posture through our
553 cooperative security locations and contingency locations, complemented by the highly-valued
554 Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response at Moron Air Base, Spain
555 the U.S. Special Operations Force-led Crisis Response Force in Baumholder, Germany and
556 the East Africa Response Force in Djibouti, provide response options during crises.
557 However, the tyranny of distance posed by the continent challenges that responsiveness, and
558 we knowingly accept risk for operations. To mitigate this risk, finalizing the development of
559 key cooperative security locations through Defense Cooperation Agreements with host
560 nations, coupled with accurate indications and warnings from increased ISR and the ability to
561 recover and evacuate our personnel, will ensure swift crisis response to all our embassy
562 locations in Africa.

563 LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

564 Moving forward, United States Africa Command continues execute its mission on the
565 African continent. We continue to focus our decisive effort on building African partner
566 capacity—and supporting African solutions to African problems. We continue to work closely
567 with international and Interagency partners to make small, wise investments which pay huge
568 dividends in building stable and effective governments—the foundation for long-term security in
569 Africa. I am confident that with your support, Africa Command will protect and promote U.S.
570 interests and keep the U.S. safe from threats emanating from Africa. Thank you for your
571 continued support to our mission and to the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast
572 Guardsmen, civilians, contractors, and families of the United States Africa Command.